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mercredi 3 décembre 2014

Thirimont: Jan 1945.


Prélude.

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Pour ceux qui ne connaissent pas Thirimont (Waimes) il suffit de cliquer sur lien suivant et de déplacer "le petit bonhomme Street View" vers le croisement avec la "rue de la Paix": on se trouve juste en face de la chapelle Notre-Dame de Fatima remplaçant l'ancienne chapelle Saint-Gangulphe.

La bataille des Ardennes est le nom donné à l'ensemble des opérations militaires qui se sont déroulées sur le plateau de Bastogne en Belgique et dans le nord du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg pendant l'hiver 1944-1945. 

La bataille commence le 16 décembre 1944 par une attaque surprise allemande, à laquelle on a donné le nom d'« Offensive von Rundstedt ». 

Chapelle Saint-Gangolf avant l'offensive des Ardennes
En ce mois de janvier 1945, les conditions atmosphériques sont épouvantables. Dans les Ardennes, il y a beaucoup de neige et la température est tellement basse qu'il faut faire tourner régulièrement tous les moteurs pour que l'huile ne gèle pas. C'est dans ces conditions que démarre le 3 janvier la contre-attaque de Montgomery. En fait, il s'agit de l'attaque du VIIe corps US du général Collins qui a été relevé sur ses positions par le XXXe Corps britannique. Elle démarre de la région de Hotton en direction de Houffalize.
Panther, Hotton, Jan.45
Elle est appuyée sur sa droite, à partir du 6 janvier, par des unités britanniques (division galloise et la 6e division aéroportée). La jonction avec la contre-attaque de Patton qui a commencé 12 jours plus tôt est prévue dans la région d'Houffalize. Les opérations sont lentes car les journées sont courtes et les Allemands se sont bien retranchés derrière des canons antichars et de nombreux champs de mines. 
La jonction a lieu le 16 janvier. À la même date, le XXXe Corps britannique retourne vers le front de Hollande. Le 17 janvier, la 1re armée US est replacée sous le commandement de Bradley mais la 9e reste sous celui de Montgomery.Le Commandement suprême allemand (OKW) ordonne le repli car, après trois mois d'arrêt, les Soviétiques ont repris l'offensive. Constatant l'échec définitif de cette offensive, Hitler rentre en train à Berlin le 15 janvier8

Le 24 janvier, Saint-Vith est repris et le 30, les Allemands sont rejetés au-delà de leur ligne de départ.



« SCRAP » BOOK reprint.

THIRIMONT BATTLE VITAL IN REDUCING BULGE, 30th (« Old Hickory » Div.) 

Seizes Villages in Hot Fights by W. C. Heinz, North American Newspaper Alliance.

THIRIMONT, Belgium, Jan. 17



The cows, thin and hungry, are wandering around alone amid the rubble in the lonely white streets and the GI's are in the cellars. The Americans have taken a key piece of ground here, and some of these who did it were sitting around, next to the while porcelain kitchen range, talking. There used to be about a hundred houses in this place. The Americans wouldn't give 10 cents for it except that it lies on a ridge commanding two miles of ground beyond, and that is why some of Adolf Hitler's best paratroopers fought 48 hours here to keep the Thirtieth (Old Hickory) division out. "Eighteen to 25 years old," a colonel said, "and in excellent physical shape. Any of our men will tell you that these Krauts were as tough as any we ever fought." The Colonel is Lieut. Col, Ellis Williamson of Raleigh, N. C. who used to teach high school music and who now commands the First Battalion of the 120th Infantry. Its executive officer is Major Chris McCullough of Fayetteville, N. C., who has a bright red handle-bar mustache." Excellent marksmen," the Major said " this is the first time we've ever fought real good German marksmen, and their officers are staying up in line, for a change, too. While the Colonel and the Major were talking, Robert Scarpello, private first-class from 35-28 99th Street, Corona, L. I., was cooking some beans in can on the stove. A cow was bleating somewhere outside and a Heinie mortar came crumping in. " I can't hear very well today," the colonel said, when somebody said something about mortars." I got pretty close to one yesterday. Couldn't hear a damn thing this morning, but it's getting better now." There were many things that made this a tough deal for the Americans here. There was the snow, the open ground with the Heinies looking down, and there was this fact that the Germans had the only road zeroed in." Every damn one of our radios froze", the Colonel said, "so we had to depend on runners for our communications. We couldn't even bring a jeep up, so that meant that we had to hand-carry everything we needed." The Major said that one tank which tried to get through a piece of swampy ground that for some reason had not frozen, was mired up to its gun." But worst of all were the houses," the Colonel said. "I never saw a town like this before. The town is sprawled all over the ridge. Between the houses there is open ground, sometimes 50 yards, sometimes 500 yards." Each house was self-supporting," the Colonel said. "It was mighty. rugged, covering that open ground." What the Colonel meant was that when the Americans attacked one house, they were under fire from another.  Sometimes they were under attack from two or three. For 24 hours the Americans held ten houses, and no more. Twice the Germans threw fresh troops and tanks into counter-attacks, and then the infantry in the 10 houses and the artillery behind them stopped the Germans for good." That was where you call for artillery support," the Major said. " They averaged 200 rounds a minute for 30 minutes, and you've got to consider the buildup, which means at the hottest our guys were throwing up to 400 rounds a minute at the peak." Outside another long Heinie mortar came crumping in.  It was close enough to rattle, muffled, but distinct through the house." That"s what we call non-habit forming," the Major said." The more you get, the less you want, if you know what I mean."



Panther

La 1re SS Pz Div qui dispose de 164 chars dont 45 « Tigre royal » et 38 « Panther ». Sa colonne principale est commandée par le jeune lieutenant-colonel SS Peiper (29 ans). Il ne devait pas initialement passer par Thirimont comme le montre la carte suivante mais il y passe sans "dommages" pour le village.

Il arrive donc à Thirimont et tente de passer par le "Ru des Fagnes" mais embourbe ses deux chars de pointe et finalement se détourne via Baugnez afin d'atteindre Ligneuville. Au carrefour de Baugnez, il rencontre une unité d'observation d'artillerie U.S. et le drame que tout le monde connait s'y produit.
   
   L'offensive allemande échoue quelques jours plus tard. 
Une retraite des unités allemandes vers St-VITH et vers le WESTWALL, férocement protégée par des unités du 3e Fallschirm-Jäger occupant la position dominante des Hauts-Sarts, déchaine l'Enfer sur Thirimont

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    Une grande partie du village est détruite entre le 13 et le 18 janvier 1945.  

    Plusieurs bataillons allemands s'affrontent à de nombreux bataillons U.S. avec l'appui d'artillerie et de plusieurs dizaines de chars. Une grande partie du village n'est plus que ruines fin janvier.       La plupart des hommes du village sont absents car enrôlés de force dans la Wehrmacht

     Les plus "chanceux" seront fait prisonniers un peu partout en Europe ou en Russie (certains le sont déjà en janvier 45) et ne rentreront que beaucoup plus tard.    
    Ils seront confrontés à de grandes difficultés pour se réinsérer vu le peu de compréhension dont fit preuve la Belgique par rapport à l'annexion dont ils avaient été victimes.    
    D' autres, disparus ou décédés, ne reverront jamais Thirimont.      

   Les fermes détruites, le matériel agricole complètement inutilisable, les animaux tués et les hommes-murs absents, prisonniers, morts ou disparus: tel fut le sort de beaucoup de familles du village et, plus généralement, des familles vivant dans les Cantons de l'Est (que certains appellent toujours aujourd'hui "Les Cantons rédimés").    

    Les femmes, les vieillards et les adolescents ayant survécus à cette "aventure", durent faire "tourner" les ménages en espérant revoir au plus tôt  rentrer leurs fils, leurs pères ou leurs époux.
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LINK
 La destruction de Thirimont (Waimes) se passe entre le 13 et le 16 janvier 1945.





Ce texte est extrait de "SAINT-VITH autour de l'ultime Blitzkrieg de Hitler", de Maurice Delaval, Editions J.A.C. Vielsalm (épuisé). J'y ai ajouté pas mal d'informations,  photos, cartes hasso v manteufelainsi que les liens.

Samedi, 13 janvier 1945


D'après le professeur Percy Ernst Schramm, (qui a tenu le journal de guerre de l'OKW)

Nouveaux transferts de Divisions, le 13 janvier, tant d'Ouest en Est, que de Norvège vers le front occidental. En réalité, on faisait un trou pour en boucher un autre !
Ces renforts, n'arrivant que par régiments, n'eurent qu'un effet très limité sur la situation générale.
Dans le secteur du XVIII Airborne Corps, en prélude à la reprise de Saint-Vith, on avait décidé une attaque coordonnée qui débuterait le 13 janvier et menacerait d'encerclement les Allemands dans l'angle formé par la confluence de l'Amblève et de la Salm.
la 30th Infantry Division, dont les positions se trouvaient à quelque cinq kilomètres au nord de l'Amblève, dans les environs de Malmédy, pousserait en direction du sud, tandis que la 75th Infantry Division traverserait la Salm pour se lancer vers l'est. 
Le 424th Regimental Combat Team et le 517th Parachute Infantry Regiment fixeraient l'adversaire au sommet de l'angle, afin qu'il ne se replie pas trop vite.

D'après History of the 120th Infantry Regiment.

Une double poussée avait été prévue pour le samedi 13. 
Sur la gauche, le 2nd Battalion partirait de Waimes pour prendre possession de Thirimont et des Hauts-Sarts (autre hauteur située au sud de la localité), tandis que le 3rd Battalion avancerait des environs de Malmédy et s'emparerait de Houyire, au sud de Baugnez
Sitôt ces objectifs atteints, le 1st Battalion devrait libérer Ligneuville

Un Fallschirmjäger Bataillon était solidement retranché dans Thirimont et sur les Hauts-Sarts, que les Allemands considéraient à juste titre comme la position clef de la région. 
Ces « parachutistes », disposant d'un sérieux appui d'artillerie et de mortiers, s'y cramponnèrent avec ténacité.
Un véritable déluge de feu s'abattit sur les deux premières compagnies durant leur exténuante progression dans la haute neige, les stoppant irrémédiablement. 
Tard dans l'avant-midi, une troisième (la Company G) du lieutenant Moncrieff arriva dans la partie sud de la localité en faisant une cinquantaine de prisonniers. 

Peu après, une contre-attaque suicidaire tenta de la déloger, mais fut refoulée au cours d'un engagement qui ressembla plus à un massacre qu'à une escarmouche. 
A à la grenade, à l'arme blanche, on se battait de chambre en chambre dans ce petit coin « abandonné de Dieu » !

Vers midi, le commandant du régiment alerta le 1st Battalion, mais l'infanterie et les mortiers ne permirent pas l'arrivée des renforts, ni par le nord, ni par le sud. Les combats se poursuivirent jusqu'à la nuit, flambées d'héroïsme trop peu connue, pour la plupart.

Même alors, le lieutenant Moncrieff ne demanda pas l'autorisation de décrocher ; c'est le colonel qui, devant l'impossibilité de renforcer cette compagnie — sauf au prix de pertes excessives — ordonna le repli. A ce moment, une autre compagnie de panzers et de nombreux fantassins attaquèrent une fois de plus, sous le grésillement des fusées éclairantes, la G Company avait perdu plus de cent hommes.

Le général Leland S. Hobbs était au poste de commandement du 3rd Battalion quand on ramena le lieutenant, blessé. Il l'interrogea avant que les infirmiers ne puissent lui donner les premiers soins.

Le 3rd Battalion devait s'emparer de la colline de Houyire, qu'occupait le 293.Volksgrenadierregiment
Pendant qu'une compagnie partirait du carrefour de Baugnez, une autre se faufilerait entre Gérômont et Hédômont, tandis que la mission d'une troisième serait de nettoyer Gérômont et de liquider les poches de résistance momentanément négligées par les deux autres (cette compagnie de réserve allait faire pencher la balance en faveur des assaillants et atteindre la première le sommet). 
Quand les hommes de la troisième compagnie se comptèrent après la prise de Houyire, leur force ne représentait plus qu'un bon peloton. 

Une fois de plus, une cohorte décimée, épuisée, mais confiante, avait finalement submergé le système de défense tenu par les vestiges d'une unité démoralisée. Il était 15 h.00.

En continuant sur leur «lancée » à travers la futaie, ils allaient arriver à la lisière et apercevoir Ligneuville en contrebas.

Hotel des Ardennes , Ligneuville.

D'après Robert L. Hewitt.

La 30th Infantry Division devait progresser au nord de l'Amblève, sur un front de six kilomètres où le terrain était un adversaire bien plus redoutable encore que les effectifs frigorifiés, démoralisés, couverts de poux et de gale du 293. Volksgrenadierregiment, responsable de ce secteur ; car il y avait des mines à profusion, dont la plupart avaient été déposées par la 1. SS Panzerdivision avant que tombe la neige. 
Dès lors, elles se trouvaient prises dans une gangue de glace qui empêchait les détecteurs de les repérer ; aussi, n'explosaient-elles que quand plusieurs véhicules avaient finalement brisé cette chape. 
Durant les trois premiers jours, quinze chars furent ainsi neutralisés.
Hédômont résista durant toute la journée aux assauts du 119th Infantry Regiment et ne tomba qu'après une nouvelle attaque, lancée à 23 h.30.

Sur le flanc droit de la 30th Infantry Division, pour la nuit, un autre bataillon réoccupa Bellevaux.

D'après le général Herbert T. Perrin, successeur du général Alan W. Jones.
Peiper King Panther, Stavelot.

«Depuis la veille, notre 424th Infantry Regiment avait comme coéquipier le 517th Parachute Infantry Regiment, n'appartenant aucune Division. Unité étonnante, unique en son genre ! 
Nous avons vite appris, à nos dépens, que ces parachutistes s'appropriaient tout ce qui n'était pas solidement rivé au sol ; que, dans leurs attaques, ils fonçaient, négligeant, avec désinvolture, toute poche de résistance et qu'ils se souciaient des champs de mines comme un poisson d'une pomme, au grand dam du Signal Corps, tout particulièrement, qui devait installer et maintenir en état les liaisons téléphoniques.

Près de Stavelot, un pont flottant avait été lancé sur l'Amblève pendant la nuit. 
Dès 4 h.30, un bataillon traversa. Une compagnie s'empara de la cote 572 (connue sous le nom de Hautes Fanges) ; une autre prit... perdit... reprit Butay, tandis qu'une troisième s'était emparée de Lusnié dès 7 h.30.
Malgré les tourmentes de neige, l'adversaire n'avait pas baissé sa garde quand le 424th Infantry Regiment progressa à travers un terrain particulièrement accidenté, où de profonds ravins alternaient avec des crêtes arides et escarpées, si propices à l'installation de positions retranchées apparemment inexpugnables. Il est impossible de faire le récit des opérations de cette journée, il y aurait trop de faits d'armes d'une rare vaillance à signaler. La fiction ferait bien pâle figure devant la réalité.
Le 3rd Battalion devait atteindre Henumont par Wanneranval, d'une part, par La Barainne, d'autre part. Mais la localité était fortement défendue et il fut stoppé à un millier de yards par une intense concentration d'artillerie et d'armes automatiques et les fantassins creusèrent des tranchées. Le colonel Reid fit appel aux howitzers, qui, toute la nuit, déversèrent sur Henumont  et ses environs « tout, sauf le matériel de cuisine ».
Quand au 1st Battalion, il s'empara pour midi de Lavaux, en route vers Coulée, l'objectif principal de la journée. Pour y arriver, il devait passer sur la crête au sud des Neuf Prés, non loin de la Faix du Diable. Il y fut cloué au sol par le feu nourri de quelques panzers et de l'artillerie. Les pertes furent sérieuses : plus de deux cent cinquante tués et blessés. Parmi eux, le commandant du bataillon, ainsi que plusieurs officiers de son état-major. Le lieutenant S-2 Huddleson fut amputé des pieds lors de l'explosion d'un obus. Remarquant que l'infirmier ne s'occupait pas en priorité du jeune lieutenant, qui semblait cependant le plus gravement atteint, le colonel en demanda la raison : « J'ai essayé », répondit le médecin, « mais il n'a pas voulu ». En clopinant, le colonel rejoignit son S-2 et essaya de le raisonner. « Non, non, colonel, pas question avant que tous les autres n'aient reçu les premiers soins. D'ailleurs, je me sens très bien. Comment se déroulent les combats ? Ne pensez-vous pas que vous devriez aller voir ce qui se passe là-bas ? » Tard dans la nuit, on s'occupa du lieutenant Huddleson, qui était encore conscient. Il mourut durant son transport à travers bois, vers Aisomont.
Sous le couvert de l'obscurité, le bataillon rajusta ses positions et se retrancha sur la crête des Neuf Parcs.
Le colonel Alexander D. Reid avait eu l'intention d'installer son poste de com-mandement régimentaire à Aisomont, où se trouvait, en réserve, le 2nd Battalion. Mais le major-médecin avait protesté avec véhémence : « Dans ce hameau que les obus ont écrasé, il ne subsiste qu'une pièce, une seule, où on est à l'abri des intempéries. Evidemment, il vous est loisible de vous la réserver, vous êtes le commandant du régiment, mais, si vous le faites, sachez que vous condamnez les blessés à une mort certaine par le froid ! Je tiens absolument à dégager ma responsabilité ! » — « OK, major », répondit le colonel, installez-y votre poste de secours ' et il alla établir son command post à un mile à l'est de Trois-Ponts, dans des ruines.»


L'indulgence des généraux Hodges et Ridgway envers cette 75th Infantry Division, qui avait reçu le baptême du feu la veille de Noël seulement faisait place à une profonde déception. Une progression plus rapide en direction de Saint-Vith aurait menacé d'encerclement les unités allemandes retranchées dans l'angle formé par l'Amblève et la Salm à leur confluence.

Le bilan de ce 13 janvier ne devait pas apporter un soulagement à leurs appréhensions ; en effet, tout ce qu'il y eut à signaler ce jour-là se résumait facilement :
1. le terrain perdu la veille à l'ouest d'Ennal par les deux pelotons avait été reconquis ;
2. nombreuses patrouilles.


A 8h., un bataillon de la 84th Infantry Division, qu'épaulaient quelques chars de la 2nd Armored Division, quittait Les Tailles, se dirigeant vers le sud-ouest. Deux heures plus tard, après s'être emparé du petit hameau des Collas, il partait vers le Petit Bois. Alors, commencèrent les difficultés ; la neige, qui tombait depuis dix jours, estompait tellement les chemins de campagne que, parfois, on ne les devinait même plus. Vers midi, en outre, la résistance allemande se durcit considérablement. Pour le soir, la progression dans les bois n'atteignait pas mille yards (18Km).
Cette alternance, défiant toute prédiction, de percées par à-coups et de haltes exaspérantes provoquait, successivement, exaltation et découragement.
347th Infantry Regiment of the 87th Infantry Division get a meal after getting winter boots near Berismenil - 13 January 1945

Sur le flanc droit, le premier objectif était une croupe à environ quinze cents yards au nord de Berismenil : pour 11 h., c'était chose faite. A 14h., on apprenait qu'il était indispensable et urgent de s'emparer d'un autre coteau, à sept cent cinquante yards au nord-est. James W. Johnston, commandant de bataillon, devait alors dire d'un air morose : «Chaque fois que j'aperçois un sommet, je pressens que ce sera notre prochaine mission !
Pour 18 h., cette deuxième colline était conquise : la résistance avait été faible. Néanmoins, dans l'obscurité, la situation était fort confuse, des éclaireurs avaient été attaqués à revers. Durant la nuit, une autre patrouille avait été envoyée pour en savoir davantage sur la configuration du front, mais elle ne devait pas rentrer. Alors, le major Ronald L. Kolb décida de partir en reconnaissance avec quelques volontaires. Peu après, ils entendaient s'arrêter un véhicule. Deux Allemands en descendirent et commencèrent à escalader le raidillon pierreux. Quand ils furent suffisamment près, les Américains bondirent des halliers. Un des prisonniers était commandant de bataillon au 60.Panzergrenadier Regiment (appartenant à la 116. Panzerdivision), le Hauptmann Hans Gottfried von Watzdorf. Ignorant que ses lignes avaient été percées jusqu'à une profondeur de plus de mille yards, il effectuait une tournée d'inspection. “I am astonished!” , s'exclama-t-il en un anglais impeccable. La réalité historique égale parfois en invraisemblance, la fiction.
Berismenil allait être capturé presque sans opposition par un autre bataillon d'infanterie, qui (ce fut une surprise complète pour les défenseurs) s'était faufilé à travers bois, donc sans le soutien des blindés, dont l'action était presque toujours complémentaire et indissociable.

Dimanche, 14 janvier.


D’après le général Carl Wagener.

Quand le Haut Commandement allemand se rendit compte que Bastogne (malgré toutes les Divisions qui avaient été amenées trop tard aux alentours) ne pourrait être prise, alors, et alors seulement, il autorisa le repli, à la condition de créer un front cohérent, par une défense à outrance, de façon à clouer sur place davantage encore nos adversaires et les empêcher de percer à n'importe quel endroit. Une seule maille lâchée aurait pu dénouer toute la trame. Notre défense a plié, mais elle ne se rendit nulle part : à aucun endroit, nous n'avons été estoqués. Malgré les pertes exorbitantes aux environs de Bastogne, il a encore été possible de se replier sans interférence majeure de l'assaillant. « Prix incalculable des secondes tombant dans le sablier. »

La retraite s'effectua dans des conditions invraisemblables : la neige et le verglas, le relief accidenté occasionnèrent des pertes sérieuses en véhicules et en équipement, de telle manière que quand nous sommes arrivés au Westwall nous n'étions plus que de faibles groupes de combat. Néanmoins, répétons-le, jusqu'au dernier repli, le commandant allemand imposa le rythme et il fut possible, conformément aux ordres, de retirer les unités SS.

D'après le colonel Charles B. MacDonald

Pour les commandants allemands, la retraite allait être un véritable casse-tête : 
Comment retirer rapidement les enfants-chéris-du-Führer alors que la pénurie d'essence était un problème angoissant ? 
Alors que les embouteillages à hauteur des ponts sur l'Our seraient de vrais cauchemars
Alors que, les réserves ayant été raclées jusqu'à l'os, il faudrait résister aux attaques américaines avec des troupes démoralisées par l'effondrement du plan grandiose et, qui plus est, sentaient monter en elles la colère de se savoir sacrifiées ? 
Alors que d'un jour à l'autre les Jabo ( “Jagdbomber flugzeug”nom donné par les Allemands aux chasseurs-bombardiers américains) pourraient fondre comme des faucons sur les colonnes en déroute ?

Robert L. Hewitt et les officiers qui ont édité History of the 120th Infantry Regiment 

Relatent en détail le tourbillon des combats qui ont permis, le troisième jour, la conquête définitive de Thirimont. Bornons-nous à signaler quelques faits qui démontrent l'âpreté de ces combats, préludes indirects à la reprise de Saint-Vith.

Le colonel Purdue apprit, six mois plus tard, d'un commandant allemand, que la cote 551(Hauts-Sarts)  n'était que faiblement tenue, mais, aussitôt que la colonne américaine avait été repérée (et on voyait à des lieues), un bataillon y avait été envoyé avec comme consigne vaincre ou mourir. Quand, après avoir titubé dans une neige épaisse, sur cette pente s'élevant de quarante-cinq pieds tous les cents yards, le premier peloton arriva en vue du sommet le bataillon avait eu tout le temps de s'y retrancher solidement, ce qui explique que les pertes se soient accumulées à une allure vertigineuse.
Fallschrmjäger on Kingtiger, Dec.44

A Thirimont, après une échauffourée qui dura plus de trois heures, le sergent Francis S. Currey, ainsi que les soldats Adam Lucero et Raymond W. Gould, mirent fin aux ravages de quarante-deux Fallschirmjäger solidement retranchés dans une ferme. « Dépassant le devoir », ils n'avaient pas hésité à traverser, absolument à découvert, une pâture large d'environ deux cents mètres pour atteindre une grange attenante. Puis, à la mitraillette, au fusil et à la grenade, ils avaient réussi à « convaincre » les Allemands de se réfugier au premier étage. Ensuite, ils entassèrent du foin au rez-de-chaussée et y mirent le feu. 
Peu après, les Allemands s'enfuirent en toussant, abandonnant dans le brasier et leurs morts, et leurs blessés. Le sergent et Adam Lucero en sortirent sans la moindre égratignure. Quant au troisième casse-cou, il avait été fauché, dans le début de l'action, alors qu'il tentait de pénétrer par une fenêtre.
Tôt dans l'après-midi, une première contre-attaque fut lancée par une trentaine de fantassins que soutenait un panzer. A la tombée du jour, deuxième tentative : tout un bataillon de Fallschirmjäger et une compagnie de canons d'assaut. Malgré le tir des howitzers, l'adversaire continua à avancer et progressa jusqu'à une cinquantaine de mètres des positions américaines avant d'être définitivement stoppé (quatre des canons furent détruits). Deux heures plus tard, deux compagnies d'infanterie et cinq canons furent neutralisés par un torrent d'obus.
Le 117th Infantry Regiment arriva dans l'après-midi à Ligneuville et liquida deux compagnies de réserve de la 3. Fallschirmjäger Division et un ramassis de petites unités désorganisées. Pour 18 h. 35, une solide tête de pont était installée de l'autre côté de la rivière. Une nouvelle contre-attaque fut repoussée aux environs de 19 h. 30.

D'après History of the 67th Armored Regiment

Sur la grand-route en direction de Houffalize, les Allemands tentaient avec l'énergie du désespoir de maintenir ouvert un corridor permettant aux derniers éléments de s'échapper. Le 3rd Battalion se heurta à des canons d'assaut que protégeaient de solides obstructions, ainsi que d'importants champs de mines. Finalement, les blindés, les mortiers et l'artillerie, appelés à la rescousse, réussirent à réduire au silence toutes les bouches à feu de l'adversaire. Le génie entreprit alors d'enlever les mines et de démolir les puissants roadblocks.
Après avoir lentement progressé durant la nuit, le 1st Battalion était arrivé devant un ruisseau. L'adversaire ouvrit le feu, tuant plusieurs fantassins. N'ayant pas repéré un endroit guéable dans les parages immédiats, le commandant laissa deux chars légers et l'infanterie, afin de fixer l'adversaire, puis rebroussa chemin avec les autres blindés, à la recherche d'une petite route permettant de rejoindre la force de gauche. Arrivant au nord-ouest de Wilogne et de Dinez, la D Company s'empara d'une
 colline surplombant les deux villages et d'où les tanks allaient tenir sous leur coupe des forces adverses. Entre-temps , l'infanterie et les deux chars légers avaient réussi à découvrir un gué, après avoir tué ou blessé la majorité des Allemands retranchés derrière le ruisseau, renversant complètement la situation en prenant à revers les dernières troupes de couverture, lesquelles se replièrent vers les deux bourgades où la plupart devaient être capturées.

Lundi, 15 janvier.



Pour étayer une défense vulnérable, chancelante, Dietrich, « dont les ressources intellectuelles étaient dépassées par la complexité de cette manoeuvre », réengagea de l'artillerie du 1.SS Panzerkorps ainsi que de petits contingents de ses SS Panzerdivisionen. Il s'exposait, ce faisant, à la colère de Hitler... mais, pour lui, comment éviter que la résistance ne soit jugulée ?

D'après le général Clift Andrus, Commandant de la lst Infantry Division (interview du 15 octobre 1964, Arlington, Virginia)

« Les progrès du XVIII et du VII Corps étant suffisamment appréciables, le V Corps pouvait désormais passer à l'attaque des éléments lui faisant face : les 246., 277., 89. Volksgrenadier Divisionen, ainsi que la 3. Fallschirmjäger Division, que soutenaient quatorze bataillons d'artillerie et près de quarante canons automoteurs.
A ma 1st Infantry Division et à un régiment de la 2nd Infantry Division revint le périlleux honneur de partir à l'assaut du défilé d'Ondenval (par où la 7th Armored Division se lancerait pour reprendre la région de Saint-Vith), tandis que les autres unités du V Corps augmenteraient nombre et l'importance des patrouilles.
Les premiers objectifs étaient Faymonville et Schoppen.
La progression fut pénible : avec de la neige jusqu'à la taille, après trois cents yards, il fallait s'arrêter pour reprendre haleine; en outre, les mines étaient si profondément enfouies que les détecteurs ne les décelaient pas toujours. Seul avantage : nos adversaires n'avaient pas cru que nous les attaquerions dans des conditions tellement défavorables, ainsi que devaient l'avouer des prisonniers : ' Nous savions bien que les Américains étaient fous, mais jamais à ce point ! '
Mes hommes s'emparèrent de Faymonville et du Klingersberg (à mi-distance entre Butgenbach et Schoppen). »
US Vehicles near Butgenbach 1945.


D'après le Général Walter M. Robertson, Commandant de la 2nd Infantry Division

«Pour s'assurer du défilé OndenvaI-Iveldingen, le 23rd Regimental Combat Team devait, préalablement, déloger les Allemands des bourgades de Steinbach et de Remonval, ainsi que du «Carrefour 68».
Après d'inénarrables combats, parfois au corps à corps, à 2 h. 40 c'était chose faite et cent trente Fallschrimjâger avaient été capturés. L'inoubliable vedette de la journée fut, incontestablement, le capitaine John M. Stephens, Jr., officier hors du commun, qui allait réellement atteindre une dimension épique. Ses exploits qui lui ont fait mériter la Distinguished Service Cross sont relatés, sans verser dans les fadaises de l'hagiographie, dans Combat History of the Second Infantry Division. »

D'après History of the 120th Infantry Regiment

A l'arrière: la chapelle St Gangolf. A Gauche la Maison Servais

Le 15 janvier marque l'apogée infernale des combats pour Thirimont. 

De part et d'autre on attaque ; les Allemands d'abord : tout un bataillon d'infanterie, qu'appuyait un bataillon entier de canons d'assaut. Durant la nuit des Sherman et des tank destroyers avaient finalement pu arriver. « Sans eux », ont dit les hommes du 120th Infantry Regiment, «il est probable que le village n'aurait jamais été capturé. » Lentement, très lentement, le 1st Battalion a progressé dans cette véritable forteresse que constituaient ces fermes aux murs épais, espacées les unes des autres de cinquante à cent yards ; de leurs fenêtres étroites, des armes automatiques avaient décimé les pelotons, les jours précédents. 
Pour 13 h. 30, le village était libéré.

A gauche: la chapelle. Au milieu: la Maison Servais. A droite: La Maison H. Henkes.
Maison Servais

Sur les Hauts Sarts, la lutte forcenée dura plus longtemps. 

Dans l'après-midi, seuls de légers progrès avaient été obtenus, mais à quel prix : une compagnie n'avait plus que soixante-trois hommes et elle en perdit encore quatorze en essayant de traverser un champ. 
Le 3rd Battalion ne comptait plus que cent cinquante hommes.

Lieutenant Edward W. Hunn, qui reçu ce qu'il croyait être une blessure superficielle, à peine une éraflure dans le dos, avait continué à combattre avec obstination. 
Quelques instants avant l'attaque finale, il s'était effondré. On découvrit plus tard qu'une balle avait ricoché sur une côte et s'était arrêtée contre le cœur ; elle était en bois, expédient que les Allemands allaient utiliser désormais dans les combats rapprochés et qui trahissait les difficultés insurmontables de leur industrie.
Le lieutenant Glyn L. Persons fut sérieusement blessé alors qu'il traversait un champ à la tête de sa compagnie. Son radio-opérateur fut tué à ses côtés par un éclat du même obus. Il ordonna à ses hommes de se replier, mais exigea de n'être secouru qu'après la chute du jour.

A hauteur des deux autres régiments de la 30th Infantry Division, de part et d'autre, l'artillerie martelait les positions adverses, inlassablement.
A Ligneuville, six panzers et un bataillon d'infanterie contre-attaquèrent les Américains installés sur la rive sud de l'Amblève, alors qu'une quinzaine de Grenadiers tentaient de saboter le pont. Cette patrouille fut rapidement encerclée et les howitzers refoulèrent les assaillants, les coordonnées leur étant fournies par un observateur d'artillerie, le sergent Rondeau, depuis une maison momentanément réoccupée.

Malgré une défense féroce, par endroits, la désintégration du front se poursuivit : après avoir capturé Pont, un bataillon continua sur sa lancée en direction de Recht. A Francheville, des Sherman qui soutenaient des fantassins traversèrent le village en tiraillant puis chassèrent les Allemands d'une tanière installée à mille yards plus au sud, à Beaumont; ce qui restait du 294.Volksgrenadier Regiment et plusieurs canons d'assaut résistèrent opiniâtrement, mais en vain.
Le 517th Parachute Infantry Regiment, après avoir piaffé, rué, fonça à travers le bois de Reuland (à quelque deux kilomètres au sud-est de Logbiermé) et arriva aux abords de Poteau.

D'après R. Ernest Dupuy.

Tandis que deux compagnies attaquaient la colline à l'est d'Ennal, une autre, celle du lieutenant Edward F. Marcinkovski, poussait directement vers le village, emmailloté dans la neige et le brouillard. Coup sur coup, deux patrouilles furent refoulées : il semblait que chaque maison était pourvue d'innombrables meurtrières, par lesquelles s'échappait un feu extrêmement précis ; puis des obus se mirent à pilonner cette compagnie auprès de laquelle le colonel Alexander D. Reid et le général Herbert T. Perin étaient venus respirer l'odeur de la poudre. '
Afin de lancer une attaque en tenaille, le général scinda la compagnie en deux groupes. Il conduisit lui-même l'assaut final : la Distinguished Service Cross devait lui être décernée (alors que le colonel gagnait la Purple Heart : il avait été blessé aux jambes).
Le commandant du XVIII Airborne Corps téléphona personnellement : Vous avez retiré une épine de notre flanc '.
S'il avait gagné une D.S.C., le général Perrin avait en revanche perdu son revolver en trébuchant dans les gravats ou en marchant à quatre pattes sous les poutres écroulées alors qu'il pourchassait les Allemands.
Les deux autres compagnies s'étaient emparées de la crête appelée R'mester.
Dans le même sous-secteur, les poussées dans les bois de Mont-le-Soie, commencées durant l'après-midi, furent abandonnées pour effectuer des rajustements locaux.

D'après The 75th Infantry Division in Combat

1st Army GIs search for German paratroopers during the Battle of the Bulge, December 1944.(Baraque Michel: Chapelle Fischbach)
Le secteur de la division s'étendait de La Neuville jusqu'à peu près Provedroux. Lui faisaient face, les 326. et 62.Volksgrenadier Division. Des positions défensives avaient été fort habilement préparées : à Hourt, de vrais petits bunkers en rondins recouverts d'une bonne épaisseur de terre, camouflés avec de la neige, abritaient plusieurs hommes disposant d'armes automatiques ; à Vielsalm, ainsi qu'à Salm-château, toutes les caves des maisons dont la façade postérieure donnait sur la Salm avaient été transformées en redoutes inexpugnables durant la journée.
Volksgrenadierdivision in mid-January 1945
Aux environs de Grand-Halleux, après quelques centaines de yards, les GI furent cloués au sol. Seule exception, à 11 h., une compagnie réussit à prendre possession de cette haute falaise, appelée Rocher de Hourt, sans pouvoir progresser au-delà.

Du colonel Douglas B. Smith, Commanding Officer du 289th Infantry Regiment , interviewé en 1965 à Sarasota
Par une étroite passerelle, un de mes bataillons, le 2nd, commença la traversée de la Salm à 3 h. 30. A 6 h. 14 exactement, le dernier homme de la dernière escouade prenait pied sur l'autre rive. Pas la moindre opposition, seulement des fusées éclairantes accrochées à des parachutes. Le bataillon se dirigea vers Bèche, où ses premiers éléments arrivèrent à 8 h.50. Une résistance fanatique, qui dura jusqu'à 15 h., nous fit perdre une cinquantaine d'hommes, tués ou blessés. Quatre-vingts Allemands furent capturés. »


« Le 15 janvier fut, doublement, un jour de chance insolente. Mon casque fut traversé, de part en part, par un éclat d'obus qui ne m'érafla même pas, alors que deux copains étaient blessés. Ensuite, une permission de trois jours à Paris me fut accordée.
En dépit d'une sérieuse résistance, le reste de mon régiment s'empara, finalement, de Salmchâteau : il était 19 h. 50. La 83rd Infantry Division nous fit parvenir une bien mauvaise nouvelle : quarante-cinq panzers se trouvaient à deux miles au sud de Bèche. »


Delenda Carthago, avait maintes fois répété Caton l'Ancien. Le général Rose et ses principaux subordonnés devaient dire de même pour le verrou de Cherain.

Le lieutenant Glen M. Alford partit avec huit blindés. La mission débuta sous d'heureux auspices : la colonne venait à peine de s'ébranler qu'un Mark IV fut détruit ; peu après, le lieutenant Sheldon C. Picard observa une longue file de pièces d'artillerie et c'est avec succès qu'il dirigea le feu sur elles. Hélas ! la fortune des armes est versatile. Le tank de tête heurta une mine et fut immobilisé. Puis, deux chars furent atteints par un feu croisé imparable. Successivement, ceux du lieutenant Picard et d'un sergent subirent le même sort. Alors, le sergent Maurice L. Humphries prit le commandement des trois encore indemmes et continua à avancer, sous un tir d'interdiction qui venait de partout à la fois. 
Panzer IV: inside.



Un obus perforant traversa le blindé d'Octaviono Carrion ; du métal en fusion éclaboussa le visage d'un équipier. Le sergent Humphries aperçut un Mark V ; son canonnier, le caporal Leslie Underwood, tira, coup sur coup, cinq projectiles sur le Panther, qui riposta : un obus traversa la tourelle et un autre atteignit la direction : il ne restait qu'à évacuer au plus vite. En rebroussant chemin, à pied, le sergent vit le Sherman de Bill Burton à l'arrêt, écoutille ouverte ; ainsi, donc, le huitième tank était, lui aussi, hors de combat.

Le tir allemand augmenta encore son tempo. Les mortiers et les mitrailleuses s'associèrent au vacarme. Puis, arriva l'infanterie en feldgrau. Les tankistes, pour la plupart, réussirent à regagner les lignes américaines, mais pas les blessés. Le caporal Leslie Underwood, qui s'était attaqué au Mark V, fit le mort. Il ne bougea pas quand un obus de mortier tomba si près de lui que sa canadienne en roussit. Pas davantage quand un soldat le saisit par le col, le secoua, Kaput! estima-t-il en s'éloignant ; ni non plus quand un autre lui décocha un vigoureux coup de pied dans les côtes. Quatre heures plus tard, après le coucher du soleil, il se mit péniblement en route. Trois autres l'imitèrent. Ils eurent à traverser un ruisseau recouvert de glace, laquelle, en se brisant attira l'attention d'une sentinelle, qui vida tout un chargeur de mitraillette dans la direction d'où venait le bruit. De retour au poste de commandement, ils firent sécher leur uniforme devant un feu qui crépitait joyeusement, en attendant d'être évacués vers un poste de secours.

Pour les autres, de nouveaux tanks arrivèrent le lendemain et une autre mission leur fut donnée.
Le temps s'étant éclairci, l'artillerie et surtout l'aviation firent des ravages dans les colonnes au nord-est et à l'est de Houffalize. Dans le secteur de la 3rd Armored Division, l'opposition restait opiniâtre et les progrès y furent maigres. Si l'on excepte Vaux qui tomba après trente heures de combats féroces, aucun des objectifs du 15 janvier ne fut atteint.
Perspective peu encourageante pour le lendemain : une colonne arriva à Sterpigny pour y renforcer la garnison.

D'après Theodore Draper.

L'infanterie, les chars et l'artillerie allaient travailler, le 15 janvier, d'une manière tout à fait harmonieuse et rendre Houffalize absolument intenable.


Après avoir quitté Dinez à 11 h., l'infanterie progressa à gauche de la grand-route, afin de se protéger des tirs de l'artillerie, des canons automoteurs, de deux panzers et des mortiers qui tentaient désespérément de s'opposer à la progression des chars, qui, à 14 h. 15, réussirent finalement à faire sauter le solide verrou installé au carrefour à hauteur de Fontenaille. Pendant que les chars démineurs s'empressaient de déblayer la chaussée et ses bas-côtés des chausse-trapes et des mines, les fantassins (qui s'étaient emparés de Mont) anéantissaient la petite garnison piégée dans Fontenaille ; à 16 h., ils se dirigèrent vers Taverneux et expulsèrent des Grenadiers qui y étaient retranchés.

Ayant repris leur avance sans plus rencontrer d'autre opposition que celle de l'artillerie, blindés et infanterie arrivaient à 17 h. 30 sur la cote 430 qui surplombe Houffalize et s'y installaient.
Quand survint la nuit, les hommes du VII Corps purent voir vers le sud, comme des éclairs, les lueurs de l'artillerie de la Third Army et les obus qui rayaient le ciel noir. Des patrouilles étaient impatientes de pousser dans cette direction pour mettre fin à la séparation entre la First United States Army et celle de George S. Patton. « La Fortune avait accordé un ultime sursis à ceux qu'elle avait comblés jusqu'alors. »

Non loin de là, le caporal Arthur O. Beyer, canonnier du 603rd Tank Destroyer Battalion, venait de sauter de son véhicule pour capturer deux soldats allemands quand une mitrailleuse ouvrit le feu sur lui. Follement intrépide, il se précipita vers elle et la neutralisa à la grenade, puis une seconde et, sur sa lancée, il continua le long chapelet de tranchées, qu'il attaqua successivement. Ainsi, absolument seul, il fit mordre la poussière à huit Allemands et en captura dix-huit. La Medal of Honor lui fut décernée.

1- Entrez dans NAME: Bakken et lire les infos qui suivent. 

2- Si vous entrez dans UNIT: 120/I et dans CASUALTIES: 1945 vous découvrirez d’autres morts du 120th Infantry Regiment début 1945.

Mardi, 16 janvier.

Infantrymen of Co. B, 120th IR, carry a wounded German soldier to an aid station on a litter sled in
Thirimont, Belgium after bitter fighting during the St. Vith counteroffensive.  Jan. 16th, 1945

L'armée allemande à l'agonie sut se battre avec furie, jusqu'à ce qu'elle tombe morte ! Ceci est un hommage que l'on se doit de rendre à cette race productrice d'admirables guerriers.


Comment parler du froid qui brûle les doigts quand ils touchent le métal, enraye les armes automatiques, condense et gèle la vapeur de la respiration sur les diaphragmes des microphones et empêche
U.S.ARMY SCR-536
les radios de fonctionner ? Quelle narration pourrait dépeindre la souffrance des hommes qui restèrent plusieurs jours et plusieurs nuits sans dormir, sans capote ou couverture, sans repas chauds (parce qu'il n'était pas possible d'en amener sur ces routes impraticables) ? 
Comment décrire les sentiments de ces hommes qui devaient combattre dans des conditions que seul un ours polaire aurait pu supporter ? Ils ont grommelé, bien sûr, ils ont blasphémé comme des damnés, parfois, mais ils ont aussi combattu comme des démons.
Les instructions avaient prévu que le défilé d'Ondenval serait nettoyé pour que la 7th Armored Division puisse le traverser le 18 janvier. Ce n'est que vingt-quatre heures après le moment fixé que la 1st Infantry Division put annoncer que tout était prêt et que les blindés pouvaient se mettre en route.
Après avoir “épouillé”  Faymonville, le 16th Infantry Regiment progressa vers Schoppen où allaient se dérouler de violents affrontements avec des éléments de la 3.Fallschirmjäger Division. A la fin de la journée, la localité, mais aussi la colline et les petits bois se trouvant au nord-ouest, étaient capturés. Les vainqueurs (alors, aussi pitoyables que les vaincus) pouvaient, sportivement , clamer, « Honneur à ceux que nous avons taillé en pièces ! », comme les chœurs antiques dans les « Troyennes » d'Euripide. Plus à l'ouest, la hauteur entre Faymonville et OndenvaI était enlevée.
Quant à lui, le 23rd Infantry Regiment (2nd Infantry Division) s'emparait d'OndenvaI et, sur sa lancée, continuait jusqu'à la lisière des fourrés situés à proximité.

A hauteur du XVIII Airborne Corps, l'adversaire cessa tout mouvement spontané de repli ; c'est donc l'épée dans les reins qu'il continua à se replier.
Dans le losange ayant comme angles Malmédy, Born, Saint-Vith et Recht, la 30th Infantry Division s'empara des hauteurs de Hunnert et du Wolfsbusch et supprima quelques roadblocks des 326. et 18. Volksgrenadier Division.
Dans le sous-secteur attribué au 424th Infantry Regiment, et au 517th Parachute Infantry Regiment le sommet boisé au sud-est de Coulée et la crête au nord-est de Petit-Thier sont dépassés ; en outre, des positions sont installées au nord-ouest de Poteau. La conquête de cet onglet menace Recht par l'ouest.
A hauteur de la 75th Infantry Division, sur les pentes au sud-est de Grand-Halleux, le 291st infantry Regiment rencontra une résistance déterminée. L'avance en direction de Ville-du-Bois ainsi que de Petit-Thier fut interrompue par l'obscurité.
Sur le front du 290th Infantry Regiment, à hauteur de Vielsalm, les coups de feu s'échangeaient entre les deux rives, mais les pauvres doughboys étaient, pour les mitrailleuses des Allemands, planqués dans des caves de la rive droite, des cibles idéales, immanquables.

(En entendant tonner le canon, une riche propriétaire se lamenta :
 « Ils vont briser mes carreaux et endommager mes bois. » Quelqu'un lui expliqua qu'une préparation d'artillerie était indispensable pour limiter les pertes parmi les fantassins.
 Elle eut cette sordide réponse : 
« Les soldats ? Ils sont là pour cela. »)

A Salmchâteau, le 289th Infantry Regiment termina l'installation d'un Bailey bridge et améliora ses positions.
Dans le secteur du VII Corps, à trois reprises, des contre-attaques au départ des bois à l'est de Honvelez furent écrasées dans l'oeuf par des concentrations d'artillerie. Aucun gain substantiel ne fut réalisé dans la zone dévolue à la 83th Infantry Division, qui fortifia ses lignes en face de Courtil et prépara son avance en direction de Bovigny et de Longchamps.
Dans le sous-secteur de la 3rd Armored Division, des combats sauvages furent livrés aux environs de Sterpigny, Cherain et Vaux. Au sud de Cherain, une colonne allemande tentant de s'échapper avant que le piège ne se referme tomba sous le feu de trois bataillons d'artillerie : treize des vingt-cinq panzers furent détruits. Rettigny, Renglez et Brisy furent quelques-uns des derniers objectifs de la Division avant qu'elle ne gagne la région de Barvaux, Ouffet et Durbuy pour un repos bien mérité.
Dans le sous-secteur de la 2nd Armored Division, de leurs positions surplombant la ville de Houffalize, les hommes du 67th Armored Regiment eurent le privilège d'assister à la rencontre entre la First United States Army de Courtney S. Hodges et la Third United States Army de George S. Patton
Où et quand eut lieu la première rencontre ? 
Quelles sont les petites unités qui ont établi ce « contact physique » ? 

Il y a plusieurs versions. Un seul point commun : c'est la 2nd Armored Division qui a permis à la First United States Army de gagner, d'une encolure.
A l' Armored School de Fort Knox, sept officiers stagiaires ont eu à présenter, en 1949, un travail collectif intitulé Armor in Adverse Conditions : 2nd and 3rd Armored Divisions in the Ardennes Campaign.
Evidemment, l'accent y est mis sur: 
le temps exécrable, glacial, qui transforma chemins et routes en patinoires, qui congela les belligérants (sans toutefois les empêcher d'accomplir des exploits dignes des chevaliers errants du Moyen Age, rivalisant de bravoure, d'endurance, de ténacité) ;
les remarquables combats retardateurs qu'ont livrés de petites formations hétéroclites ; derrière chaque tournant, était embusqué quelque panzer ou canon automoteur ; la moindre ferme était devenue un fortin qu'il fallait enlever au cours d'affrontements sans merci à des Allemands, souvent dépenaillés, mais qui continuaient à faire preuve d'une grande pugnacité ; bref, une interminable partie de bras de fer qui se jouait entre le souffle des Américains et l'épuisement progressif des moyens matériels des Allemands.

Ces sept officiers incriminent dans l'échec du verrouillage et le manque d'équipements d'hiver, et les quartiers généraux, qui ont attribué à des divisions blindées une mission qui aurait dû être confiée principalement à de l'infanterie. Ou alors les chars auraient dû être utilisés massivement et non pas répartis en petites task forces, qui, par ailleurs, ont gaspillé beaucoup de temps à nettoyer les secteurs qu'elles venaient de libérer. (Si elle n'ont pas piétiné, le moins qu'on puisse dire est que leur avance n'a vraiment pas été spectaculaire, estiment-ils.)
Dans leurs conclusions, ils n'ont pas hésité, à l'époque cependant où le général J. Lawton Collins venait de recevoir sa quatrième étoile et devenait le chef d'état-major de l'Armée américaine, à «porter la hache dans la haute futaie de l'histoire sombre qui abrite bien des broussailles ténébreuses ». Comment expliquer, s'interrogent-ils, que quatorze jours aient été nécessaires à celui qui avait mérité le surnom de LightningJoe, aussi, tant il avait coutume de progresser à pas de géants, pour avancer de seize miles, à vol d'oiseau, ? Comment (question que se pose, écrivent-ils, le général Siegfried von Waldenburg, commandant la 116.Panzerdivision) comment les forces américaines, de loin supérieures à celles qui garnissaient le front allemand démantelé, n'ont-elles pu percer et refermer la souricière à Houffalize en capturant les quatre Panzerdivisionen encore à l'ouest de la ville?
Ils écrivirent aussi :
Les combats de la 560.Volksgrenadier Division et de la 2. SS Panzerdivision contre la 3rd Armored Division ont été féroces, non parce que leurs commandants espéraient reprendre l'initiative, mais parce qu'ils attachaient une importance vitale au libre passage à travers Houffalize.
Tiger & Paras, 2.SS Panzer Div.

Ou encore :
Le 15 janvier, le général Fritz Bayerlein, commandant le Panzer Lehr, réussit à retraiter à travers la ville. Il signale le carnage terrible en hommes ainsi qu'en matériel et estime avoir eu beaucoup de chance en s'échappant à la dernière minute de cette nasse.
Il faut croire, concluent-ils, que Jo-l'Eclair devait avoir des raisons péremptoires
En 1979, le général J. Lawton Collins a publié Lightning Joe an Autobiography. Il se souvient d'avoir, durant toute une semaine, rongé son frein en attendant d'être autorisé à contre-attaquer. Il se rappelle avoir, mainte et mainte fois, signalé au maréchal Montgomery que ses Divisions auraient dû se trouver plus à l'est, à hauteur de Saint-Vith, afin de couper la voie de repli des troupes allemandes, et non pas près du sommet du Saillant (où la contre-attaque du VII Corps refoulerait seulement l'adversaire, comme cela s'était produit à Falaise). 
US Vehicles 87th.Div. near St_VITH Jan.1945

Il poursuit :
« Monty prétendait que le front nord n'était pas encore stabilisé (condition sine qua non, selon les concepts tactiques traditionnels, avant qu'une contre-attaque ne soit lancée). Il craignait aussi que la 6. Panzerarmee n'arrive à percer, au nord, le front de la First Army! J'eus beau lui dire que la situation était totalement différente de ce qu'elle était au début de la contre-offensive allemande, quand cinq Panzerdivisionen et douze Infanteriedivisionen s'étaient attaquées à deux Divisions inexpérimentées (99th et 106th) et aux rescapés de deux autres (4th et 28th). « Personne n'arrivera », lui dis-je, « à percer à travers des unités de haut vol comme les lst, 2nd et 30th Infantry Divisions, ou comme la 82nd Airborne Division, ou encore la 3rd Armored Division. »
Mais Monty répliqua par un non sequitur (en latin dans le texte) : Joe, vous ne pourriez ravitailler tout un Corps par une seule route. ' (A savoir, la grand-route entre Liège et Saint-Vith.)
J'ai riposté (avec une exaspération irrespectueuse, je l'avoue) : D'accord, Monty, peut-être vous, les Anglais, mais nous bien ! ' Comme d'habitude, l'opinion de Monty prévalut.
« Un succès tactique » a écrit von Moltke, « n'est réellement décisif que s'il est obtenu à l'endroit stratégiquement correct ! »
J'avais présenté à la First Army trois plans de contre-attaque de mon VII Corps  : deux concernaient une jonction avec la Third Army, tandis que Saint-Vith était l'objectif du troisième. Il paraîtrait que le général Hodges avait préféré celui qui envisageait la percée le plus à l'ouest.
Après un certain temps (durant lequel Hodges, Ridgway et moi n'avions cessé de harceler Montgomery pour qu'il autorise la First Army à attaquer, le plus tôt possible, aussi à l'est que possible) Bradley avait suggéré au général Eisenhower, le 27 décembre, que l'attaque de la Third Army parte de Bastogne vers Saint-Vith.
Montgomery décida finalement, le 31 décembre, d'envoyer le VII Corps  vers Houffalize et le XIII Airborne Corps de Matt en direction de Saint-Vith... mais nous ne pouvions démarrer que le 3 janvier. »
Comme Alexandre le grand, le générall. Lawton Collins aurait pu dire : « J'aime mieux avoir à me plaindre de ma forture qu'à rougir de ma victoire. »


« Mon inquiétude obsidionale prenait fin, les mors de cette redoutable tenaille s'étaient rejoints à Houffalize sans capturer ce salmigondis de petites unités, C'était la première partie de ma gageure : à force d'expédients, ramener derrière le West-wall le plus possible de combattants, même dépenaillés ou couverts de pansements ensanglantés. J'étais soutenu par le souvenir de la phrase que Mathias Erzberger avait dite au maréchal Foch, dans le wagon de Compiègne : « Une nation comme la nôtre souffre, mais ne meurt pas ! »


Même si la situation allait en se détériorant de jour en jour, le repli ne fut, jamais, un sauve-qui-peut général dans l'insubordination ou la confusion. Pour l'arrière-garde, qui allait s'accrocher à ses positions avec une ténacité farouche, sans esprit de recul, ce fut une opération sacrifice, au cours de laquelle elle allait être hachée, déchiquetée par la mitraille.
N'ayant pas l'âme d'un nouvel Attila, j'avais recommandé à mon artillerie d'épargner, autant que faire se pouvait, les villages que nous venions de perdre. »

D'après Hal D. Steward

Houffalize, anéantie par l'aviation et le feu intensif de l'artillerie, n'était qu'un amas indescriptible de gravats et d'engins calcinés. La route conduisant à ce goulet se tortillait en d'effarants virages, propices aux dérapages ; elle était jonchée de cadavres pétrifiés et d'effets dont les troupes en retraite s'étaient délestées. Néanmoins, le dialogue des canons ne s'était pas tu, l'adversaire restait coriace.

German 88mm 

A la lisière de la petite cité, Herbert Burr, appartenant au 41st Armored Tank Battalion, gagna la Distinguished Cross. Alors que tout l'équipage de son char avait été tué ou blessé par deux projectiles d'un 88, il continua imperturbablement à tirer, réussissant à liquider les servants de ce redoutable canon. Il dégagea alors un blessé de son Sherman, qui prenait feu. En rampant, il traîna sur une distance de deux cents yards son coéquipier inanimé. De retour à son blindé, il réussit à éteindre les flammes, puis ramena le char vers l'arrière.



Sorted List of Units (U.S. & German) involved in The Battle of the Bulge, Jan 45.

1st Army
1st Engineers
1st Infantry div: http://www.history.army.mil/documents/ETO-OB/1ID-ETO-OB.htm
1st SS Panzer Div
29th Field Artillery Battalion (105 mm)
2d Armored Div: http://www.history.army.mil/documents/ETO-OB/2AD-ETO.htm
2d Infantry div: http://www.history.army.mil/documents/ETO-OB/2ID-ETO.htm
2d SS Panzer Div
3.Fallschirmjäger div
3rd armored div: http://www.history.army.mil/documents/ETO-OB/3AD-ETO.htm
3rd Army
4th Engineer Battalion
4th Infantry div : http://www.history.army.mil/documents/ETO-OB/4ID-ETO.htm
4th Medical Battalion
4th Quartermaster Battalion
4th Reconnaissance Troop
4th Signal Company
6 Panzerarmee
7th armored div: http://www.history.army.mil/documents/ETO-OB/7AD-ETO.htm
8th Infantry Regiment
12th Infantry Regiment
16th  Infantry reg
18e Volksgrenadier div
20th Field Artillery Battalion (155 mm)
22nd Infantry Regiment
23rd Infantry reg
246e Volksgrenadier div
289th Infantry Regiment
294 Grenadier regiment
30th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop [Mechanized]
30th infantry div.: http://www.history.army.mil/documents/ETO-OB/30id-eto.htm
42nd Field Artillery Battalion (105 mm)
44th Field Artillery Battalion (105 mm)
60e Panzergrenadier Reg (116 panzer div?)
62e Volksgrenadier div
67th armored reg
75th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized)
75th CIC Detachment
75th Infantry div: http://www.history.army.mil/documents/ETO-OB/75ID-ETO.htm
75th Military Police Platoon
75th Quartermaster Company
82d Airborne div: http://www.history.army.mil/documents/ETO-OB/82ABD-ETO.htm
83rd Infantry div "Thunderbolt Division"  "Ohio Division" :http://www.history.army.mil/documents/ETO-OB/83ID-ETO.htm
84th Infantry div  https://archive.org/details/gov.dod.dimoc.30182
89.Volksgrenadier Reg
99th infantry div: http://www.history.army.mil/documents/ETO-OB/99ID-ETO.htm
105th Engineer Combat Battalion
106th Infantry div: http://www.history.army.mil/documents/ETO-OB/106ID-ETO.htm
113th Field Artillery Battalions 
116e Panzer div
117th Infantry Regiment
119th Infantry Regiment, 
120th Infantry Regiments
23rd regimental combat team
26th Infantry
275th Engineer Battalion (Combat)
277e Volksgrenadier div
28th Infantry div : http://www.history.army.mil/documents/ETO-OB/28id-eto.htm
290th Infantry Regiment
291st Infantry Regiment
293e Infanterie div
293 Grenadier regiment
326e Infanterie div
375th Medical Battalion
393rd Infantry Regiment
394th Infantry Regiment
395th Infantry Regiment
424th Infantry reg
424th regimental combat team
517th Parachute Ìnfantry reg
531st Anti-Aircraft Artillery / Automatic Weapons (AAA/AW) Battalio
560e Volksgrenadier div
575th Signal Company
704th Ordnance Company (LM)
730th Field Artillery Battalion (155mm)
775th Ordnance Company(Light Maintenance)
897th Field Artillery Battalion (105mm)
898th Field Artillery Battalion (105mm)
899th Field Artillery Battalion (105mm)
Signal Corps
V corps
VII Corps
XIII corps
XVIII Airborne corps

Cartes de Thirimont-Waimes 1942 (1/50000).




Cartes de Ligneuville 1942 (1/50000).









 


823rd Tank Destroyer Battalion.


Ce bataillon est intervenu au départ de "Weismes" à partir du 13 Jan 1945 à partir de 06h du matin.

Si vous examinez ces rapports vous découvrirez les différentes positions occupées par ses véhicules. Ainsi le 13 Jan. ils arrivent en 837016. Sur la carte de Thirimont vous verrez que cela correspond a "Grosbois". Vous remarquerez un bois qui n'existe plus aujourd'hui. Vous noterez aussi que la route provenant de "Rue" (Waimes) débouche sur la "Voie des Allemands"...




A partir de ce point les véhicules U.S. allaient se trouver sous le feu des paras du 3.Fallschirmjäger qui sétaient implantés sur le point culminant: "les Hauts-Sarts".

Seul le bois de "Freneux" (aujourd'hui disparu) pouvait encore protéger partiellement leur approche de Thirimont
.



Vous trouverez ci dessous le compte rendu concernant les combats se situant entre le 13 au 18 janvier 1945.


Carte combinant celles de MALMEDY et de VIELSALM, recentrées sur THIRIMONT. Edition 1943. 




13  JANUARY 45.

823rd TD Battalion, (787052), attached 30th Infantry Division


Battalion personnel conducted routine duties. A & D Batteries 110th AAA Bn. no change.

“A” Co., 823rd TD Battalion, (793043).


After being on the move for the greater part of the period, following infantry and tanks, A-2 and A-1 et 16:30 and 17:00 took up position at 786022 and 779022. A-2 at 22:30 moved to 788028. A-1 in a support role fired 10 rounds HE and to knock out a machine gun next expended 5 rounds HE[1] and I round AP[2]. Unit had 1 NBI[3].

“B” Co., 823rd TD Battalion, (787052)


WAIMES (Weismes)
In order to get in position for the attack, B-2 at 05:00 left its former position closing into an assembly area in the vicinity of WEISMES at 06:00; while B-1 at 0745 entered an assembly area near 837015. Where it was prepared to following advancing infantry into THIRIMONT.

From that location B-1 fired 150 rounds HE into ONDENVAL in the sector of the First Infantry Division in an attempt to neutralize enemy tire flanking our forces from that direction.

A-3 from their direct fire positions fired 75 rounds HE in support of the initiate stages of the attack. Because enemy small arms and mortar fire made occupation of planned positions impossible, B-3 at 17:30 moved 1 section to 819023 and at 18:00 made a slight displacement of 1 gun.

At 22:00 a B-2 M-10 received a direct hit from an artillery shell with no noticeable damage but the jar caused extensive damage to the motor putting it out of commissions.

“C” Co., 823rd TD Battalion, (765046)


Unit moves for  the period are as follow:  "C" Co. CP at 12:15 to position South of BURNENVILLE (765046). C-2 at 13:15 to 795039, C-3 et 15:30 to 791044 and C-1 at 17:30 to 784045. In order to fully expend all ammunition the firing of which permission had been secured from higher headquarters, 1 concentration of  30 rounds reduced and 2 concentrations of 267 HE normal were expended after which the Co. FDC[4] dissolved until the completion of the present operation.

Rcn Co., 823rd'TD Battalion, (786045)


1/4 Ton JEEP 
In its first operation Rcn performed exceptionally well with units supporting each TD Co in the location of routs, positions, liaison with infantry, tank and engineer units, security, maintenance and repair of roads and assisting engineer and infantry mine removing crews. X 1st Rcn 1/4 ton was damaged by enemy mortars.,



14 JANUAR 45


823rd TD Battalion, (787052), attached 30th Inf DiV.


MALMEDY 30th Div. Headquarter Jan.45
With all units attached Battalion exercised merely supervisory duties over the gun companies. In a move in sections the 1st part of the rear echelon completed its move from SPA to MALMEDY (784043)

'A" Co., 823rd TD Battalion, (793043) attached 119th Inf Rgt


A-2 at 0730 moved to 795020. About 1000 am "A" Co forward CP[5] was established at 790033 and at the same time A-3 took up positions at 795021 though at 1500 it move t0 797013. A-1 at 1130 put 1 gun at 774004 and at 1630. A-2 completed the moves for the period entering positions at 791900. A-1 starting with 3 M-10s had 1 put out of commission by a mine and another fall by the wayside because of mechanical failure. Although one A-1 M-10 was straddled by bombs dropped by friendly planes, the TD was not damaged but personnel losses were 3 injured, 2 requiring evacuation.

“B” Co. 823rd TD Bn, (787052), attached 120th Infantry Rgt.


B-1 and B-2 moved at 1330 taking up assembly positions at WEISMES. Because of the M-10 of B-2 out of action because of mechanical failure during previous period, and
M-10
1 M-10 being damaged by a mine at 0700, 1 section of B-1 and the 2 remaining guns of B-2 were sent by a circuitous Western route to THIRIMONT closing at 1700 at 833003. 1 of the B-2 M-10s became stuck at 821006 and because of lack of recovery vehicles, at the close of the period had not been retrieved. During a strong enemy counter-attack between 1800 and 2000 from THIRIMONT West, B-1 destroyed 1            Mk IV tank.

“C” Co.,823rd TD Bn (765046), attached 117th Inf Regiment.


 At 1030  "C" Co was attached to the 117th Infantry Regiment, and after moving by bounds all day, C-3 at 1915 took up positions near LIGNEUVILLE,(804991) while C-1 at 1700 closed at 807027.

Rcn Co.,823rd TD Battalion, (786045)


Unit continued its routine reconnaissance of routes and gun positions and the pioneer platoon did some mine sweeping and road maintenance.



(Une image que beaucoup connaissent mais la légende est intéressante car le 120th Infantry Rgt monte sur Thirimont...)
American soldiers of the 30th Infantry Division (120th Regiment) at the intersection of Rue de la Gare and Place du Commerce in anticipation of the team on the way out of town of Malmedy. Jeep transports U.S. 57mm anti-tank gun M1 (British QF 6 pounder).

Malmedy: 526th Armored Infantry Bn.


15 JANUARY 45


823rd TD Battalion, (787052), attached 30th Inf Division.


Batteries A & D, 110th AAA Bn. were relieved from attachment at 08:00 reverting back to their own unit for primary mission employment. Supervisory control over gun Companies continued to be exercised. Capt. TYNDALL was received as reinforcement, being assigned to Hq. Co[6] as an assistant S-4.[7]

“A” Co, 823rd TD Battalion,(793043) attached 119th Inf Reg.



Les cartes de Peiper montrent qu'il ne devait ni passer par Thirimont ni par Ondenval. Il devait suivre la route longeant l'Ambleve pour atteindre Ligneuville...
A-2 by 1100 took up positions at 793983 (North of PONT); A-1 at 1530 stopped there one remaining M-10 at 775982 and a short time later moved to 773890; a forward "A" Co. CP was established at 1515 at 799015; A-2 at 1500 stopped temporarily at 803992 and at 1745 closed at 775991 (South of PONT) while A-3 at 1800 moved to 784999. 2 old men returned to unit as reinforcements. The EM listed a KIA[8] from air-bombing during previous period as now listed as DOW[9].

"B" Co. 823rd TD Battalion (787052), attached, 120th Inf Regt.


At 05:30 the one section of B-1 in WEISMES moved to 826003 and when the attack was launched for THIRIMONT, B1 and the one M-10 of B-2 led the way closing in THIRIMONT (830004) at 06:00. In the action that followed 1\B-1 M-10 was put out of commission by a mine and although movement was impossible, its location was such that it continued to cover a field of fire. In reducing all resistance in the town the 3 remaining guns of B-1 and the 1 gun of B-2 expended 50 rds AP[10] .200 rds HE, 4000 rounds .50 cal MG and 6000 rounds .30 Cal ammunition. This ammunition expended was, to a considerable extent, instrumental in the capture of the town. German Mk IVs attacking from the North, East and South suffered 3 casualties from the guns of B-1 and 1 from the gun of B-2 and in addition to this tank numerous Germans were killed and the fire of these M-10’s was responsible for the surrender of large numbers of enemy troops. As it is impossible to take prisoners with M-10’s, these surrendering as a result of TD fire[11] were takes into physical custody by the Infantry and of the total takes only 15 were listed in the TD credit column. During the action Lt MALCOLMSEN platoon leader of the 2nd platoon of  “B” Co. was killed by a sniper’s bullet while personally directing the actions of this M-10s. “B” Co. forward CP at 813022 at 11:05. 1 old man was returned to the unit as reinforcement.
M-10 Tank Destroyer
"C" Co. 823TD Battalion (765046) attached to 117th Inf Regt.

At 0900 C-1 set up at 802983 and 809984 with C-2 taking up positions at 803992 while at 1405 "C" Co set up a forward CP at 799015.

Rcn Co., 823rd TD Battalion (786045)


One section of the 2nd platoon at 1105 closed at 815021 and the 1set platoon at 16:30 closed at 772005.1n assisting in the removal of a half-track abandoned by the German the pioneer platoon removed 15 American mines and 3 Germans booby-traps. To affect the removal of a B-2 M-10 stuck in the mud the TD was dug out and corduroy read was built to the vehicle by the pioneer platoon. This platoon also assisted in the delivery of ammunition to B-1. At 15:15 3rd Recon set up at 803992. At 17:00 a 1st Recon 1/4 ton hit a mine with extensive damage to the vehicle and minor injuries to a EM.


A Thirimont, mais où (Maison Servais?, Etienne?)




16 JANUARY 43


823rd TD Battalion, (787052), attached 30th Inf Division


Battalion rear completed its move to MALMEDY.

"A” Co., 823rd TD Battalion, (793043), attached 119th Inf Regt


The one M-10 of A-1 in operation during the first part of the period at 1100 moved to 767963 and upon an additional M-10 becoming operational at the close of the period it also went into position at the location.

"B" Co., 823rd TD Battalion (787052), attached 120th Int Regt


All operational M-10s of B-1 and B-2 in THIRIMONT withdrew about 11:30 and took up assembly positions in WEISMES  (842042) about 1215 where they did maintenance and reorganized after previous attacks.

The B-2 M-10 previously reported stuck in the mud was recovered and put in operation. Unit had 2 NBI[12].

"C" Co, 823rd TD Battalion, (799016), attached 117th Inf Regt


At 0900 C-2 took over C-1’se position in LIGNEUVILLE while C-1 took up an assembly position at that location. A short time later C-2 moved to 797977 while at 20:50 C-1 put 1 section at 808963 and 1 M-10 at 805970. At 09:00 "C" Co. moved their CP to the forward CP Location (799015). One M-10 of C-1 had its radiator damaged by mortar fire but damages were slight. Unit had 1 NBI.

Rcn Co, 823rd TD Battalion (803993)


At 13:30 Rcn Co CP was established at 803993 while later in the period 2nd Recon moved in with "B" Co’s forward CP.



17 JANUARY 45


823rd TD Battalion, (787052), attached 30th Infantry Division.


 
M3 Half Track
Lt. GATLIN in a search through the debris of the battle field found a M-3 half track lost by B-3 at ST BARTHELMY that the Germans had taken and abandoned still in operating condition with all "B” Co tactical sign legible and only a few of the interior compartments modified to meet German needs.

"A" Co, 823rd TD Battalion (775993), attached 119th Inf Regt.


At 12:00 "A' Co. CP was established at 775993 and at 16:00 A-1 moved to 781952. An “A” Co. 1/4 ton was badly damaged when icy conditions caused it to run into a tree, All non-operational M-10 were repaired and returned to front-line positions. Unit had 1 battle’s injury.

"B" Co. 823rd TD Battalion, (812996), attached 120th Inf. Regt.


"B" Co. CP at 11:30 moved to 812996 and between 17:45 and 18:15 B-3put one gun at 803982, one gun at 802984 and a section at 811982.

"C" Co. 823rd TD Battalion, (799015), attached 117th Inf. Regt.


Unit had 1 NBI and Lt GOxSARD was evacuated as a NBI.

"Rcn Co. 823rd TD Battalion, (803993),


2nd Recon moved to 813996 at 13:15.



18 JANUARY 45 


823rd TD Battalion, (787052), attached 30th Infantry Division.


90 mm M-36 Jackson
 2 new M-10s and 1 M-36 were received from ordnance but 30 minutes after their arrival XVIII Corps notified this Headquarter (Hq) that the issuing of the M-36 to the 823rd TD Battalion was a mistake on the part of First Army and that it would be necessary to turn it over to another unit during the succeeding period, however an agreement was made that the unit receiving the M-36 would deliver a replacement M-10 at the same time it picked up the M-36.

“A” Co., 823rd TD Battalion, (775993), attached 119th Inf Regt


The 2 M-10s of A-1 that became operational during the previous
M-20 Armored Utility Car
period took over the positions held by the other section of A-1 and the section of A-1 relieved returned to the Co CP for maintenance. Shell fire damaged 1 M-20 slightly.



“B” Co, 823rd TD Battalion, (812996), attached 120th Inf Regt.


B-1 and B-2 at 12:30 moved to the Co CP where they took up an assembly position until the clearance of roads would allow them to occupy their next position. Whom it became evident that the German road-block would not be removed during-the period, B-2 at 15:40 took up an assembly position at LIGNEUVILLE (805993) and B-1 at 17:30 put one section in LIGNEUVILLE at 801987 and a gun at 814981 and 808978.



“C” Co, 823rd TD Battalion, (799015), attached 117th Inf Regt.


3 Inch M-10 Wolverine or "Tank Destroyer"
By 07:00 C-1 had moved one section to 811959 and 815959. In an attempt to flank the Germen road-block, holding up the advance of the 117th, Lt. McINNIS called for artillery fire .upon the road-block. After adjusting 4 rounds and being assured additional rds .were on the way, Lt McINNIS, believing the anti-tank guns in the German road-block would be neutralized during the artillery barrage and his left flank would therefore be protected, moved out into an exposed position in an attempt to destroy a MK IV Tank. The M-10 fired 8
75mm Mark IV Panzer
rounds APC with results undetermined while numerous short rounds were fired by the German tank without injuring the M-10.

Instead of a barrage only 2 additional rounds of artillery were fired and 1 of the German self-propelled assault guns put 3 rounds through the engine and fuel compartments of the M-10.

The M-10 was backed to a defilade position where it remained during the balance of the period under all types of heavy fire.

A mortar shell landed in the turret of the other C-1 M-10 exploding a couple rounds of 3" ammunition, killing the gun-commander with no other damage or casualties being inflicted. 

In order to make plans for future operations C-3 which at 12:00 had taken up positions et 802956

and 788956 overlooking RECHT withdrew at 17:30 to an assembly position at the Co CP.

1 M-10 returned from 0rdnance and upon being assigned to C-3 brought that platoon to its full T/E. strength. Unit had 1 NBI in addition to the 1 KIA.

Rcon Co, 823rd TD Battalion ,(803993)


2nd Recon had 1/4 ton damaged by mortar tire, but it was repaired and returned to action.



19 JANUARY 45


823rd TD Battalion, (7877052), attached 30th Infantry Division.


SPA (Belgium)
The M-36 secured by this unit through a mistake in orders by higher headquarter was delivered to the 814th TD Bn in exchange for a M-10 making the total of M-10 assigned to this unit 30.

Personnel from all Companies took baths in the SPA Mineral Bath Health Center and 4 men and 2 officers left the unit on passes to….








[1] HE  High Explosive.
[2] AP: Armor-Piercing;
[3] NBI: Non-Battle Injury (Disease Non Battle Injuries (DNBI))
[4] FDC  Fire Direction Center

[5] CP: Command Post.
[6] Head Quarter Company.
[7] S4=logistic Officer.
[8] KIA: Militaries use the term "killed in action" (KIA) as a casualty classification. They generally use it to describe the deaths of their own forces by other hostile forces or by friendly fire during combat. U.S. front-line-ground-combat forces remain male only. However, U.S. naval, air, and support troops contain females, as well as other nations' forces, and militaries can consider them KIAAP.
[9] DOW:Died of Wounds.
[10] AP: Anti Personal Shell
[11] TD: Tank Destroyer M-10 fire

[12] NBI: Non-Battle Injury (Disease Non Battle Injuries (DNBI))






743rd Tank Battalion

























117th INf Regt. 

The St.VITH Offensive, Phase I 

    
At 6:00 13 January, the 119th Regiment under the command of Colonel R. A. Baker, attacked south for its objectives of Bellevaux (703005), and Hedomont (795022). Pushing south at 06:00, from the outskirts of Malmedy, the 3rd Battalion reached the northern edge of Hedomont by 07:35 where it was halted by very strong resistance. That city, it will be remembered was to be captured before 08:00, so that it would form a base for a further push south.  As the situation turned out, Hedomont was not taken by darkness of the same day.


Supported by a Company of tanks of the 743rd Tank Battalion, the 3rd Battalion, 119th Infantry reached a point at (794023), where mines damaged several tanks and held up the armor. The infantry received very heavy fire from the crest (500meter) of the hill about 100 yards north of Hedomont. The infantry regrouped and with Company L striking out of the woods et the west side of the city and Company I attacking from the northeast, some gain was made. But in mid-afternoon the fire power of the defending troops drove the 3rd Battalion back.

The 1st Battalion had attacked for Hedomont at 07:30, to support the unsuccessfull 3rd Battalion. Advancing to the northern edge of the city, it could make no more progress than the 3rd Battalion. One platoon of tanks,  supported by a platoon of infantry from Company B, attempted to edges into the city from the west side but were turned back with heavy losses. By 18:00 hours a definite penetration of the city had not been made at any point and Companies L, K and I of the 3rd Battalion, plus Company B of the 1st, were in position around the northern side of the city. Companies A and C were withdrawn to the north as regimental reserves.

In a latter of instruction dated 20:00 hours, 13 January, the 119th Regiment was directed to take Hedomont that same night. From 22:00 to 22:30 hours Hedomont received a terrific artillery barrage, at the conclusion of which Company I. under Capt George D-Rehkopf, again attacked from the east and Company L, led by Capt. Lawrence J. Gagliano, from the west, with Company K. coming down from the north. Stunned to some extent by the terrific barrage, and the intensity of the infantry drive, the enemy fell back slowly and stubbornly. It required almost five hours of steady street fighting, but by 03:20, 14 January, the 3rd Battalion was in possession of the city.

During the first day’s offensive the 2nd Battalion, 119th Regiment did not experience the difficulty the other two battalions of the regiment encountered. At 06:00 the 2nd Battalion moved of from its line of departure and keeping in the cover of the wooded area, proceeded 2500 yards. By 08:00 they were on the outskirts of the city of Bellevaux, but received scattered fire from enemy elements who occupied portions of building. Throughout the day fire fights occurred in the City end at nightfall, tiny enemy pockets were still present.

At last light, Company ( unreadable), occupied positions from west to east, about 600 yards north of the city proper.

So much for the western part of the 30th Division attack on 13 January. It was the eastern portion that turned out to be so costly and even more difficult to penetrate.
The 120th Regiment attacked  at 08:00. The objective of the 3rd Battalion was Houyire the dominating piece of -terrain between Malmedy and Ligneuville and commanding the MaImedy  St.  Vith road. The first goal for the 2nd Battalion was Thirimont and the 1st Battalion was to support those two battalions with its fire. Coming down the main highway as far as Baugnez, the 3rd Battalion cut to the west through the wood and with Companies K,L, and I abreast , hit the forward slope of the hill and drove the enemy off by moon.

By 14:00 positions were consolidated with a road bock, emplaced, and with Company I, on the south or reverse slope, Company I on the west and Company I on the east.
Also at 08:00, 13 January 1945, the 2nd Battalion, 120th Infantry moved to the east, and then when north of Thirimont,  attacked directly south toward the city. Thirimont was expected to be sized that day. That was not the cases, however, and it took that day and almost two more, before the mission was accomplished. It must be remembered in following the action around Thirimont, the enemy resistance came not primarily from the city proper, or from forces coming in to reinforce the city from the south, but from the east; from the exposed left flank of the 30th Division. When the Division moved off in the attack on the morning of 13 January, tlhe106th Division on the right flank, moved south in a complementary action. On the left flank, however the 1st Division did not move and as elements of. the 30th advanced south, their left flank was exposed to enemy artillery  and infantry attacks coming from the direction of Ondenval (850001)and FaymonviIle (865017).

With Company G on the left, Company F on the right and Company K in reserve following closely, the 2nd Battalion attacked toward Thirimont. While it was still rather dark, Company G slipped past the outer ring of defense of the city and got into the city proper.
Company F moved down the Weismes  to Thirimont road, but was not as fortunate.
Caught by a strong joint set up in the road at (831015) and on both flanks, the company, led by Capt John M. Jacobsen, was hit by small arm fire, automatic weapon and artillery fire.

The artillery tire came from the east, estimated to the west of Faymonville by approximately 2000 yards. Because Hauts-Sarts was a hill overlooking Thirimont and all approaches to it, it was locally assumed that enemy observers, from posts on the Crests, 1800 yards South of Company F, communicated fire direction information to artillery, 2000 yards east.

If Company F had had some armor support; they may have gotten by the roadblock. But the 2nd Battalion armor of one platoon of tanks and 2 platoons of tank destroyers were all held up near the line of departure when the lead vehicle hit a mine and stopped the entire column. Therefore the attack wee launched without armor support.            In any event, Company F slugged at the strong point at  (831015) until about noon, and then badly depleted, they are forced to retire.

Company G. attacked to the left of Company F and bypassed the roadblock at (839011) and was in the city of Thirimont by first full lights.
If the left flank had been secure, and German reinforcements could not have come from that exposed enemy held area. such a maneuver of bypassing a strong roadblock under the cover of early morning darkness would have been excellent. Once in Thirimont, Company G took up positions in the cellars and buildings. Firefights were continued throughout the day and fell heavily in the city. Enemy artillery came from the vicinity of Ondenval and Lt.. Charles W. Moncrieff called for artillery fixe by radio throughout the day. He directed the fire capably, and frequently called for concentrations that landed among enemy troops in the house next to one he was occupying.            

Throughout the day, 13 January, attempts were by the 2nd Battalion, 120th lnfantry to reinforce Lt. Moncrieff’s position. Company F could not get by the roadblock and enemy outpost positions in the vicinity of  (8390119) An attempt was made by 1st Lt.. Walter A. Wert Jr., to push Company E through the woods and around the right of Company F to Thirimont. The woods were almost impenetrable and German troops in dugout positions effectively halted small groups from infiltrating.

General Leland s. Hobbs,
30th Division Commander.
The fighting in Thirimont continued throughout the day and Company G’s casualties were mounting. In a telephone conversation made at 12:15, 13 January, to the Corps Commander General Hobbs said,

“ I had come under the assumption that the big unit (1st Division) on our left would do something to relieve the pressure on our left. If anything can be done to  have some elements on the left push along and take the pressure off, it’s essential”

During the early hours of the darkness small groups of the Germans got into the city which they approached from the east. Then at approximately 20:00 hours, under complete blackness, the enemy launched a complete attack of seven tanks supported by over 100 infantrymen. Moncrieff called for artillery fire and pozit[1]  type ammunition was utilized. It was very effective in eliminating enemy infantry, but the tanks were not damaged to any appreciate extend.  Shortly after the initial counter attack, larger group infiltrated into Thirimont from Ondenval.
At about 22:00hours, Moncrieff called back to Battalion requesting permission to withdraw from the city with the men that remained. Permission was granted and Moncrieff led the Company back to the woods, along slow covered trails and in inky blackness. Approximately 40 officers and enlisted men returned, of the force of about 100 that had moves out with Company G at 17:00 that morning. The strength of Company G on 13 January was 163 enlisted men and 5 officers. On the 14 January it was 84 enlisted men and 3 officers. Includes in the 84 enlisted men was the company headquarters, cooks, mechanics , etc.

At about midnight, 13 January, the 2nd Battalion, 120th Regiment had withdrawn to their position occupied before the morning attack had been launched. At 00:30, 14 January, the 1st Battalion, 120th Regiment, under Lt. Colonel Ellis W. WilIiamson attacked through the badly mauled 2nd Battalion, for the objective: Thirimont .

The battalion encountered extremes difficulty in a attempting to move through the blackness at the night, the woods, and the heavily falling snow.  At almost 06:00, 14 January, the battalion has advanced through the enemy outposts on the outskirts of Thirimont . The temperature was dropping steadily, and a further difficulty was encountered with radio communication. The cold caused the radios to malfunction in many case and radio control of the units became difficult.            

Coupled with the fact that enemy artillery still rained down, from German positions in the vicinity of Ondenval, very little progress was made against Thirimont.
30th Division artillery played an important role during the l4th and leveled a large amount of artillery fire en enemy vehicles, batteries and infantry units. The fire was directed almost entirely by air observation end was doubtless costly to the enemy. 

L4Y Piper Cub (Grass hooper)
From noon of 13 January to noon of the following day, division artillery units fired almost 10,000 rounds of 105 and 155 mm ammunition. The use of artillery Cub Planes for directing the fire was profitable and as Colonel Purdue, QC of the 120th pointed out, the plane also called back by radio important enemy movements; the result of friendly artillery fire, and served to keep enemy artillery batteries silenced for fear of being spotted by Cub plane observators, who in turn would call down artillery fire on such batteries. Throughout 14 January, the 1st battalion, 120th Regiment, supported by 2d Battalion, hammered away in Thirimont unsuccessfully.

An attempt was made to strike at the city from the west by the 3d Battalion, with Hauts-Sarts as the base. Groups of enemy had infiltrate, during the night of 13 and 14 January, from the east, and had reinforced the already strong group on the steep hill that over looked Thirimont.

The Germans maintained communication back to Ondenval, and artillery fire on friendly troops fell throughout the morning of 14 January. At 11:50 hours, Companies I and E attacked for the hill, but  where beaten back.

Under ordinary conditions, driving an enemy from such a superior defensive position as afforded by the crest of a hill would have been difficult. But attempting to advance up the side o a barren slope against snow, ice, and wind against a firmly entrenched enemy was an almost impossible task. The attackers were forced to a halt 500 yards from Hauts-Sarts. That objective was very valuable to the enemy, for not only did he use the crest for an OP (observation Point) to direct fire on troops moving toward Thirimont, but he could also direct artillery fire on anything in the area moving on Malmedy-Ligneuville (St. Vith) road south of Geromont.

Ligneuville
On the west side of the Malmedy-Ligneuville road, the hill and the vicinity designated as Houyire had been taken on the previous day by 3d Battalion, 120th Regiment.
Early the morning of 14 January, the 2nd Battalion, 117th Regiment skirted the east slope of Houyire, and attacked south with Ligneuville as the objective. The original plan had contemplated the 119th and 120th Regiments of the Division as handling the 1st phase of the St. Vith offensive and committing the 117th Infantry, through the 119th after the latter had advanced as far south as the 96th east-west grid lin. The unexpected resistance around Hauts-Sarts and Thirimont, held up the advance of the 120th and in an attempt to out past the enemy at Thirimont, the 117th was committed to attack.

Moving south toward Ligneuville from Houyire, the 2d Battalion, 117th Infantry, avoided being observed to any great degree by advancing along the west side of the Malmedy-Ligneuville road. The trees were thick, the knee deep snow drifts were higher by 3 or 4 inches more of snow that had fallen during the night and communication was difficult. At 12:00 hours, 14 January, the Battalion was in the outskirts of Ligneuville. They were met bu scattered units that where displaced in the stone buildings of the city. Fire fights continued throughout the afternnon in the city of Ligneuville, but by 16:00  the enemy had been driven out. Moving though the city quickly, on the St. Vith road, Company E approached the bridge spanning the Ambleve river. The bridge, at (806987), had been prepared for demolition by Germans, but the Company E commander, Capt. George H. Sibbald, cut the wires and led his troops across. With all three Companies in the city, the 2d Battalion, 117th Infantry, consolidated their positions and were not taken unaware by the German counter attack launched at 20:00 hours. Estimated at a battalion of infantry and supported by six tanks, the enemy attempted to regain Ligneuville. They were unsuccessful, however, and were forced to withdraw.

Moving further to the right, or west, into the 119th Infantry sector, it will be recalled that during the early morning hours, 14 January, after a terrific 30th Division artillery barrage on Hedomont, the city was captured by the 3d battalion. At first light, 14 January, after a terrific struggle, Lt. Colonel Robert h. Herlongs 1st Battalion passed through the 3d and attacked south of Lamonriville (790005).

The Battalion met practically no resistance at Lamonriville and went through it rapidly. Still moving south from Lamonriville, with Companies A and B leading and Company C in the rear, the Battalion headed to Reculemont (785995). Shortly before noon they were halted north of the city by very accurate and damaging mortar fire and artillery. With the support of tanks from the 743d Tank Battalion, the enemy line was broken north of Reculemont and 50 POW’s were captured. With tanks leading the way, Companies A and B took up positions in Reculemont at dusk. With a firm base in the city, Captain Donald R. Fell led Company C through the town and by darkness had gone an other 1000 yards south to reach the north bank of the Ambleve river.

Thus in one day the 1st Battalion, 119th Regiment had pushed, slugged and battered their way through snow, woods, ice, and a determined enemy for a gain of approximately 4000 yards. Their casualties were relatively high, but secure the entire 30th Division’s on 14 January.

Martin B-26B-50-MA Marauder Serial 42-95857 of the 556th Bomb Squadron
The 2d Battalion, 119th Infantry, moved off at 10:00 hours, 14 January with Company G on the right and Company F pushing further into Bellevaux. Under 1st Lt. G. L. Farris, Company G skirted Bellevaux on the west and attacked Thioux (761004).
They were met by heavy small arms fire but prior to noon they had possession of the city. Company F in Bellevaux was troubled during the morning, not only, by the enemy but also by the American Air Corps. A small group of medium bombers mistakenly dropped several bombson the city, but caused no serious casualties of 2nd Battalion troops.

Shortly after 13:00 hours, a platoon was sent out by Capt. Edward C. Arm of Company F, for the purpose of securing a river crossing site. They crossed the Ambleve at 13:30 and shortly after, Company G and  E followed, and secured a bridge head in the vicinity of Planche (775999). Working in smooth coordination, Company E, 2nd Battalion, 119th Infantry, which had been the reserve Company throughout the day, then moved past Company  G and seized Villers (759996), which lay I800 yards west of the river crossing site. In the vicinity of Villers, Company E established contact with the 517th Parachute Infantry, 106th Division at (756997).

With Company E in Villers, Company G attacked Beaumont (781994) which lay 200 yards south of Villers. The enemy troops in Beaumont, had doubtless been reinforced by those who had withdrawn from Villers and by midnight, 14 January, Company G had not get been successful in taking the city. .
By 24:00 hours, 14 January, the 30th Division had made most of  its progress on the right flank of the division sector. Two bridges heads has beeen established: one in Ligneuville (805986) and one in Planche (775999) and plans for 15 January were stated in a letter of instruction.

The most important factor mentioned was that the 1st Infantry Division, on the left flank of the 30th Division, would attack south prior to daylight, 15 January.
In the 117th Infantry sector, 15 January was relatively quite. The 2d Battalion remained in Ligneuville and eliminated scattered enemy groups in their zone that were found on the south bank of the Ambleve River. The 3d Battalion passed through the 2d and proceed south against light resistance for approximately 2000 yards and reached an area in the vicinity of (810967) by 18:00 hours.

The 3d Battalion, 119th Infantry had been attached to the 117th  and during 15 January moved in a line along southeast section of Ligneuville and set up positions of defence along Malmedy-St. Vith road. Further they established outpost groups in the woods in an attempt to capture or destroy a few enemy harassing patrols and several German self-propelled assault guns that had been bypassed or had infiltrated back into the lines and were causing some disturbances.

The other two Battalions of the 119th Infantry continued to attack in the Regiment’s sector throughout 15 January and by nightfall had reached the line marking the termination of the first phase in the St. Vith Offensive.

The 1st Battalion, 119th Infantry used Companies A and C Primarily during 15 January. Company A ‘s Platoons worked between Borgueuscheid (790991) and the Ambleve River, hunting out harassing patrols and scattered enemy units. Company C supported by a platoon of tanks of the 743rd Tank Battalion, swung east of Lamoriville and crossed the bridge in Ligneuville (805988) spanning the Ambleve. Once across the bridge, Capt. Fell moved west in the direction of the objective, Pont (794977), The outskirts of Pont were reached before noon and an attack for the city *was launched immediately. Driving the enemy out of the houses, Pont fell by 14:30.
28 POW’s were taken during the assault on the city. Moving south out of Pont, the same unit of the 119th infantry advanced  toward (794972). An ineffective natural road block or 22 heavy trees had been felt across the road.  They were quickly removed and the Company continued until dusk.


In the 2nd Battalion, Company F had continued to attack  against Beaumont until 02:00, 15 January. At 07:45. Company G passed through Company F at Beaumont and advanced along the Beaumont-Houvegnez road. The Company met very strong small arms fire and very heavy mortar concentrations. Also encountered, in lesser amounts, were artillery and rocket fire. By 11:00, Francheville was taken and the attack pressed to the south to capture another small village, Houvegnez. The woods become thicker and the enemy resistance stronger. Division artillery fire was called for in great volume by the 2d Battalion, 119th Infantry and following it, Company G pushed into Houvegnez where it capture over a score of stunned prisonniers. The total number of POW’s taken by the 119th Infantry during 15 January numbered 108.

In the 120th Regiment on 15 January, the attack against Thrimont continues. The 1st Battalion to get into the city with amor support by noon. The enemy defended from houses in the city that had been made into strong points of defence.
It was against such defences that Company B of the 823d Tank Destroyer Battalion assaulted.

Those brick house in the city had been turned into veritable pill boxes and heavy machine guns and other automatic weapons emplaced in them. If it had not been for the supporting tanks from the 743rd Tank Battalion, and the Tank Destroyer’s from the 823rd, it would only have been at an exorbitantly high price of infantry that this city would have been taken on 15 January.

The 3d Battalion of the 120th Infantry attacked Thirimont at the same time as the 1st Battalion. Hitting at the city from the Northeast. The Battalion met very heavy sniper, small arms and automatic weapon fire, not only from the city, but also from the east. 

The 1st Division, on the left flak of the 30th Division attacked south the same morning, but did not advance fast enough to relieve the pressure on the 120th Infantry.  Toward noon, 15 January, fire on the 3d Battalion increased to such an extend that it was necessary to call for help from the 2d Battalion.

The 2d Battalion, 120th Infantry had moved off early the same morning on the right flank of the 3d Battalion and headed for the Wolfsbuch forest area. That objective objective contained a hill whose elevation was almost 600 meter high and easily dominated the area. Lt. Colonel Cantey had moved his 2d Battalion down the Malmedy St. Vith road when he was intercepted about 500 yards out of Ligneuville at (816984), and ordered to return to the Thirimont area and support the right flank of the 3d Battalion.

Throughout the day (15 January) fighting continued unabated.
By nightfall the 120th Infantry was finally in possession of Thirimont and Hauts-Sarts. Division artillery expended around 11,000 rounds of 105mm and 155mm ammunition that day, and most of it was called for and directed at the enemy in the Thirimont area. The job the support tanks and tank destroyers accomplished cannot be minimized and the final capture of those two strong points, in a large measure belongs to them. The rate of casualties for the 120th for that day was high and the total number for 13,14 and 15 January amounted to over 450 killed, wounded and missing.

Because of the nature of the terrain, that is the sharp rises and falls, plus the knee deep snow, ice, and heavy forest, litter bearers found it necessary to frequently carry wounded several thousand yards. Ambulances in many cases could not get anywhere near the wounded. However, the 105thMedical Battalion improvised and borrowed sleds from farmers in the neighborhood. Frequently, the sleds were pulled by horses and served admirably to get the wounded to ambulances for further evacuation.
With the fall of Thirimont, at the close of 15 January, all Objectives in the first phase of the St.Vith offensive in the Division zone was captured. The operation had gone according to schedule, except the left flank where the cost had been high; unexpectedly high in fact.  The 30th Division can only be commended highly for the job they while operating with an exposed left flank

It can safely be assumed, that had the 1st Division on the 30th Division left flank, been ordered to attack at “H” hours, “D” day, 08:00, 13 January, in coordination with the 30th Division, the losses sustained by the latter would have been much lighter, and the advance more rapid. When the 1st Division do attack, two days later, 15 January, they quickly eliminated the strong automatic weapon and artillery positions in the vicinity of Ondenval and Faymonville that has been striking at the side of the 30th Division for two days.

As for the enemy tactics during the first phase; they have been touched on above. One of the most troublesome items needs additional emphasis. That was the mines that the Germans laid in roads and possible routes of approach. In most cases, because of the haste of their withdrawal, the enemy made to attempt to lay mines in any careful or strategic pattern. They were again favoured by the weather on this score for shortly after the mines were laid, they were covered by snow . Ice followed, more snow and again ice. That meant that scores of our vehicles would roll over the mines without setting them off. After a road became accepted as “safe”, by the number of vehicles they had gone over it, a light jeep, or a heavy tank would unexpectedly detonate the mine. As for Infantry field positions occupied by enemy, they were also aided by natural terrain features. Concealed wooded areas, road side dugouts, approaches to roads, firebreaks and trench lines on hill crests were only few utilised. In the cities, infantry positions were invariably taken in stone houses. All in all, the sector was admirably suited to, and offered every tactical and strategic advantage to defending troops. In the two day period from 13 January to midnight 15 January, the Division captured 497 POW’s.

The caliber of the enemy soldier on the division front had risen materially from the attack hour on 13 January. At that time almost all of the opposition was estimated to be from the 18th Volksgrenadier Division. But shortly after the initial attack by the 30th Division, elements of the 3rd Parachute division (3. Fallschirmjäger (see below report)) hit the left flank of the 30th.

In the area of Thirimont, four Battalions of parachute Division were identified. The fact that the enemy opposition on the left flank of the 30th Division were paratroopers, as compared with 18th Volksgrenadier Division soldiers on the right portion of the Division sector, may help to explain the severity of the fighting and the tenacity of the resistance encountered by the 30th Division in the former sector.

U.S. Army, After Action Report. OCR’ed on January 2015






[1] POZIT: On December 28, 1944, they made their first use of specially fused rounds they called "Firecrackers", introduced just a few days earlier. These were radar proximity fused shells (called POZIT) intended for an air burst above troop concentrations. This amazingly advanced weapon came as an especially “nasty surprise” to the Germans. One of my father's roles was timing the fire of their three batteries of four 155mm cannon so that all the shells hit virtually simultaneously, with no warning. Coupled with the POZIT fuses the result was devastating.












3.Fallschirmjäger THIRIMONT 
    


....Das FJR9 war um den 14. und 15. Januar 1945 in der Gegend von Thirimont (Belgien) im Einsatz. Es hatte am 15. Januar schwere Verluste (183 Mann an Toten, Verwundeten, Vermißten und Gefangenen). Der gesuchte Ort Steinbach (wohl eher ein kleines Dorf) liegt ca. einen guten Kilometer nordöstlich von Thirimont (auf dem Weg nach Faymonville). Steinbach wird auch in dem Buch über das FJR9 erwähnt.Damit wären wir dann auch schon beim ultimativen Literatur-Tipp. Rudi Frühbeißer: Opfergang deutscher Fallschirmjäger. Dort wird die Geschichte des FJR9 tageweise erzählt. Sehr ausfürlich und genau, das Beste was es zum FJR9 gibt. 


History of the 9th German Paratroopers Regiment, part of the 3rd German Paratroopers Division as described by one of their NCO's.
They fought mainly in 3 major battles: around D-Day at St. Lo area in France, autumn 1944 around Düren, Germany,  and last but not least the Battle of the Bulge  from Losheim to Thirimont and back to the Rhein.

.....

Der Autor, Rudi Frühbeisser, vor einem Teil seiner Unterlagen  und Karten, die in dicken Bänden gebunden sind.
L'auteur, fêtant ses 18 ans fraichement lavé
 et rasé..A Cloville, près de St Lô en 1944.
Er selbst hat als Fallschirmjäger einen großen Teil dieser Einsätze durchgestanden.
Schon 1953 fuhr er mit zwei ehem. Fallschirmjägern in die Normandie. 1962 reiste er mit seinem alten Kommandeur, Oberstleutnant a. D. Gundolf Freiherr Schenk zu Schweinsberg, in Belgien durch die Ardennen, um dort seine Unterlagen zu ergänzen.
1964 flog er mit 19 Mann seines ehemaligen Fallschirmjäger-Regiments in die Normandie, um am 20.Jahrestag der alliierten Invasion, an der Calvadosküste, teilzunehmen. Die alten Einsatzorte aufzusuchen und in den unendlich großen Soldatenfriedhöfen zu weilen.
Noch einmal sei den ehem. Angehörigen seines Regiments gedankt, die ihn durch Unterstützung mit Material bei seinem Buch geholfen haben.
Er schrieb dieses Buch zum Gedenken derer, die im
Einsatz ihr Leben hingaben.
Als Mahnung an die junge Generation, sich endlich die Hände zu einer echten und endgültigen Versöhnung zu reichen, über den weiten Gräberfeldern ihrer Väter, für eine glückliche Zukunft.


Das Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 9

Im Dezember 1943 erhält der bisherige Kommandierende General des XIII. Fliegerkorps, Generalmajor Eugen Meindl, den Auftrag, das II. Fallschirmjäger-Korps mit der 3. und 5. Fallschirmjäger-Division sowie den dazugehörigen Korpseinheiten aufzustellen.
Le Général Meindl près d'une MG34...
Als Raum für die Aufstellung wird das Gebiet ostwärts der französischen Stadt Melun bei Paris bestimmt.
Bei der in der Zwischenzeit eingerichteten Sammelstelle des II. Fallschirmkorps treffen täglich große Bahntransporte ein, die zum größten Teil aus 17jährigen kriegsfreiwilligen Jägern bestehen, die von den dafür bestimmten Fallschirm-Sprungschulen von Wittstock und Salzwedel in Deutschland, Kraljewo in Serbien und Dreux bei Paris in Frankreich kommen.
Das Stammpersonal der einzelnen Einheiten bilden die alten Veteranen von Rotterdam-Holland, Eben Emael-Belgien, Kreta, Afrika, Sizilien, Monte Cassino, den Restbeständen der ehemaligen Luftlande-Lehrabteilung (LLL) und der Luftlande-Aufklärungsabteilung(LAA)des XIII.Flieger-Korps des Generalmajor Meindl. Das aufgestellte Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 9 wird in die Stadt Troyes, südwärts von Melun, verlegt.
Die Dienstgeschäfte der einzelnen Einheiten werden vorerst von den dafür bestimmten Hauptfeldwebeln übernommen, während die jeweiligen Bataillone von einem Frontoffizier geführt werden.
Bis zum Eintreffen des Regimentskommandeurs wird das Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 9 von dem ehem. Chef der Luftlande Aufklärungsabteilung, Hauptmann Bodo Göttsche, geführt.
lm Kino und Theaterbau werden die einzelnen Bataillone auf die Fallschirmtruppe verpflichtet.
Anfang Februar 1944 wird das gesamte Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 9 im Rahmen der 3. Fallschirmjäger-Division, die von Generalmajor Richard Schimpf befehligt wird, im Bahntransport in die Bretagne in den Raum Brest verlegt.

........

9. Januar 1945


Gesamtverluste: 3 Mann = 2 Tote — 1 Verwundeter.

Am Abend soll das Regiment eine Verschiebung vornehmen. Das II. Bataillon des Major Taubert, der erkrankt ist und von Hptm. Hardt geführt wird, soll das I. Bataillon ablösen.
Der Verbandsplatz des II. Batl. ist schon in Faymonville eingetroffen.
Bei einem Feuerüberfall auf das Haus, in dem der Verbandsplatz untergebracht ist, wird der Arztschreiber Ogfr. Alfred Matthey in der Brust tödlich getroffen. Matthey war schon mit in der Normandie und hat manchen Jäger aus dem feindlichen Feuer geholt.
In den Abendstunden erhält das I. Bataillon den Befehl, sofort abzurücken.
Nähere Anweisungen erhält das Bataillon auf dem Marsch.
Die kleinen Handwagen waren überall gut in den Häusern verstaut und sind bald mit Waffen und Munition beladen.
Es sind zwar vom II. Bataillon Melder eingetroffen, die die Einheiten des II. Bataillons in die Stellungen einweisen sollen, aber die Kompanien sind noch nicht da.
Gerade als wir die Bahnüberführung mit unseren Leiterwagen durchfahren, bricht dem Küchenwagen des Ogfr. Sepp Riegel ein Rad. Eine halbe Sau liegt im Schnee und der gute Sepp flucht.
Als ob es der Ami riechen würde, legt er auf den Ort Faymonville und die Bahnüberführung starkes Artilleriefeuer.
Auf der Straße nach Steinbach marschieren wir nach Süden.
Von der 8. Kp. wird der Oberfeuerwerker Piontek durch einen Splitter in den Rücken schwer verwundet, daß er stirbt.
Die 1. Kompanie, die als Spitze marschiert, erreicht bald den kleinen Ort Ondenval. Nach etwa 1000 Metern kommen erneut Hauser.
Es ist der kleine Ort Thirimont.


10.  Januar 1945

Gesamtverluste: 1 Mann = 1 Verwundeter.

Das il. und III. Bataillon haben ihre Stellungen bezogen.
Der Ort muß noch bewohnt sein, denn wir hören verschiedentlich im Ort Hundegebell.
Weiter marschieren wir auf der Straße. Ober die Einöde Grosbois marschieren wir sichernd zur Straßenkreuzung, die in die Hauptstraße einmündet, die rechts nach Weismes und links nach Baugnez und Malmedy führt.
Kurz nach etwa 200 Meter sehen wir im Schnee ein zerstörtes Haus gegenüber der Kreuzung.
Auf Befehl kehrt die 1. Kompanie wieder um und muß nach Thirimont zurück.
Auf Grund der Kompaniestärke wird die 1. Kompanie als BatailIons-Reserve bestimmt. Mit Oberleutnant Strasser suchen die Zugführer am westlichen und südlichen Rand des Ortes Thirimont die Stellungen aus.
Als es Tag ist, werden die Stellungen ausgehoben und im Schnee getarnt. Die Gruppen haben sich in den Kellern der Hauser im Ort Quartiere gesucht. Der Ort ist noch bewohnt. Der Tag verlauft mit einzelnen Erkundungen im Ort und im VorgeIände nach Sedan(**), wo kurz vor Sedan in einer Mulde frische amerikanische Zigaretten und Büchsen und eine Mütze gefunden werden.
Die Bewohner des Ortes sind uns sehr zugetan.
Zum Teil sind ihre Männer und Väter selbst bei der Deutschen Wehrmacht.

**Le bourgmestre Nemery avait baptisé Houyîre du nom de Sedan, en souvenir de la victoire de 1871 (Régime Prussien), mais sous le régime belge, il a été débaptisé en Merckem, nom qui rappelle une des victoires belges de l’avant-dernière guerre...

11. Januar 1945

Gesamtverluste: 3 Mann = 2 Verwundete — 1 Gefangener.

Bei einem Spähtrupp, den eine Gruppe der 8. Kompanie im Vorgelände von Faymonville durchführt, wird der Jäger Paul Kreit gefangen.
Die derzeitige Front in dieser Gegend verläuft wie folgt:
Die Straße, die von Weismes nach Baugnez führt, ist Niemandsland. Also sind wir in der letzten Nacht durch Niemandsland spaziert, um Thirimont herum nach Ondenval — Remonval — Steinbach — Faymonville — Anttönnchen.
Der Verbandsplatz des I. Bataillons befindet sich im Ort Thirimont in der Dorfstraße auf der linken Seite neben einer kleinen Motorradwerkstatt.
lm Nebenhaus des Verbandsplatzes hat sich eine Gruppe der 15. Pi.-Kp. des Obltn. Havighorst mit Oberfeldwebel Schulze eingenistet.
Das Haus ist zu einem kleinen Depot geworden.
Maison Servais à droite et la Chapelle St Ganfolf au fond.
(venant d'Ondenval et allant vers Waimes ou Baugnez)
Anfang der Dämmerung beginnen die Jäger damit, südlich von Thirimont zur Sicherung einen Minengürtel anzulegen.
Ein junger Jäger packt sich einen Schlitten voll Minen und fährt die schmale Straße bergab. Seit einiger Zeit hort man das Brummen eines Panzermotors. An der Kurve passiert es dann. Der junge Jäger kommt um die Kurve.
Der Fahrer des Panthers muß den Jäger aber gesehen haben, denn er hat den Panzer gebremst und steht.
Der Jäger rumpelt nun mit seinem Minenschlitten genau unter die linke Raupe des Panthers.
Der junge Jäger schreit:
„Mensch bleib mit deinem Kasten bloß stehen, unter dem Panzer liegen lauter scharfe Minen!"
Wortlos springen die Panzerfahrer auf die Hinterseite des Panthers ab. Vorsichtig beseitigen sie den Minensegen und legen die Minen am Rand der Straße ab, wo sie der Jäger mit einer Geschäftigkeit wieder kunstgerecht auf seinen Schlitten packt.
Der Panzerkommandant, ein Oberscharführer, meint:
„Na, du Knilch, da hättest Du uns aber bald vorzeitig in den Himmel gebracht ! Komm her, das ist ein Grund zum Feiern !"
Der Panther soll nach Baugnez zu einer Gruppe SS-Grenadiere fahren, die zur Kampfgruppe Peiper gehören und dort auf hoffnungsvollem Posten liegen.

12. Januar 1945

Gesamtverluste: 3 Mann = 3 Verwundete.

Die ganze Nacht ist starkes Artilleriefeuer auf den Ort Thirimont niedergegangen.
Am Vormittag, als das Feuer abflaut, geht Hauptmann Schiffke zum Bürgermeister und fordert diesen auf, mit den Bewohnern sofort den Ort zu verlassen. Vor Einbruch der Dämmerung ist es dann soweit, daß fast alle Bewohner den Ort verlassen.
Sonst bleibt die Nacht sehr ruhig.

13. Januar1945: Amerikanischer Großangriff

Gesamtverluste: 15 Mann = 6 Tote — 9 Verwundete.

Um 6 Uhr fahren die Jäger in den Kellern aus dem Schlaf hoch. Fast einem Einschlag gleich, geht ein Feuerschlag auf Thirimont nieder.
Das Feuer nimmt an Heftigkeit immer mehr zu.
Um 7 Uhr steigert es sich fast zum Trommelfeuer.
Anfrage beim II. und III. Bataillons-Stab läßt nach kurzer Zeit die Telefonverbindung unterbrechen.
Störsucher rausschicken, das wäre Mord!
Ohne Befehl machen sich die Fallschirmjäger im Ort fertig.
Was an Munition und Handgranaten einzustecken ist, wird in die Taschen des Knochensacks geschoben. Denn wir müssen uns bestimmt wieder auf einen Krieg aus der Hosentasche einstellen. Vereinzelt gehen die Gruppen aus den Kellern in die Wohnungen und stellen sich in sicheren Ecken auf, um vor Splittern sicher zu sein.
Sobald das Feuer nachläßt, wollen die Jäger sofort in die Stellungen laufen und die Nachtposten verstärken.
Um 7.30 Uhr rumpelt jemand über die Kellertreppen in den Gefechtsstand der 1. Kompanie.
Es ist der Kompaniemelder Gfr. Franz Heß, ein alter Normandie-hase.
Ganz außer Atem setzt er sich auf die Kellerstufen und sagt zu dem Kompaniechef Obltn. Stresser:
„Herr Oberleutnant, der Amerikaner ist mit einem Rgt. Negern im Ort eingedrungen, sofort fertig machen zum Gegenstoß!” Einer meint zum Spaß, na, die Neger sieht man dann wenigstens im Schnee!
Wie konnte es geschehen, daß in den gut abgesicherten Ort Neger eindringen konnten?
In einer kurzen Feuerpause laufen einige Gruppen los, um in die vorbereiteten Deckungslöcher und MG-Stände zu kommen.
Als sie durch die Gärten hinter dem Verbandsplatz vorbeilaufen, fährt eine Granate in das Depot der 15. Pi.-Kp.
Die Granate durchschlägt das Dach und explodiert im Keller.
Sie hat eine furchtbare Wirkung. Oberfeldwebel Schulze, Gfr. Goldmann, Howe und Schüßler sind sofort tot. Gfr. Niehaus und noch zwei Mann sind schwer verwundet.
Bald soll sich auch unsere Frage über die Anwesenheit der Neger aufklären. Bei der 3. Kompanie, die den nordwestlichen Ortsrand von Thirimont bezogen hat, waren zwei junge Jäger auf Posten, der weit dem Ort vorgelagert war. Bei diesen beiden Posten sind im Morgengrauen mehrere Kolonnen Amerikaner in Reihe vorbeimarschiert. Wenn nur ein Jäger die Nerven gehabt hätte bis zum nahen kleinen Wäldchen zu laufen, um dann ungesehen nach Thirimont zu gelangen. Dort hätten dann die Kompanien alarmiert werden können, und den Amis hätten die Verteidiger einen „feuerlichen Empfang" bereitet. So aber gelang es, daß die 2. und 3. Kompanie seitlich umgangen wurden und ohne auf Widerstand zu stoßen, konnten sich die Amis gegenüber der Kirche und noch in zwei Häusern im südwestlichsten Teil des Ortes festsetzen.
Als die 1. Kompanie Häuser besetzt und an den Fenstern hinter Matratzen Stellung bezieht, hört man zwischen den Einschlägen schon deutlich das langsame Bellen der amerik. MGs.
Auch sieht man schon etliche Garben von Knallerbsen, wie die hellroten Leuchtspurgarben genannt werden, durch den Ort zischen.
In den Häusern richtet sich alles zur Ringsumverteidigung ein. Das Ziel der 1. Kompanie ist, es so schnell wie möglich zu dem über der Straße liegenden Haus, in dem die Bäckerei ist, zu kommen.
De ruft einer:
„Da, ein Neger!"
Text Box:Text Box:Wo?
„Dort am Fenster im gegenüberliegenden Haus!"
Richtig, da schaut aus dem oberen Fenster ein Neger in Schneebekleidung heraus. Sein Gesicht sticht aus der Schneebekleidung heraus.
Einer schießt mit dem Gewehrgranatgerät auf das Fenster. Peng, der Neger ist weg.
Der 1. Kompanie gelingt es dann doch, im geschlossenen Sprung über die schmale Straße im das andere Haus zu kommen.
Keine Verluste.
Eine Gruppe sammelt sich im hinteren Teil des Hausganges, wo es sehr dunkel ist, um über eine schmale Stiege nach oben zu gehen. Plötzlich wird die Kellertüre zurückgeschlagen und zwei Neger bleiben unter der Haustüre stehen und peilen die Lage. Dann treten sie nach links aus der Haustüre.
Ogfr. Bregulla ist mit zwei Sätzen an der Haustüre, zieht eine Stielhandgranate ab, behält sie bis zur höchsten Grenze in der Hand und wirft sie dann hinter die Füße der an der Hausecke stehenden, uns den Rücken zukehrenden Negern.
Dabei schreit er laut in oberschlesisch: „Hund fluchte!"
Ständig wird die geringste Bewegung am Haus, von einem schweren amerik. MG mit einer Garbe, ja sogar mit Punktfeuer registriert. Wo mag das MG wohl stehen?
Jetzt wird es ausgemacht. Das MG schießt genau aus dem Kellerfenster des Hauses, das direkt vor der Kirche steht und in die quer durch den Ort laufende Dorfstraße zur Kirche hineinsehen kann.
Wenn das MG nicht wegkommt, können wir nicht mehr weiter. Von den Häusern der 4. Kompanie, die auf der anderen Seite der Dorfstraße Stellung bezogen hat, machen sich der Kompaniemelder Jäger Greil sowie der MG-Schütze Krämer und der Jäger Pager auf, um das MG auszuheben. Trotz des noch immer auf dem Ort liegenden Feuers, gelingt es den dreien, in dem noch vom Feind freien Teil gut vorzukommen.
Jetzt können die Jäger der 1. Kompanie die drei Jäger auch schon erkennen, die sich da durch die Gärten auf das Haus zuschleichen.
Dann haben sie es geschafft.
Der MG-Schütze gibt Feuerschutz und die beiden Jäger springen die wenigen Schritte zum Haus hin.
Jäger Rudi Pager, ein Sachse, steckt neben die Mündung des MGs die mitgeführte Panzerfaust in das Kellerfenster und drückt ab.
Eine Stichflamme fegt zum Kellerfenster heraus.
Der Jäger Pager jedoch bleibt liegen.
Sein Kumpel Armin Greil robbt zu ihm ran, und zieht ihn zurück.
Beide stellen sie jetzt fest, daß sich Pager durch den Abschuß der Panzerfaust schwere Verbrennungen zugezogen hat.
Zu zweit packen sie ihren Kameraden und schleppen ihn durch die Gärten auf den Verbandsplatz von Doktor Kahle.
Wenn sie jetzt noch die Straße überqueren, dann sind sie im Haus des Verbandsplatzes.
Als dann beide mit ihrem verletzten Kameraden über die Straße rennen, trifft den 3g. Greil ein IG in den Unterleib. Es ist das MG, das von der anderen Seite der Kirche, im Pfarrhaus, seit einigen Minuten den Ort bestreicht.
Um 10 Uhr kommt erneut der Melder der 1. Kp. zu den einzelnen Gruppen durch und teilt mit, daß es den Kompanien des I. Bataillons gelungen sei, den Ami auf eine Linie zurückzuwerfen und um 13 Uhr wird, wenn die Verstärkung vom Regiment eintrifft, ein Gegenstoß gestartet, um den Ami wieder aus dem Ort zu werfen.
Verschiedentlich wurden schon mehrere Neger gefangen. Man steckt sie kurzer Hand in einen tiefen Keller und verklemmt mit Balken die Eingangstüre. Denn ein Abtransport wäre bei der Kampfstärke ein Irrsinn!
Der Zugführer der 4. Kompanie Objg. Clemens Moors, ein alter Fallschirmjäger, hat in dem Haus neben seinem Zug einen weißen Captain und vier Neger mit einem Funkgerät ausgemacht. Der muß raus, denkt sich der Oberjäger, sonst bringt der uns wieder die Ari, die seit einiger Zeit schweigt, auf den Hals.
Thirimont, vue de l'école et de la chapelle St Gangolf.
(Direction: venant de Waimes)
Doch sobald sich ein Fallschirmjäger, wenn auch im Laufschritt, irgendwo zeigt, geht sofort ein Granatwerferfeuerhagel auf die Stelle nieder, wo er zuerst gesichtet wurde.
Also ist jemand da, der das Feuer leitet!
Es gelingt nun Objg. Moors mit dem Kp.-Truppführer Ofw. Domnick und dem MG-Schützen Jg. Fuchs, die Amis mit dem Funkgerät auszuheben.
Als sie mit den Gefangenen, und dem Funkgerät wieder aus dem Haus sind, gehen neben dem Haus einige Einschläge nieder.
Objg. Moors trifft ein Granatsplitter in den Unterarm, während der Ofw. Domnick einen großen Splitter an den Springerhelm bekommt, daß er mit einer schweren Gehirnerschütterung liegen bleibt.
Doch immer wieder, wenn Gruppen ein Haus verlassen und in ein anderes Haus eindringen, geht ein Feuerhagel nieder.
Von der 4. Kompanie wird dann auch im Kirchturm ein Beobachter ausgemacht. Mit dem Fernglas kann man deutlich erkennen, wie die Antenne des Sprechfunkgerätes aus dem Schallfenster am Glockenstuhl geht.
Der Panzervernichter Gfr. Franz Westphal nimmt sein Ofenrohr, legt es auf und schießt mit einem Schuß den Beobachter aus dem Glockenturm heraus.
Sofort ist festzustellen, daß das Feuer nicht mehr geleitet wird.
Als die 1. Kompanie mit dem Zugführer Fw. Vinz Kuhlbach wieder ein anderes Haus erreicht hat, wird in Abständen in das Haus mit einer amerik. MPi geschossen.
Es kann nicht festgestellt werden, wo der Schütze steht.
Plötzlich kann man erkennen, wie aus dem gegenüberliegenden Haus ein Ami läuft, wenige Schritte danach an einer Hecke stehen bleibt und dann mit seiner MPi das Haus beschießt.
Als der Ami wiederholt aus dem Haus kommt, beugt sich Gfr. Frühbeißer mit einem Gewehrgranatgerät weit aus dem Fenster des oberen Stockwerkes, um so besseres Schußfeld zu haben, und drückt ab.
Zur gleichen Zeit aber trifft ihn ein Schuß durch den rechten Oberarm.
Fast wäre ihm von dem Schlag das Gerät aus der Hand gefallen. Gott sei Dank, es ist nur ein glatter Durchschuß durch den Muskel.
Der Ami mit der MPi ist ausgeschaltet, wo aber ist der andere Schütze?
Schnell wird rekonstruiert.
Der Schuß muß also aus dem Dach der etwa 15 Meter entfernten Scheune gekommen sein.
Richtig, nach einiger Zeit hebt sich ein Dachziegel und Mündungsfeuer blitzt auf.
Als der Ami wieder schießt, schießt ein anderer mit einem Gewehrgranatgerät auf den Schützen. Es gibt ein großes Loch im Dach und der Schütze ist außer Gefecht.
Erneut beginnt die feindliche Artillerie in den Ort zu schießen. Unser Chef Oberleutnant Strasser bekommt ganz schön Dunst. Als er eine Wiese in einem Obstgarten durchläuft, spritzt neben ihm der Schnee auf. Ein MG beschießt den Alten.
Sobald er den Kopf wieder aus dem Schnee hebt, spritzt nur wenige Handbreit neben ihm erneut der Schnee auf.
Bei ihm befindet sich der MG-Schütze Ogfr. Jonny Bonnemann. Jonny, ein alter Italien- und Normandiekämpfer, hat in Holland ein Ding gedreht und wurde vom Feldgericht verurteilt. Er macht nun bei der Kompanie seine Frontbewahrung.
Nur durch des schneidige Vorgehen von Bonnemann gelingt es, daß sich der Kompaniechef Obltn. Strasser aus seiner mißlichen Lage befreien kann. Plötzlich bellt es ganz hell auf.
Allmächtiger, jetzt ist ein Panzer im Ort.
Richtig, bald ist ein Sherman-Panzer ausgemacht, der auf dem Nebenweg mit einigen anderen Panzern vom Hauts-Sart-Berg, der südwestlich von Thirimont liegt, herunter gefahren kam.
Auf der anderen Seite des Ortes hat sich ein Sturmgeschütz der Panzerjäger-Abteilung 2./683, die von einem Leutnant Lorenz geführt wird, eingeschlichen und den Panzer schon bei der Einfahrt von Ondenval aus ausgemacht und angerichtet.
Langsam hat es Routine gemacht, wenn Amis gefangen werden, dann sperrt man sie in den nächsten Keller, um so nicht Kräfte für einen Transport abgeben zu müssen.
Als sich während einer Feuerpause Gfr. Frühbeißer vom Stabsarzt Dr. Walter Kahle im Verbandsplatz verbinden läßt, hört er vom Doktor, den die Alten immer Karbolonkel nennen, daß es beim Kampf noch sehr wenige Verwundete gegeben hat, die meisten lassen sich verbinden und gehen zu ihren Zügen zurück.
Als Frühbeißer dann aus der Haustüre tritt, prallt er mit zwei Negern unter der Türe zusammen.
Der eine Neger schreit fürchterlich und läßt seine MPi fallen, der andere wirft seinen Karabiner auf die Straße.
Ein Sanitäts-Oberjäger kommt hinzu und nimmt die Neger in Empfang.
Frühbeißer jedoch nimmt sich für alle Fälle die MPi und die Magazine mit Munition. Diese Sten Gun ist doppelt so schwer wie der Karabiner 98 k.
Als er dann wieder vor dem Haus seines Zuges angelangt ist, will er über die Straße rennen. Mitten darin fährt eine zischende hellrote MG-Garbe über die Straße. Frühbeißer trifft ein schwerer Schlag am rechten Bein und er fällt auf die Straße. Auf allen Vieren läuft er ins Haus.
Dort stellt er fest, daß er einen Schuß in die Innenseite der rechten Kniekehle erhalten hat.
Also wieder zurück zum Doktor,damit er eine Arbeit hat. Diesesmal nimmt er jedoch den Weg bis an die Ecke der Dorfstraße, die des amerik. MG nicht einsieht.
lm Verbandsplatz angelangt, zieht der Doktor Kahle mit der Pinzette und anderem Gerät des Projektil heraus.
Jetzt stellen alle mit Entsetzen fest, daß es ein Explosivgeschoß ist, des nicht explodiert ist.
Nach kurzer Zeit humpelt der Gfr. Frühbeißer mit einem dicken Knieverband wieder ab. Denn Doktor Kahle muß den Verbandsplatz mit den Verwundeten räumen. Erst vor wenigen Minuten hat ein MG zu den Fenstern hereingeschossen.
Er soll neben dem Bataillonsgefechtsstand in einem Haus wieder seinen Verbandsplatz aufmachen. Inzwischen ist die Lage wieder sehr verworren.
Der Gefechtsstand der 3. Kp. des Hptm. Woitscheck soll eingeschlossen sein. Hptm. Fick, der Chef der 2. Kp., versucht ihn wieder freizukämpfen.
Auf dem Rückweg zur Kompanie wird Frühbeißer, als er vor dem Punktfeuer eines amerik. MGs an einer Hausecke Schutz sucht, um die Hausecke gezogen. Als er sich umdreht, verspürt er gleichzeitig einen stechenden Schmerz in der rechten Hüfte. Als er sich ganz herumdrehen will, erkennt er, daß hinter ihm ein langer Neger steht, er ihm des aufgepflanzte Seitengewehr in die Hüfte drückt.
Mit einer Fistelstimme zischt der Neger: „Hands up!" Frühbeißer schießt es durch den Kopf: ja sieht mich denn keiner?
Er Läßt die Waffen fallen und hebt die Hände über den Springerhelm. Der Neger stinkt nach einem furchtbaren Fuselschnaps.
Er muß sich verirrt haben, denn an den zwei Häusern war zuvor kein Ami zu sehen.
Der Neger japst dann: „Mag snell Paratroupers go on!" Dabei treibt er ihn einen schmalen Weg hinunter.
Mensch, denkt sich Frühbeißer, das ist ja der kürzeste Weg zum Bataillonsgefechtsstand. „Da kann der Neger mich abliefern." In 40 Metern muß das Haus auftauchen.
Plötzlich hört er laut: „Volle Deckung!"
Zack, nichts wie runter!
Schon rattert die Garbe eines MG 42 über Frühbeißer weg. Der Neger aber ist tot.
Objg. und Funktruppführer der 4. Kp Richard Rösinger, ein ganz alter Fallschirmjäger, der mit seinem Funktrupp in einem kleinen Haus sein Funkgerät aufgestellt hat, hatte Frühbeißer in seiner verzweifelten Lage gesehen, konnte aber nicht schießen, da er sonst ihn selbst getroffen hätte. Erst ais der Neger vor dem Haus war, konnte der Oberjäger feuern.
Nach einem kräftigen Schluck aus der Flasche und mit den besten Wünschen ist Frühbeißer wieder aus dem Haus und nimmt nur wenige Meter danach seine Waffen, die im Schnee liegen, wieder auf.
Unser prächtiger Bataillonsarzt muß nun doch seinen Verbandsplatz räumen. Mit einigen Sanitätern gelingt es ihm dann den Verbandsplatz zur Verlegung zu räumen. Es sind auch einige verwundete Amerikaner dabei. Um ihn herum humpeln Fallschirmjäger. Schwerverwundete werden auf der Trage, die mit den zwei Griffen im Schnee ais eine Art Schlitten nachgezogen werden, gezogen. Der Doktor Kahle winkt mit einer Rot-Kreuz-Flagge.
Plötzlich wird ständig neben dem Doktor auf die Strafe geschossen. Aber der Doktor kann den Weg noch einige Male machen, bis er das Haus leer hat.
Frühbeißer ist mit einer Meidung zum Batl. unterwegs.
Die Schnee-Eifel, was ihr Name verspricht.
Mit 1PS geht es noch
Das Laufen wird immer schwerer, denn der Fuß schwillt an. Auch die Finger der rechten Hand werden langsam dick wie Bratwürste.
Eine über die Straße gefallene dicke Tanne versperrt ihm den Weg.
Er bleibt in der Tanne stehen und peilt durchs Gelände.
Die Straße herauf kommt der Kompaniemelder Gfr. Franz Heß angerannt. Auch Franz bleibt in der Tanne stehen und spricht mit seinem Kameraden Rudi.
Dann nimmt er seinen hellblauen Seidenschal und bindet seinem alten Kumpel den verwundeten rechten Arm hoch.
Plötzlich kracht es ganz hell, Franz Heß hat genau über der Nasenwurzel ein Loch, aus dem etwas Blut läuft. Langsam sinkt Heß um. Frühbeißer fängt ihn auf und legt ihn in der Tanne nieder. Eine Stimme ruft plötzlich: „Bleibt in der Tanne, ich hab den Schützen entdeckt. Dann bumst eine Handgranate.
Der Zugführer der 4. Kp. Objg. Kattner ist dann auch bei der Tanne und will helfen. Er kann aber nicht mehr helfen.
Der Kompaniemelder Gfr. Franz Heß ist gefallen.
Gfr. Frühbeißer zieht seinem Kameraden die Erkennungsmarke heraus und bricht sie ab.
217 444-64 ist die Erkennungsmarkennummer, die Franz Heß trug. Nun nimmt Frühbeißer noch die Brieftasche an sich und Iäuft weg zum Bataillonsgefechtsstand. Dort meldet er den Verlust des Kompaniemelders.
Als dann Frühbeißer, dem das Laufen immer mehr Beschwerden macht, den Gefechtsstand verläßt, haut in der Nähe eine Granate ein und ein kleiner Splitter trifft ihn im Nacken.
Der Stabsarzt meint jetzt, daß es genug sei und er solle zu Doktor Liebau nach Schüller zur Krankensammelstelle.
Als es dunkel wird, gelingt es Frühbeißer, mit seinem Kameraden Ogfr. Bonnemann, dem ein Ami im Nahkampf die linke Hand durchschossen hat, unbeschädigt ins Tal der Amel zum Forsthaus zu kommen.
Die Nacht liegt über dem zum Teil brennenden Ort Thirimont. Ab und zu fallen einige Schüsse.

14. Januar 1945

Gesamtverluste: 21 Mann = 21 Verwundete.

Thirimont von der östlichen Seite.
(A voir le clocher, je ne pense pas qu'il s'agisse de Thirimont)
In der Nacht schickt der Zugführer der 3. Kp. Ofw. Zalikowski den San.-Oberjäger Egon Luger aus Bregenz los, um nachzusehen, was mit dem zweiten Zug des Ofw. Heini Hansen und dem dritten Zug des Ofw. Waldemar Lemke los sei.
Der Oberjäger kommt nicht mehr zurück.
Was mag da los sein?
Thirimont, vue depuis le clocher de l'église.
Der Zugführer Waldemar Lemke hält ständig durch zwei Melder Verbindung mit dem Nachrichten-Zug 3./293 einer Volksgrenadier-Einheit, die dem I. Batl., unterstellt wurde. Der Chef der Einheit läßt aber melden, daß in seinem Abschnitt in Thirimont alles in Ordnung sei.
Der Zug von Ofw. Lemke hat die Aufgabe, die wiedergewonnene Straße en der Kirche zu bewachen, die zum kleinen Ort Sedan führt, der 400 m westlich von Thirimont liegt und nur aus vier Häusern besteht. Dazu ist eine Gruppe mit panzerbrechenden Waffen unter Objg. Fechner zugeteilt. Ohne daß der Zug aber etwas merkte, brach der Ami ungesehen bei dem Nachrichten-Zug der 2./293 ein.
Vor der Türe des Hauses in dem Keller, wo Waldemar Lemke seinen Gefechtsstand hat, stehen zwei Posten, die ständig die geringste Veränderung melden müssen. Ein ZbV-Zug einer anderen Einheit kommt an und soll zu dem Zug der 2./293 durchstoßen. Als Einweiser wird um einen Melder gebeten, der den Weg kennt.
Der Zug wird aber von den Amis geschnappt, wobei der Melder von den Amis mit dem Gewehrkolben erschlagen wird.
Der Melder vor dem Haus kann gerade noch das Anrücken der Amis melden, dann ist das Gehöft von Amis umzingelt. Nur wenigen gelingt der Ausbruch.
Der Amerikaner wirft eine geballte Ladung in den Keller.
Hier sehen auch noch einige, wie man den gefangenen Kompaniechef Hauptmann Woitscheck bringt.
Als beim Zug des Ofw. Zalisowski noch immer keine Nachricht eintrifft, geht er mit Oberjäger Bruno Walz auf die Straße zu, die aus Thirimont herausführt. Kurze Zeit später erkennen beide, daß sich eine Kolonne aus dem Ort heraus auf sie zubewegt. Beide rufen die Kolonne an.
Kein Laut!
Nun feuern beide ihre MPis ab. Jetzt hören sie deutsche Laute. Nichts wie hin.
Nun stellen sie fest, daß es sich um 40 Mann des I. Bataillons handelt, die als US-Gefangene amerik. Verwundete auf Schlitten zum amerik. Verbandsplatz ziehen sollten. Die US-Sanitäter haben die Fallschirmjäger gut behandelt und versorgt. Leider ist bei der Schießerei der San.-Oberjäger Egon Luger der auch gefangen wurde, am Bein verwundet worden.
Große Freude herrscht bei den befreiten Jägern.
Text Box:Ein verwundeter amerik. höherer Offizier, bittet die Fallschirmjäger mit gefalteten Händen, daß seinen Leuten nichts getan wird. Was denkt sich der bloiß?
Nach kurzem Kriegsrat beschließt Ofw. Zalikowski, daß ein US.Sani bei seinen verwundeten Kameraden bleiben soll, während er die anderen US-Sanitäter zur Hilfe für die eigenen Verwundeten mitnimmt. Es gelingt der Gruppe sich unerkannt um Thirimont hinter den amerik. Linien herumzuschleichen und im Süden wieder auf Thirimont zu stoßen.
lm Morgengrauen erhält dann Obltn. Strasser vom Bataillonskommendeur Hptm. Schiffke den Befehl, im Gegenstoß den Ort vom eingedrungenen Amerikaner zu säubern. Fast wie nach einem Plan beginnt die Säuberung in einem schneidigen Gegenstoß. Die zum Teil brennenden Häuser geben genügend Büchsenlicht ab.
Blick von der Vorpostentsellung bei Grosbois auf den Graben mit
der Stadt Malmedy.
Es gelingt den Fallschirmjägern den gesamten Ort wieder in Besitz zu nehmen und den Ami zu werfen. Es wird auf kleinere Gruppen gestoßen, die sich oft nur mit 3 Mann in Häusern eingeigelt hatten, und so auf Entsatz gewartet haben.
Es wird auch große Kriegsbeute gemacht.
Mit den zum Teil in Kellern gefangenen und bei dem Gegenstoß neu gefangenen Amerikanern ist der Kampf beendet.
Es liegen sehr viele gefallene Amerikaner im Ort.
Obltn. Strasser kehrt zum Gefechtsstand zurück und meldet seinem Kommandeur Hptm. Schiffke:
„Befehl ausgeführt, Ort vom Feind frei, 92 gefangene Amerikaner und große Kriegsbeute. Eigene Verluste sind gering!"
Sofort wird wieder genügend Munition und Handgranaten verteilt. Auch die erbeuteten Beutebestände und Waffen werden dabei benutzt.
Es wurden auch einige Pakgeschütze und Granatwerfer erbeutet. Diese Waffen werden sofort zweckmäßig im Ort untergebracht und zum Einsatz bereitgestellt.
Am Nachmittag geht wieder schweres Feuer auf den zum Teil schon schwer zerstörten Ort nieder. In der Dämmerung will der Amerikaner von der Straße aus Sedan und der Einöde Grosbois aus den Ort angreifen, was aber zum Teil mit einem sofortigen Gegenstoß unterbunden wird.
Die Nacht bleibt bis auf Störfeuer ruhig.

15. Januar 1945

Gesamtverluste: 183 Mann = 10 Tote-37 Verwundete-98 Vermißte-38 Gefangene.

Thirimont Schulhaus
Die Züge, die das II. und III. Bataillon zur Unterstützung geschickt hatte,konnten wieder abgezogen werden.
Beim II. und III. Bataillon hat der Amerikaner auch mit starken Angriffstruppen versucht die Fronten einzudrücken.
lm Morgengrauen geht erneut ein schweres Feuer auf den Ortnieder. Dieses mal schießt der Ami nur mit Phosphorgranaten.
Die Wirkung ist verheerend.
Die Reste der 3. Kompanie sind bald wieder umzingelt und werden gefangen. Oberjäger Fechner, Gfr. Niekamp und ein Jäger werden gefangen genommen und zum Verhör gefahren. Alle sitzen vorne auf der Motorhaube und stützen sich mit den Füßen auf der vorderen Stoßtsange ab. Der Fahrer fragt die drei Fallschirmjäger etwas.
Gfr. Heinz Niekamp, der englisch sprechen kann, dreht sich um und gibt dem Fahrer Antwort.
Der Fahrer zieht die Pistole aus dem Brusthalter und schießt Niekamp in den Rücken. Niekamp blutet sofort aus Mund und Nase.
Auch bei den anderen Kompanien gibt es Gefangene. Alle werden in dem kleinen Schulhaus zusammengetrieben und in ein großes Zimmer gesperrt. Dort muß alles abzählen.
Als alles mit dem Abzählen fertig ist, hat der Chef der 1. Kompanie Obltn. Hans Strasser die Nummer 92.
Kloster Montenau
Dies konnte alles ein Jäger berichten, dem bei dem Abtransport der Gruppe die Flucht und das Durchschlagen zur eigenen Linie gelang.
Bataillonskommandeur Hptm. Schiffke ist am Bein schwer verwundet und läßt sich, damit er eine bessere Übersicht hat, mit einem Schlitten durchs Gelände ziehen.
Bei Anbruch der Dunkelheit müssen die schwachen Kräfte dem immer stärker werdenden Feinddruck nachgeben und den total zerstörten Ort Thirimont räumen.
Beim II. und III. Bataillon geht es seit dem Morgengrauen hoch her.
Beim Regimentsgefechtsstand, der sich zur Zeit im Kloster Montenau befindet, überschlagen sich die Meldungen.
Auch hier begann im Morgengrauen ein mörderisches Artilleriefeuer.
Bald sind die einzelnen Drahtverbindungen abgerissen und der Weg der Melder muß durch Funk ersetzt werden.
Hauptmann Hardt, der seit der Erkrankung des Majors Taubert das II. Bataillon führt, hat aile Hände voll zu tun, um das Ärgste von seinen Jägern abzuwehren.
Von der 15. Kp. wird bei der Versorgung von Verwundeten der Sanitäts-Oberjäger Schmitz gefangen. Gfr. Nickel erhält dabei einen tödlichen Bauchschuß.
Bei einem Gegenstoß, der von der 8. Kompanie durchgeführt wird, fällt der Kompaniemelder Jäger Mechler durch Kopfschuß. Jäger Lorenz erhält einen Mundschuß und wird gefangen. Der zweite Kompaniemelder, der die Meldung weiterbringt, erhält einen Bauchschuß und wird auch gefangen. Den Waffenwart, Jg. Kern, trifft in einem Haus ein Kopfschuß und wird auch gefangen. Von der 6. Kp. des Hptm. Stark fällt der Gruppenführer Objg. Jumpertz.
Auch die 7. Kp. ist in schwere Abwehrkämpfe verwickelt. Ofw. Kalitzki, den Ofenrohrschützen trifft, ais er gegen einen Panzer vorgeht, ein Explosionsgeschoß in die rechte Schulter.
Ofw. Schütze, Fw. Fritz Lipka, Stehle und Jansen werden gefangen.
Auch der alte Normandiehase, Oberjäger Siegfried Rosenlehner, der mit seiner Gruppe ein Haus verteidigt, wird von den Amis überwältigt.
Er wird außerhalb von Faymonville zum Verhör gebracht. Als er in ein Zimmer geführt wird, liegt hinter der Türschwelle auf dem Boden ausgebreitet eine Hakenkreuzfahne. Objg. Rosenlehner steigt jedoch über die Fahne hinweg und bleibt stehen. De hauen ihn die Amis mit den Gewehrkolben nieder.
Als er sich wieder erheben kann, brüllt ihn ein Ami in deutscher Sprache an:
„Du stinkender Hund, wenn Du noch einmal nicht auf den dreckigen Hakenkreuzfetzen trittst, geht es dir genau so wie dem da!" Dabei deutet er mit der Hand auf einen am Boden liegenden Falischirmjäger. Der Oberjäger kann erkennen, daß es sich um einen Kradmelder des Stabes des II. Bataillons handelt, der Name fällt ihm aber nicht ein. Dies alles berichtet der stellvertretende Zugführer Objg. Staudt von der 7. Kp., dem es als Verwundetem gelang, wieder auszurücken, als er sich beim Stab zurückmeldete.
Beim anschließenden Gegenstoß fallt Oberleutnant Klüber.
Es gelingt auch, mehrere Häuser im brennenden Ort wieder zurückzuerobern und Gefangene zu machen. Bei der 6. Kp. fallt der Jg. Jung durch Bauchschuß.
Am Nachmittag fällt der Bataillonskommandeur Hauptmann Hardt. Der Adjutant Oberleutnant Willi Gutermann übernimmt nun selbst die Führung über das Bataillon. Immer wieder gelingt es dem Amerikaner, mit neuen Kräften in den Ort einzudringen.
Der Bataillonsstab selbst wird immer ärger bedrängt.
Der Führer des Nachrichtenzuges Fahnenjunker-Stabsfeldwebel Herbert Reintal macht mit seinem Nachrichtenzug einen Ausfall, es gelingt auch den schneidigen Jägern, fast alles alte Fallschirmjäger, den Ami um einige Häuser zu werfen, einige Zeit später werden die Jäger umzingelt und gefangen.
Den MG-Schützen 3g. Münk von der 6. Kp. trifft am MG ein tödlicher Kopfschuß.
Die 8. Kompanie ist in eine Zange genommen worden. Aus drei Seiten greift der Amerikaner an.
Der Kompaniechef Ltn. Alfred Schmidt wird dabei schwer verwundet. Er erhält einen Steckschuß in den Rücken, im rechten Oberschenkel einen Schußbruch und im linken Fuis einen Steckschuß.
Der die Kompanie übernehmende Ltn. Georg Schmidt wird im Rücken und am Fuß verwundet.
San.-Fw. Bodo Paulat, der sich um die beiden Offiziere gekümmert hat, wird, als er dem verwundeten Fahnenjunker-Oberjäger Kliesch helfen will, selbst verwundet.
Bei der 7. Kompanie fällt durch Halsschuß der 3g. Gustav Kühn. Bei Anbruch der Dunkelheit wird der Verbandsplatz umzingelt und der arbeitende Oberarzt Doktor Fritz Dingebauer mit seinen beiden Sanitäts-Obergefreiten Kubatta und Jonetzko und einer größeren Anzahl von Verwundeten gefangen.
Auch der Bataillonsstab soli gefangen sein.
Zuvor haben sie noch Gefallene notdürftig bestattet und die Unterlagen dem Fräulein Maria Christiani übergeben, die mit ihren Eltern in einem Keller haust.
Am Abend zieht sich dann das schwer angeschlagene II. Bataillon aus dem Ort Faymonville zurück auf die Orte Steinbach und die einzelne Ferme, den Steffenshof, der auf dem Weg 200 Meter südlich von Faymonville an der Straße nach Ondenval liegt. Das III. Bataillon des Hauptmanns Buchholz kann dem Feind nicht mehr standhalten und muß aus Remonval zurück und sich auf Ondenval absetzen.
Die Nacht selbst bleibt nach den schweren Kämpfen ruhig.

16. Januar 1945

Gesamtverluste: 22 Mann = 3 Verwundete-15 Vermiite-3 Gefangene-1 Kranker.

Am Nachmittag kommt es in den Steilungen des Steffenshofs und am Kreuz im Rohrbusch an der Straße von Faymonville nach Ondenval — Eibertingen — Iveldingen zu einem schweren Kampf. lm Gegenstoß gelingt es, den eingedrungenen Amerikaner wieder aus dem Wald zu werfen.
Bei der 13. Kp., die nördlich von Iveldingen ihre Stellungen hat, fällt der Gfr. Schwarz.
Das I. Bataillon hat eine neue Verteidigungslinie an den Hängen nördlich Montenau im Tal der Amel bezogen.
Bei Anbruch der Dunkelheit kommt es beim Steffenhof zwischen der 6. Kp. und einer größeren Gruppe von Amerikanern zu einem schweren Gefecht. Dabei wird der Oberfähnrich Gegenmantel mit seinem Zug gefangen genommen.
Beim I. Bataillon greift der Amerikaner am Abend über den Amel-Fluß an, wird aber abgewiesen.

17. Januar1945

Gesamtverluste: 10 Mann = 3 Tote —1 Verwundeter — 3 Vermißte — 3 Gefangene.

Oberstleutnant Gundolf Freiherr Schenk zu Schweinsberg
Unter seinem Befehl wurde ab 1.Okt. 1944 das Regiment
in Holland neu aufgestellt. Später war er Kommandeur des
I. Bataillons und Kdr. der "Kampfgruppe Schenk".
Bei einem Stoßtrupp, der auf der Straße nach Croix de Sar, das an der Straße nach Ondenval, 200 Meter rechts der Vieux-Mühle am Amelfluß liegt, vorgeht, fällt der Ordonnanzoffizier des Regimentsstabes Obltn. Eich.
Bei der 5. Kp. fällt der Fahnenjunker-Oberjäger Dubbe durch Kopfschuß.
Oberst Liebach, der Kommandeur des Fallschirmjäger-Regiments 8, der zu Beginn der Kämpfe in der Normandie verwundet wurde, ist aus dem Lazarett zurückgekommen und übernimmt, wenn auch umständlich, wieder die Führung über das Regiment.
Oberstleutnant Gundolf Freiherr Schenk zu Schweinsberg wird somit frei.
Aus einem Zug der Pi.-Kp. des Rgts. und noch einigen Gruppen sowie aus 5 Sturmpanzern und 3 Sturmgeschützen wird unter der Führung des Oberleutnants die „Kampfgruppe Schenk" gegründet.
Diese Kampfgruppe soll sich noch als große Unterstützung für das Regiment erweisen.
Die Kampfgruppe selbst bleibt aber dem Befehl von Oberst i. G. Helmut von Hoffmann, dem Regimentskommandeur, unterstellt. lm Rohr-Busch unterhalb der Höhe 533 kommt es zu einem schweren Kampf.

18.Januar 1945

Gesamtverluste: 37 Mann = 4 Tote —10 Verwundete — 23 Vermifite.

Nördlich von Iveldingen im Bereich der 13. Kp. kommt es zu einem schweren Rückzugsgefecht.
Der Kp.-Chef Obltn. Schenk kann den ständig anstürmenden Amerikaner nicht lange aufhalten. Der alte Ogfr. Scharanowski fällt dabei.
17 Mann, unter ihnen der Fähnrich Max Ursprung, werden vermißt.
Bei der 14. Kp., die en die 13. Kompanie anschließt, fällt der Jäger Bach während des Angriffs durch Herzschuß und Ogfr. Schmerold durch Kopfschuß. Objg. Pielensticker erhält einen Beuchschuß und stirbt.
Men of I Cy. ride a tank into the attack of Schoppen
Aus den Rückzugsbewegungen ist zu ersehen, daß der Amerikaner unbedingt in Schoppen eindringen will.
800 Meter westlich von Schoppen an der Straße nach Faymonville liegt genau gegenüber der Höhe 548 links eine kleine Waldparzelle.
Dort wird der angreifende Amerikaner aber von der „Kampfgruppe Schenk" abgewehrt.
Die Sturmgeschütze feuern in des Wäldchen, daß es Fetzen gibt.
Als dann vorsichtig die Jäger der Kampfgruppe in das Wäldchen eindringen, finden sie 150 gefallene Amerikaner.
Von diesem Tag an nannten die Jäger das Wäldchen, das „Totenwäldchen I"
Der Regimentsgefechtsstand befindet sich wieder in der im Tal liegenden „Möderscheid-Mühle".

19.Januar 1945

Gesamtverluste: 22 Mann = 7 Tote — 8 Verwundete — 7 Vermißte.

Bei der 14. Kompanie entfernt sich unerlaubt von der Truppe der Jg. Rudi Hust.
Bei Tagesanbruch kommt es bei der Vieux-Mühle am Amel-FIuß mit einer Gruppe Nachzügler zu einem Gefecht. Der Zugführer Fahnenjunker-Feldwebel Rudolf Barnersoi wird beim Oberqueren eines kleinen Weges, um den schützenden Wald zu erreichen, verwundet. Bei ihm ist der Gfr. Bail und der Melder Ogfr. Klee, der am Arm schwer verwundet wird. Oberleutnent Michel, der Chef der 15. Pi.-Kp. wird seit diesem Gefecht mit Fw. Barnersoi und Gfr. Bail und Ogfr. Klee vermißt.
Der Frontverlauf im Regiment ist südlich von Schoppen aus über die Hôhe 534 zur Hôhe 533 der sogenannten Eibertinger Höhe zum Wald am Bambusch nach Mirfeld und Amel.
Um 7.30 Uhr greift der Ami ohne Artillerieunterstützung an.
Es herrscht so starkes Schneetreiben, daß man keine 100 Meter weit sieht. Die eigenen Sturmgeschütze der Kampfgruppe kommen somit nicht zur Wirkung, da sie blind schießen müssen.
Der Feindangriff erfolgt mit Panzerunterstützung von Norden, Westen und Osten aus.
Die im Nordteil des Ortes Schoppen liegende Gruppe der dort eingesetzten „Kampfgruppe Schenk" erhält den Befehl, sich in den südlichen Ortsteil abzusetzen. Draht und Funkverbindung zum Regiment sind unterbrochen.
Möderscheid-Mühle
Die „Kampfgruppe" beabsichtigt, sich hinhaltend auf die Möderscheid-Mühle abzusetzen. Der Gefechtsstand der „Kampfgruppe Schenk" wird erst aus Schoppen zurückgenommen, als der Amerikaner nur noch 100 Meter entfernt ist. Das Absetzen erfolgt völlig geordnet.
Gegen 10 Uhr ist die „Kampfgruppe" südwestlich der Höhe 534 an der Straßenkreuzung unterhalb der Eibertinger Höhe.
Von der 3. Fallschirmjäger-Division kommt der Befehl:
„Schoppen ist sofort wieder zu nehmen!"
Der „Kampfgruppe Schenk" wird die Zuführung von Kräften und Artillerieunterstützung zugesagt.
Aerial view of Schoppen, Jan.45
Nach kurzer Besprechung machen sich die wackeren Streiter bereit.
Es gelingt auch unter der Führung des schneidigen Kp.-Führers der Kampfgruppe, des Obltn. Wedding, in Schoppen wieder einzudringen. 7 Sturmgeschütze sind bei den Fallschirmjägern. Während des Kampfes, der von einer unbeschreiblichen Härte ist, gelingt es 40 Amerikaner zu fangen, die sofort zum Ausgangspunkt zurückgebracht werden.
Es werden mehrere Panzer im Nahkampf vernichtet.
Doch der Nachdruck der Amerikaner wird immer stärker, so daß sich die eingedrungene Kampfgruppe wieder auf den südlichen Rand von Schoppen absetzen muß.
lm Kampf fällt auch Adjutant Obltn. Wedding.
Um 12 Uhr kommt ein neuer Befehl von der 3. Division:
„Schoppen ist wieder zu räumen!"
Als die mutigen Fallschirmjäger wieder am Ausgangspunkt angelangt sind, bestehen sie nach Abzug der Sturmgeschütze noch aus 12 Mann.
Auf die Höhe 534 erfolgt von größeren Kräften der Amerikaner ein viermaliger Angriff auf die Anhöhe, der jedoch jedesmal blutig abgewehrt wird.
Bei den Kämpfen fällt von der 13. Kp. Fw. Günicker. Ogfr. Petzold wird durch einen Splitter im Gesicht tödlich getroffen. Bei der 5. Kompanie wird der Zugführer Fähnrich Seibt vermißt.
Jg. Leser von der 5. Kp. trifft ein Volltreffer und Objg. Helmdach wird von einem Splitter tödlich getroffen. Jg. Radeck von der 7. Kp. verstirbt auf dem Weg zum Verbandsplatz. Jg. Anton Stettelmann von der 5. Kp. trifft ein tödlicher Kopfschuß. Auf dem HVP stirbt der Ltn. Alfred Schmidt an seinen erlittenen schweren Verletzungen, ebenso der Ogfr. und Werfer-Führer der 4. Kp. Karl Gettel.
Die Nahkämpfe halten bis zur Nacht an.
Lange hört man vor den Stellungen verwundete Amerikaner schreien.

20. Januar 1945

Gesamtverluste: 5 Mann = 1 Toter-3 Verwundete — 1 Vermißter.

Bei einem Gefecht der 2. Kompanie fällt an der Kirche in Amel der Chef der 2. Kp. Hauptmann Fick.
Es erfolgen größere Absetzbewegungen der 13. Kompanie, die mit Teilen noch bei der Halbacher-Mühle südöstlich von Iveldingen liegt. Es gelingt auch den Jägern sich ungehindert abzusetzen und sich bei Mirfeld am Möderscheid-Bach wieder ins Regiment einzugliedern.
Der gesamte Tag bleibt ruhig.
Auch die Nacht über kommt es zu keinem Feuergefecht.

21. Januar 1945

Gesamtverluste: 4 Mann = 4 Verwundete.

Bei einem auf eine Gruppe der 4. Kompanie erfolgten Jaboangriff wird der Ogfr. Heppler mit schweren inneren Verletzungen geborgen.
Sonst verläuft der Tag ruhig.

22. Januar 1945

Gesamtverluste: 1 Mann = 1 Gefangener.

Bei einem Gefecht mit einem Spähtrupp wird der Ogfr. Rosenkranz der 13. Kp. gefangen.
Es ist wieder starkes Schneetreiben vor den Stellungen. Deckungslöcher können schon lange nicht mehr geschaufelt werden.
Die meisten Jäger liegen in Schneemulden.
Der Tag und die Nacht verläuft ohne Stôrungen.
.....
OCR'ed on Jan. 2015





Autres documents et témoignages. (extrait)....



3.Fallschirmjäger examinant une mitraillette Thompson
prise aux américains.

En plus de Krinkelt-Rocherath et Elsenborn il y avait un endroit que je voulais voir et qui était identifié dans les after-actions rapports de l'armée U.S. comme "crossroads 68". Cela prit un certain temps pour y arriver mais j'ai trouvé que c'était le croisement de la Rue du Werhè et Voie des Allemands à Thirimont, 

(voir la carte de Thirimont ci-dessous) 

au sud-est de Malmedy. Près de ce carrefour un bataillon de la 30e D.I. a essayé pendant plusieurs jours de prendre une ferme à un groupe de soldats et officiers SS. La compagnie G de mon père fut détournée pour aider ce bataillon. Au cours du combat pour cette ferme le 15 janvier 1945, mon père fut blessé par un officier SS d'une fenêtre du premier étage. Le combat a réellement été décrit avec un certain détail dans les after-actions rapports du 23e  régiment d'infanterie. "Entretemps la compagnie G faisait mouvement vers la droite et se préparait à attaquer le Crossroads 68 qui soutenait des attaques répétées depuis deux jours d'un bataillon de la 30e D.I. Lorsqu'une section était immobilisée par un feu puissant de mitraillettes le Capitaine M. STEPHENS, Jr commandant la compagnie G, déplaça deux chars aidant sa compagnie à avancer d'une centaine de yards en direction du Crossroads. Sur le temps qu'ils agissaient comme une base de tirs il déplaça deux sections de fantassins du nord-ouest en un mouvement de flanc, attaquant ensuite l'endroit avec deux chars crachant un intense volume de feu dans les trois maisons situées dans cette zone.


Crossroads 68: Croisement des rue du Werhè et voie des Allemands à Thirimont.


         
Crossroad 68.
  L'action fut un succès total et le Crossroads fut sécurisé un peu avant midi. On fit au total 37 prisonniers et au moins la moitié des nombreux soldats furent tués.
            Mon père se trouvait dans une des sections des fantassins. Le Capitaine STEPHENS les avait dispersés sur une ligne à travers le champ. Donnant des ordres aux chars par radio tenue dans une main et tenant un pistolet dans l'autre main, il mena les fantassins par le champ enneigé vers une vieille demeure. L'officier SS a tiré sur mon père lorsqu'ils ont pris la ferme à la fin de l'attaque. La force du tir retourna mon père, le jeta dans la neige avec son bras valide coincé sous lui et son lourd paquet au-dessus de lui. L'officier SS tira la goupille d'une grenade et lança la grenade dans la neige près de mon père. Dans l'impossibilité de se lever il se mit en boule, essaya de placer son casque entre sa tête et la grenade mais après un moment mon père a réalisé qu'un bon moment était passé et commença à compter..... La grenade n'avait pas éclaté.
            Anne-Marie a fait un travail remarquable de détective et a retrouvé la maison où tout ceci eut lieu. Nous avons parlé avec la famille, le fils et petits-enfants qui y vivent maintenant. Le fils est né après la guerre mais sa sœur aînée, Marie LECOQUE, qui devait avoir 16 ans en 1944 vit toujours à proximité. Marie LECOQUE nous a accueillies et a passé l'après-midi à raconter ce que la guerre avait été pour elle et sa famille
  



US ARMY SIGNAL CORPS PHOTO.TEC/3 JACK KITZEROW 165 PRISONERS TAKEN IN BELGIUM BY 30 TH DIVISION ARE MARCHED TO ENCLOSURE. GEROMONT, BELG. 30TH DIV. F USA. The date suggest they come from THIRIMONT.
Geromont, Malmedy




    La blessure de mon père était grave assez pour qu'il soit retiré des combats. La balle était entrée près de l'épaule, est descendue le long de l'os qu'il brisa et la balle se logea dans son coude. Vu de l'extérieur la blessure, couverte par les vêtements et l'équipement, ne saignait pas beaucoup et ne laissait d'abord pas croire au médecin qu'il avait été touché. Cependant les dégâts intérieurs étaient sérieux et sa main fut vite remplie de sang de sorte que ses doigts gonflés ressemblaient  des grosses saucisses noires. En dépit des dégâts et tel un berger, il accompagna certains prisonniers à retraverser les champs et aida pour les interrogatoires avant de partir pour les premiers soins. Il fut vite envoyé vers un hôpital de campagne, ensuite à Liège où il demeura plus ou moins une semaine puis dans un hôpital en Angleterre où il resta plusieurs semaines. Au total il séjourna plusieurs mois dans des hôpitaux en Europe et aux U.S. Pendant mon adolescence je savais qu'il avait été blessé mais j'ignorais jusqu'à ce que je devienne adulte qu'il avait eu des douleurs dans le bras et une sensation écrasante dans sa main droite même depuis la guerre. Il ne s'en est jamais plaint ou n'en a jamais parlé. J'ai découvert accidentellement la douleur dans son bras et sa main des années après avoir quitté la maison. Ce n'est que dans les toutes dernières années qu'une thérapie physique tardive a réduit de façon spectaculaire la douleur et lui a permis d'étendre son bras tout droit. Cependant un des livres que j'ai lu, souligne qu'une fois au combat, la seule fin des combats pour les fantassins était soit la fin de la guerre - qui était encore bien loin, soit être blessé, ou capturé ou mort. Mon père avait eu de la chance malgré la gravité de sa blessure.

    Autre chose que je n'ai su que récemment et que j'ai appris seulement accidentellement c'est que mon père avait reçu la Bronze STAR.


 





Hans WIJDER,  ISBN: 978-0-8117-1352-8.


The Battle for Thirimont.

   On 13 January 1945, the 2nd Battalion of the 120th Infantry Regiment (commanded by Col. Branner P. Purdue) of the 30th Infantry Division was ordered to take Thirimont. The attack started at 08:00 hours on 13 January with the support of the American 743rd Tank Battalion and 823rd Tank Destroyer Battalion. The strategy of the operation was a double strike, one from both flanks of the regimental zone aimed at the Germans' probable strongpoints.
  
"On 13 January at 06:00 hours, the troopers were awakened from their sleep in the cellar. A barrage, seemingly like a single impact, came down on Thirimont. The fire increased in volume, and by 07:00, it had reached the level of a drumfire barrage. Requests to the staffs of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions were made, but the telephone connections broke after a short while. Sending out signalers to find and fix the break would be murder! Without any orders the paratroopers in the town prepared themselves. What ammunition and hand grenades that were available were shoved into the pockets of the jump suits. We certainly had to prepare for a ‘poor man's war’ once more! One by one, the squads left the cellars of the houses and took up positions at safe corners to protect themselves from shrapnel."

  The 2nd Battalion attacked south to seize Thirimont. In the advance, two German strongpoints were bypassed and had not been reduced at the end of the day's fighting. Mortar and artillery fire were particularly heavy in the area of F Company and only G Company reached the town. Thirimont and the hill (Hauts-Sarts) were considered by the Germans to be the key to the area, and they clung to them tenaciously. Artillery, mortar, and small arms were deluged upon the attackers. 

  Frühbeisser continues:
"As soon as the fire died down, the troopers walked to their positions reinforcing the other night positions. At 07:30 hours, somebody stumbled down the staircase of the cellar to the command post of the 1st Company. It was the company runner, Lance-corporal Franz Hess, an old sweat from the Normandy campaign. Completely out of breath he sat down on the steps of the cellar and told the company commander, Oberleutnant Strasser, Leutnant, the Americans have penetrated the town with a regiment of Negroes, prepare a counterattack to be launched immediately!' One man joked that at least Negroes can be spotted easily in the snow!'

   "During a short pause in the fire, some squads moved out to reach the prepared trenches and machine gun positions. When they walked through the garden behind the first aid post, a shell hit the depot of the 15th Pioneer Company. The shell penetrated the roof and exploded in the cellar. Stabsfeldwebel Schulze, Obergefreiter Goldmann, Obergefreiter Howe, and Obergefreiter Schüssler were killed on the spot. Obergefreiter Niehaus and two other men were severely wounded."



THIRIMONT Church.
How did the Americans manage to get into the western part of Thirimont without getting noticed by the German paratroopers? At the 3rd Company of the 1st Battalion, Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 9, which had taken up positions at the northwestern edge of the town, two young soldiers were on sentry duty far out in front of the town. At this post in the dawn, several columns of Americans marched past, one after another. Not being stopped by the sentries there (assumed to be their own troops), the Americans bypassed the 2nd and 3rd Companies, and without running into resistance, the Americans took up positions opposite the church and in another two houses in the southwestern part of the town.

  When the 1st Company occupied the houses and took up positions at the windows behind mattresses, they could clearly hear the slow bark of American machine guns between the shell bursts. They could also see several bursts of "exploding peas," as the bright red salvoes of tracer were called, whiz through the town. In the houses everyone took up a 360 degree defense. The objective of the 1st Company was to gain the house across the street, in which there was a bakery.
...were billeted in a house in Ondenval to the left of the main street, nearly the last house in the direction of Thirimont...


Panzerfaust training.
  Leonhardt Maniura of the 15th Pioneer Company of Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 9 writes: "In the meantime, we had changed quarters once more and were billeted in a house in Ondenval to the left of the main street, nearly the last house in the direction of Thirimont (Maison "Moutch"?). On 13 January—a Saturday—the Americans increased the mortar fire and German tracked vehicles drove through Ondenval to Thirimont. The Americans had launched a major attack in Thirimont. We, in Ondenval, prepared ourselves in a frantic hurry, were each issued a Panzerfaust, apart from our other pack, and were exhorted to leave the troublesome gas masks in the fighting position.
ONDENVAL, chemin du "vieux Moulin"
We engineers then marched over snow-covered forest and meadow tracks past “Vieux Moulin” to the edge of Thirimont. Along the way, I wanted to take off my lined camouflage trousers, as they were very obstructive for a quick advance, but did not take them off.

  "Above Thirimont, we reached a road, also covered with snow. All of us worked our way forward, crawling closely behind one another. I did not notice that the warhead of my Panzerfaust had broken off and lost, therefore it was useless. Immediately I remembered that the detonator for the hand grenades had remained in the gas mask container in Ondenval! My armament now was: a carbine 98 K with 100 rounds of ammunition and my little pistol (6.35) with four rounds.


..an American observer had been located in the church tower.
"On this snowy road, we really were plastered with shells. Apparently, we made a clear target later, I learned that an American observer had been located in the church tower at Thirimont. Despite the shelling I kept my gallows humor, because when a shell impacted between me and the crawling squad leader, he shouted, `Maniura, are both my feet still connected to my body?' I answered, yes, but is my head still attached to my body?' Both of us laughed in relief.

  "From this point onward, we had to move down a slight slope to Thirimont. Here crawling soldiers who had gone before had formed a track for us in the snow. I determine that, because a killed Fallschirmjäger had been rolled to one side out of this track, we could quickly reach the first house by sliding down, all under an intensive barrage. Having the paratrooper cartridge belts now became a handicap. They were made of cloth, were worn round the neck and attached to the belt. The individual cartridge pouches were closed by snaps. In the crawling and the sliding, I didn't notice that some of the snaps became undone, and I lost part of my ammunition.

Old Wooden Outhouse staying in the courtyard!
  "As mentioned, our objective was the first house in Thirimont, coming down this road; my objective was the bog, which was located separately from the house in the courtyard. While my comrades walked into the house—taking cover—I ‘assaulted' the bog! I really was not disturbed that the toilet was shaking a bit due to the many shell impacts. For me it simply was a great relief! But only now the danger of my situation became clear to me. I lost no time in pulling up my pants, and jumping, I reached the protective house where I was able to pull them up quietly."

  The 2nd Battalion (Lt. Col. James W. Cantey) of the 120th Infantry Regiment opened the attack on the 1st Battalion of Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 9—likely under platoon strength—and especially on the 14th Antitank and 15th Pioneer Companies. In reserve were A and C Companies of the 743rd Tank Battalion. The 120th InfantryRegiment's G Company, under the command of Lt. Charles W. Moncrieff, pushed forward with supreme effort and gained the outskirts of Thirimont.

  At 08:45 hours, G Company was meeting heavy resistance from east and south of Thirimont. The German unit contacted here was the 1st Battalion of Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 9. The advance of E and F Companies was stopped by heavy enemy fire. G Company alone continued to advance and fought to the main street in the rural settlement.
Thirimont, au centre gauche: la Maison Gallo

Thirimont,   38 rue de la Paix.


Modern view of the road taken by paratroopers of the 15th Company of Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 9.
  At 11:45 hours, an infantry counterattack against G Company in the town was contained without loss of ground. Meanwhile, dug-in German troops on the high ground (Hauts-Sarts) southwest of Thirimont were bringing fire to bear on the troops in town. F Company had been assigned to clear the route for armor, since the path with G Company guided upon was unsuitable for tanks. But F Company, led by Capt. John M. Jacobsen, met the most petrifying fire, and was forced to halt when the casualty toll reached a demoralizing total. Tanks of the 743rd Tank Battalion endeavoring to break the way hit mines.

  Leonhardt Maniura resumes his account: "Now the street fighting from house to house began in Thirimont, houses the Americans had not already taken in their big attack. We also took prisoners. Concerns that something could happen, or even fears, did not arise with me; whether one was too `occupied'? Nearly simultaneously we heard a German MG42 with its typical rapid rate of fire from another house. Joyfully we jumped towards this house and found out too late that the MG42 was
MG42
manned by Americans. The comrade with the cigarettes was shot in the belly, held his hands in front of his stomach and called for the medic. I do not know whether the medic or the doctor who came up in a hurry managed to help my comrade, as the house-to-house fighting continued."

  Unteroffizier Ernst Schumacher, also from the 15th Pioneer Company remembers: "We received orders to attack Thirimont. The town was now taken by the Americans, and we as pioneer company should retake it. After the first attempt to retake the town, our company was heavy beaten, and from its 150 men strength, only 30 were still alive, this all happened in just one night! Together with my friend Goldmann, we had taken up positions at town entry behind a thick tree, but we were unable to move because American sharpshooters had found our position."

  "We were there from 11:00 hours until about 15:00 hours, under small-arms fire and heavy American artillery fire that poured down on us all the time. We were waiting for the reinforcements of our tanks that should help us to retake Thirimont. Shortly before 15:00 hours, we got a nearby hit from the American artillery. Goldmann was hit by shrapnel—one went into the main artery and killed him on the spot."

   "At that moment the tank unit [Kampfgruppe Schenk, with Sturmgeschütze and Sturmpanzer] arrived. I moved behind one of the tanks into town. When we reached the centre of town we received heavy artillery fire. I jumped in one of the houses and in the cellar I found back the rest of my company."
  Concerned about those mines, Sgt. Perry "Cock" Kelly of the 743rd Tank Battalion stood in the turret of his Sherman tank and swore again at his driver to keep the tank, crawling along in low gear, in the mine-free ruts made in the snow by the passage of previous vehicles. Any slight incline or uneven surface sent the tank slipping sideways. A thunk on the outside of the hull brought swearing from Cock as he turned his head and was momentarily stunned by the unexpected appearance of a soldier with snow frozen in his hair. The tank tracks had passed over the feet of the hidden figure. The weight of the tank jerked the dead soldier from underneath his snowy shroud and now rudely held him in a position of attention. The dead were less numerous than mines, but of equal concern in the U.S. zone that had been overrun at the outset of the German offensive the month before. Over two days (13-15 January), the 743rd Tank Battalion lost fifteen tanks to mines.

  Ondenval, and the 1st Company of Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 9, succeeded in entering the town from the east. In an effort to hold the town, American troops retreated to the cellars while American artillery fired POZIT ammunition. However, the artillery fire was ineffective against the German assault guns, and the protection of the houses was available to the German paratroopers as well as the US soldiers.
Sturmtiger
At that moment, G Company was in possession of a third of Thirimont, but without any support. It had taken about fifty prisoners, but its casualties were also numerous. At 14:30 hours, a group of about one hundred German paratroopers was advancing toward the town from the east and was brought under artillery fire and driven off. Late in the day, six assault guns (Sturmpanzer-Abteilung 217 and Heeres-Sturmgeschütz-Brigade 98), two companies of the 3rd Battalion (under Hauptmann Rudolf Buchholz) coming from
  Lieutenant Robert S. Warnick of G Company, 120th Infantry Regiment, 30th Infantry Division, describes the scene: "We saw soldiers in white camouflage suits coming down the road which our
  "When we took some prisoners and prepared to send them to the rear, it became clear that we had been encircled. The German Soldiers also had encircled us from the rear and we realized that we had been cut off in the `godforsaken village.' Our men fought in every house, in every cellar and from house to house, room to room. We could only hope that E Company soon would break through to us.
  "Shortly before noon, we saw a group of about 100 German soldiers attack toward us, and we
U.S. ARMY SCR-300
radioed our artillery to give us all they had! We fought until it became dark, but ammunition got scarce and still we had not received any reinforcements. When we saw even more soldiers come in our direction with tanks, we pulled our 1st platoon forward in order to try to beat off this attack. About this time we received permission to pull back, and our company commander, Lieutenant Moncrieff, assembled his officers to decide how we could pull out of this `hornet's nest' without too many losses. It was a sticky situation.
  "The officers met in a house close to the main road in the village, and it was not an easy thing to get there, as the German Soldiers covered the road with machine gun fire and everyone who tried to cross the road got a salvo from the MG. We all were discussing how best to get out of here when an enemy tank broke through our lines and cut our company in two.
  "The tanks came driving up the road firing directly toward the house where we were. We called up artillery support to keep these tanks away from us but without result, and the tanks fired incessantly at our house and the surrounding houses.
  "Nearly half of our company was on the other side of the road. It was stupid trying to reach them, since the road was controlled by the Germans, and we had no means to combat the tank in front of our house. We decided that the men on the other side of the road had to get out of this by themselves. So we tried to get out and most managed to reach the battalion, although Lieutenant Moncrieff was wounded".
  Throughout the day on 13 January, attempts were made by the 2nd Battalion, 120th Infantry Regiment, to reinforce Moncrieff's position. F Company could not get by the enemy's roadblock and outpost positions. An attempt was made by 1st Lt. Walter A. Wert Jr. to push E Company through the woods and around the right of F Company to Thirimont. The woods were almost impenetrable, and German troops in dugout positions effectively halted small groups from infiltrating.
  The fighting in Thirimont continued throughout the day, and G Company's casualties were mounting. In a telephone conversation made at 12:15 hours on 13 January to the corps commander, General Hobbs said: "I had come under the assumption that the big unit (1st Infantry Division) on our left would do something to relieve the pressure on our left. If anything can be done to have some elements on the left push along and take the pressure off, it is essential."
  At the end of the day's fighting, elements of G Company were forced to withdraw from Thirimont. The rest of G Company left in Thirimont was later learned to have been captured.
  At about 22.00 hours, Moncrieff called back to battalion requesting permission to withdraw from the city with the men that remained. Permission was granted and Moncrieff led his company back through the woods along snow covered trails and in inky blackness. Approximately 40 officers and enlisted men returned, of the force of about 110 that had moved out with G Company that morning. The strength of G Company on 13 January 1945 was 163 enlisted men and 5 officers. On 14 January, it was 84 enlisted men and 3 officers.
Thirimont'map used by U.S. Infantry on Jan. 45

  In the meantime, it had become dark, but the area was brightly lit by the partially burning houses in Thirimont. From time to time, shots were fired, but the battle for Thirimont was over for now. The 4th Company of Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 9 suffered the highest losses in the fight for Thirimont: 21 killed and 12 wounded.
  GeneralHobbs was at the battalion command post and spoke with Lieutenant Moncrieff before he was evacuated. Plans were meanwhile being completed for an attack on Thirimont by the 1st Battalion, and the remnants of G Company were assigned to help F Company take a strongpoint out­side the town at the same time. The strongpoint was a tough objective, particularly for so battered a company as F Company, and it was not seized until after the fall of Thirimont.
  At about midnight, the 2nd Battalion of the 120th Infantry Regiment, had withdrawn to their position occupied before the morning attack had been launched. Meanwhile, after supporting the initial attack by fire, the 1st Battalion, 120th Infantry Regiment, 30th Infantry Division, was in readiness for an attack on Ligneuville and had moved forward toward Baugnez.
  During the night of 13-14 January, a patrol from the 119th Infantry Regiment reached the town of Thioux and reported it unoccupied. The same patrol heard movement of vehicles and talking in the town of Bellevaux.
  Staff officer Oberstleutnant i. G. Dietrich Moll of the 18th Volksgrenadier-Division noted in a report written after the war: "On 13 January 1945, the expected enemy attack began. Strong enemy forces from Malmédy attacked in the direction of Ligneuville. Tanks supported by heavy artillery fire pushed our brave men from Grenadier-Regiment 293 back to a fine going from Baugnez to Bellevaux.
  "The next day, the enemy broke through our defense fine into Ligneuville. The town was already prepared for to be destroyed, but because of the chaos, it fell before we had a change to destroy it, in enemy hands. Enemy tanks arrived at the south end of the River Amblève, but were pushed back by our tank destroyer unit before they could cross the river.
  "The Pioneer Battalion received orders to block the road Pont-Recht and to destroy all crossroads. At the same time the bridges of the railroad line Born-Recht-Petit Thier were prepared for demolition.

F  Company was to take to reinforce us. We shouted toward them, relieved that we finally were receiving some reinforcements. But then the men in the white camouflage suits opened fire on us, and through my binoculars I could make out they were `Jerry' uniforms. Now we had to huddle up more and continue fighting.

Situation of the 30th Infantry Division.


  The U.S. 30th Infantry Division continued its attack to the south, advanced approximately 3,000 yards against moderate resistance across rough terrain covered with snow, seized the towns of Ligneuville, Hedomont, Lamonriville, Reculemont, Thioux, Villers, and Bellevaux, and in a night attack reached the outskirts of Thirimont. The division seized the high ground and established bridgeheads across the Amel River south of the towns of Ligneuville and Bellevaux.


  "Also on the left flank, the enemy attacked with strong units. To cover the gap on the right side, Grenadier-Regiment 294 was ordered to pull back on a fine from Ochsenbaracke (north of Kaiserbaracke)-Poteau-Petit-Thier."
  "The Artillery Regiment was placed in new positions in the area of Born-Wieschen (one kilometer southwest of Recht)-Nieder-Emmelser Heide."
  "On 15 January 1945, enemy infantry and tanks crossed the River Emmels and pushed back Grenadier-Regiment 293 to the ridge of a forest south of Ligneuville and Pont. After our tank destroyer unit knocked out many tanks, they had many casualties themselves and lost most of their own guns."
  The weakened 18th Volksgrenadier Division was completely surprised when they received a replacement battalion of 500 men who were assigned to the division and divided amongst the grenadier regiments. The division's headquarters was moved on the southwestern edge of Born.
  Farther northwest in the 3rd Fallschirmjäger-Division's area, after an attack, the U.S. 30th Infantry Division reached the outskirts of Thirimont. A patrol from the 3rd Battalion of the 120th Infantry Regiment moved toward Hill 551 (Hauts-Sarts), southwest of Thirimont in an effort to secure the heights and protect their troops in the town from the south. However, the fire of German paratroopers who were entrenched on the top of the hill with automatic weapons drove the patrol back.
  At the same time, an advance party from B Company, 1st Battalion, moved out from "Five Points"
Baugnez: Five points Crossroad.
to establish a block on the Ligneuville road, 1,000 yards east of the high ground at Houyire.
  The remainder of the battalion followed when the roadblock was set up, moved 1000 yards south almost to the block, then swung east into the Pange Stream valley and up the steep banks and winding road into Thirimont. The riflemen of C Company led the way. That company was to seize the rear outskirts of the town; then A and B Companies were to push through and take the remainder of Thirimont.
  Captain Pulver, commander of B Company, 1st Battalion, 120th Infantry Regiment, 30th Infantry Division, remembers:
  "Sgt. Wally Miller was leading the way. He was about to open the door of a house near the road, when the door was opened for him by a German soldier coming out. Without hesitation, Sergeant Miller snapped a quick shot killing the German. A hail of bullets ensued from within the house. In his haste to get away, Sgt Miller lost his rifle and helmet as well as the skull cap he had worn since those distant days on the Vire Canal in Normandy.
  "While we continued forward on the road, C Company surrounded the house and took several prisoners. We reached the outskirts of Thirimont just at daybreak."
  There was a deep snow, which hampered the advance of the unit's tanks and tank destroyers alike. Thirimont and the heights to the south of it were deemed difficult to take by the Americans, and they saw it as a difficult job.
  At 04:45 hours German artillery, mortars, snipers, and light machine guns fired on the Americans, and resistance increased steadily until in the early dawn, the battalion was forced to halt.
  Captain Pulver continues: "C Company moved to our left but was immediately pinned down in a gully just short of a row of houses. Our company began receiving heavy machine gun fire from Hill 551(Hauts-Sarts) on our right. Since we were unable to move from our exposed position, I sent Sgt. Henderson and his squad around our right flank with the mission of knocking out the machine gun that was giving us so much trouble. We were learning that every house in the village was a bastion. The thick stone walls of the homes made excellent supporting forts, with rifles and automatic weapons firing from every window and opening. Sergeant Henderson's squad met with disaster—three killed and the rest captured. The Germans actually marched these prisoners down the hill to the village in plain view, and we could do nothing to save them."
  Snow hampered any armored support; tanks bogged down in the soft stream bottom. Patrols sent to flank German strong points were unable to advance. When daylight began to glimmer over the housetops, it became suicidal to attempt to move heavy weapons over the open ground to support the battalion, and the plans for A and B Companies to go though C Company were postponed. C Company pushed slowly onto its outskirts objective and held its ground along the hedgerows which zigzagged on either side of the road. At 13:30 hours came a light counterattack in which thirty paratroopers and an assault gun were repelled.
 
Torn. Fu. d.2/ German Portable Transceiver.
Fritz Roppelt, a forward observer in the 12th Company of Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 9, describes the situation: "Via radio, I informed the battalion and regimental command posts that the Americans in Thirimont noiselessly had advanced to the main road from Calvary to Church! Mired in thoughts and watching for shell holes in the foggy snow, we came to Calvary. Near the top of the first house we noticed a spy hole, and it took only one look for me to grasp the entire situation: as far as one could see down the main road at Thirimont there were Yanks standing around, and in front of them, with raised hands, were captured members of 2nd Company, Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 9. Once more, they had not heeded my warnings not to take up combat positions in the houses, but 100 meters to the north of it!"
  Inside Thirimont, elements of Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 9 had set up an iron-clad defense, and they fought with great tenacity. As darkness was closing in, about 17:30 hours, German paratroopers of the 1st Battalion counterattacked with one battalion of infantry advancing in waves and supported by one company of Sturmpanzer and assault guns.
  Oberschütze Rudi Frühbeisser of Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 9 recalls: "At dawn on 14 January, Oberleutnant Strasser was ordered by battalion commander, Hauptmann Schiffke, to clear the town of Americans that have penetrated it with an energetic counterattack. The partially burning houses gave off enough light for this."
  C Company, 1st Battalion, 120th Infantry Regiment in the lead rallied its fire power, and called for artillery. The Germans pushed furiously forward to within fifty yards of the hastily dug in fines of C Company along the hedgerows and roadways making Thirimont a complicated network. There two assault guns were knocked out by artillery fire, but the paratroopers still advanced.
  The paratroopers managed to retake the center of the village and chase out the American troops. They ran into smaller groups, which often had set up roadblocks with only three men and waited for relief. Large amounts of booty were taken. For the Americans, partially captured in the cellars and partially in the counterattack, the fight was over. In the village there were many dead Americans.
  Frühbeisser continues: "Oberleutnant Strasser returned to the command post and reported to his commander, Hauptmann Schiffke: `Order executed, town cleared of enemy, 92 captured Americans and large amounts of booty. Our losses are slight!' Ammunition and hand grenades were distributed; captured weapons and supplies also were used. Some anti-tanks guns and mortars also were captured. These weapons were positioned in the village and prepared for action.
Thirimont, Grosbois.

  "In the afternoon a heavy barrage again came down on the damaged town. At dusk the Americans attacked the town from the road toward Sedan and the hamlet of Grosbois, but were partially blocked by an immediate counterattack. Apart from harassing fire, the night remained quiet."
  In the meantime, the positions of the 3rd Battalion, 120th Infantry Regiment, 30th Infantry Division, on Houyire were taken over by the 117th Infantry Regiment at 1030 hours on 14 January. (L Company of the 3rd Battalion was attached to the 117th Infantry Regiment until 1600 hours, when he reverted to battalion control).

The Second Attack on Thirimont.


  At 00:30 hours on 14 January, the 1st Battalion of the 120th Infantry Regiment, under Lt. Col. Ellis W. Williamson, attacked through the badly mauled 2nd Battalion for the objective of Thirimont. The battalion encountered extreme difficulty in attempting to move through the blackness of the night, the woods, and the falling snow. At almost 06:00 hours, the battalion had advanced through the enemy outposts on the outskirts of Thirimont. The temperature was dropping steadily, and a further difficulty was encountered with radio communication. The cold caused the radios to malfunction in many cases, and radio control of the units became difficult. Coupled with the fact that enemy artillery still rained down from German positions in the vicinity of Ondenval, very little progress was made against Thirimont.

"On the evening of 13 January, our company was given orders to attack along the Ligneuville road to set up a roadblock to prevent the approach of enemy armored vehicles. The 3rd Platoon was issued rubber boots for wading the Amblève River. They were then to take up defensive positions to guard the area while the engineers were building a footbridge. But late in the evening orders were changed and we were redirected southeast toward Thirimont to assist the 2nd Battalion.

  Alan D. McGraw, a squad leader in I Company, 3rd Battalion, 120th Infantry Regiment, 30th Infantry Division, recollects: "After leaving Malmédy, our unit was assigned a hill (`Houyire') on the south of the town. The squad area we replaced had been manned by nineteen men. We covered it with five. We had several patrols and an occasional attack here and there, but always returning to Malmédy."
U.S. Infantry Foxhole with MG.30

  Pine covered and even higher than Houyire, Hauts-Sarts (Hill 551) was known to be full of German snipers who had caused numerous casualties among the U.S. troops in Thirimont. It presented a formidable problem, but it was the principle key to the entire Ligneuville sector. At 11:50 hours, 3rd Battalion crossed the line of departure and moved generally parallel to the road from Baugnez, striking Hauts-Sarts from the northwest. Along the road where destroyed American vehides were still lying in testimony of the German breakthrough, men met constant harassment by artillery and rocket shells, aimed at the obvious route of advance.
  Tech Sergeant A. P. Wiley of the 2nd Platoon, M Company, 120th Infantry Regiment, writes: "We then moved around Hill 541 on the road to Hauts-Sarts and jumped off about noon. We were in thick woods and under constant small arms fire, but we continued to move past Hauts-Sarts and turned to attack Thirimont from the northwest. The 2nd Battalion of the 120th Infantry Regiment had attempted to capture Thirimont the day before, but they had been turned back in a fierce fight that resulted in many casualties in the 2nd Battalion. We were about to find out what the 2nd Battalion had been through and that Thirimont was the key defensive position for the Germans."
  Alan D. McGraw continues: "Then on 14 January, we were to take Hill 551(Hauts-Sart). On the way our commander, Lieutenant Andrews, was killed and shortly after that my BAR man, Ed Belicek, was shot in his left arm. The bullet entered above his left wrist and traveled up his arm and exited out his shoulder. There was a little stream right before the approach to the hill. Some tanks had been running around there before we got there. Although the ice had began to refreeze, I and others went through up to our waists. The snow was knee deep."
  Leading the 3rd Battalion in what was to become an historic battle was I Company, still so sorely in need of replacements that it functioned as a platoon. Behind was to follow K Company. The lead company gained the second hedgerow on Hill 551 before receiving any opposition.
  With the mission of seizing the hill, alone if necessary, and then to give supporting fire to the 1st Battalion in Thirimont, I Company swung right (south) and then headed up the hill (northeast), in an effort to strike the enemy from the rear.
  Alan D. McGraw again: "As we got nearly three-quarters the way up the hill, we ran into a larger German force coming down. After the initial fire and shooting slowed down, we managed to get some fox holes started."

  All at once, then, when I Company was 250 yards from the top of the hill, the Germans, who had gained positions by that time, began to fight back with terrifying intensity. The German superiority in numbers soon began to tell, for though I Company struggled bravely on, it could not prevent the Germans from gradually encircling it; almost a battalion was combating a mere platoon.
GMC CCKW-353, 2.5 Ton 6x6 Truck
  McGraw continues: "After lying in the snow all the rest of the day, waiting for support or relief, I was wet from the waist down, and I was sure I was going to freeze to death, so I asked Lt. John Doyle, our platoon leader, if I could go back and try to find some dry clothes. I felt bad about leaving because we only had fourteen men left in the whole company. As I approached the aid station a truck stopped and a bunch of guys got off, they threw off a bunch of overcoats, and I grabbed one. It had six packs of Camel cigarettes in one of the pockets. Anyway, the doctors cut my boots off my feet which were a light shade of blue. I told him if I could get some dry clothes, I was going back up. He tied a tag on my big toe and said, Son, you're going to the hospital.' I'll never forget that day as long as I live.

Into the draw of the Pange Stream the troops ran across the open ground up the hill toward the heights ahead. The Germans were prepared. They had chosen positions for their automatic fire and artillery observation’posts which were impossible to detect.

  I Company men kept hoping K Company would appear to help in the assault. A runner sent to contact K Company returned to find that in the meantime I Company had been forced to withdraw and leave about a half squad, which had been cut off, either captured or killed. K Company was struggling, too. In and around one house, the Germans had set up a pillbox, and as K Company advanced over the snow, in the open, the Germans let go with their maximum.

 
Squad leader Sgt. Francis W. CURREYy who had distinguished himself a month before at the paper mill near Malmédy, observed where the strongpoint was, and with two of his pals ran 200 yards toward the house. The three men ducked into a barn next door for cover. The buddies all came from upstate New York, and they fought with an ardent and unbeatable teamwork. With rifles and hand grenades, they fought the Germans on the ground floor of the bouse, forcing them at last to go upstairs. Private First Class Raymond W. Gould had distinguished himself by leading a squad to knock out a strongpoint on Houyire; now he ran to a back window to catch the Germans by surprise. As he climbed in, however, a German observation post nearby saw him and cut him down. Sergeant Francis W. CURREY and his other comrade, PFC Adam Lucero, did not hesitate a moment; they fired a BAR and threw hand grenades into the upstairs from outside until they were fired on from another enemy position. They went inside and fired through the windows; soon they had forced the enemy upstairs again. The remainder of the squad had come to the barn, meanwhile, and was firing persistently through the walls and windows of the house. For three and a half hours the scrap continued.

  At 17:30 hours, Sergeant CURREY had his men put hay in the house from the barn and ignite it. Soon the house was aflame, and the Germans were forced to withdraw, with losses, into the night. The pillbox was reduced, and the two pals responsible were unscathed.

  There were many better-installed strongpoints, however, and though I and K Companies finally gained contact, darkness found the 3rd Battalion digging in 500 yards short of their objective. Patrols were sent out to reconnoiter the areas to the flanks.

U.S. Signal Corp.: Telephone Network maintenance.
  At dawn on 15 January, another heavy barrage came down on Thirimont and the surrounding hamlets. This time the Americans used only phosphorous shells. The effect was destructive. The entire day there was fierce defensive fighting in Thirimont and vicinity against the advancing Americans. From dawn, things were very intense for the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 9. At the regimental command post, located at the monastery of Montenau, reports came in one after another. Here also at dawn a murderous artillery barrage began. Soon the individual telephone wires were broken and the use of runners was replaced by radio communication.
German KIFu.Spr.d (dorette) Portable Radio Set


  On 15 January, the battalions resumed the attack with a superhuman effort. Just before dawn, the Germans directed a two-company attack against the 1st Battalion clinging to the outskirts of Thirimont. Two hours later, at 08:15 hours, Lt. Col. Ellis W. Williamson, 1st Battalion commander, sent A Company on the left and B Company on the right to strike the remainder of the town. The Germans called their utmost support and threw all their strength against the attackers. The Germans were in an unusually advantageous position to do so. Indeed, the whole town was a bastion, a defense town of ideal specifications. Its approximately 100 houses were for the most part thick walled, stone farmhouses, spaced at distances of from 50 to 100 yards. Edging forward, the riflemen faced a series of bristling forts, irregularly spaced pillboxes, from whose windows automatic weapons were mutually protecting. Wherever they could, the German troops utilized the cellars, and, considering them-selves invulnerable, they flayed the advance with persistent fire. Later men were to say, `the sniper fire both from the houses and the hill Hauts-Sarts was terrifying.

  Captain Pulver, commander of B Company, 1st Battalion, 120th Infantry Regiment, writes: "Colonel Williamson informed me via 300 radio that the commander of A Company had been killed and asked if I could spare Lieutenant Hunn. Lieutenant Minyard had left a few days before Christmas, but the three sergeants, Maybee, Johnson, and Barnett, had just returned to the company the day after New Year's, and I still had Lieutenant LePage. A Company had been very unfortunate in losing three commanders. Lieutenant Hunn commented, as he bid me so long, 'Will I be next?"'

  Men who walked upright for only a second or two would drop dead. None could trace where the shot came from. There was Captain Pulver (commanding officer of B Company), who walked around as straight as a flagpole, directing tanks and leading them into positions; how he escaped being killed is a mystery. Anybody else who stood up for long dropped again for a lot longer.

  The solution to the pillbox fighting soon appeared to be the use of tanks' and tank destroyers' primary weapons. The tracked vehicles moved to positions behind the hedgerows or houses and blasted at the pillboxes causing the most difficulty. The tankers fired on the basements for several minutes; then infantry troops rushed at the house and reduced it. In all cases, it was slow going; it was hard persuading the Germans that after their victory drive toward the Meuse and Liege, they were actually going to be pushed back into Germany again.

  Captain Pulver again: "The colonel called me again to tell me that there were six tank destroyers on the road behind us and that, if I could find a way to get them forward, they would help out. Did we need help! Somehow I got back to them and guided them forward across a stream and up a steep hill. It was slippery going, but they finally groaned their way to the front.

  "I got two of the tank destroyers to fire on a large complex that was giving us a bad Lime. This consisted of a stone house, with connected barn. After about ten rounds from the cannons of the tank destroyers, a white flag was seen waving from an upstairs window. I moved Sergeant Dale's squad forward to receive the surrender. Forty white-suited German paratroopers filed out the door with their hands up. We lined them up on the road in front of the house preparatory to moving them to the rear when an enemy machine gun up the hill on our right fired into their ranks killing five and wounding two of their own men as well as two of ours. We quickly dove into a ditch. The commander of one of our tank destroyers saw the whole thing and blasted the German machine-gun position.

  "Our prisoners suddenly became very friendly. One who could speak English volunteered to help evacuate their own as well as our wounded. Doors were ripped off their hinges to serve as litters and the whole column was soon on its way to medical vehicles about a mile away."

  One of the German paratroopers that were among the prisoners, and helping carry out the wounded American soldiers, was Leonhardt Maniura of the 15th Pioneer Company of Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 9: "At dusk I entered a house with my carbine at the ready, and for the first Lime saw civilians in Thirimont (in Amel and Ondenval very few civilians had been seen) . They were treating a severely wounded American soldier which was on a stretcher. Next to him was a tasty looking evening meal: we saw all this by candle light since there was no electricity. In a way I felt sorry for the wounded man, but I really pitied the civilian population, for they had been pulled into this fight without bearing any guilt for it. The civilians asked me not to do anything to the American. That was not my intention at all! I continued looking round the house to see whether any Americans were lurking in there, and then continued without having been offered anything to eat. But I really would have had no time for that, and I was not really hungry anyway.

  "Near the edge of Thirimont, we entered a farm building that was encircled by a wall. It slowly was getting dark. A while later other soldiers, like us in white camouflage clothing, entered the building through the open door. We looked at each other, very distrusting and hostile, and for the first time I had a scary feeling, as there was no possibility of cover in the enclosed courtyard and we were a smaller group. Thank God it soon became clear that they also were German soldiers. We knew from experience that two groups of enemy soldiers could walk next to each other on a street without recognizing each other until somebody spoke up and then they learned they were enemies! The Fallschirmjäger helmetswithout a rim around the edge also looked more like American helmets than normal German ones.

  "We continued in the dark past the edge of Thirimont to an isolated farm where we entrenched in a shed built next to the house. We defended the farm until the next day until our ammunition was used up. I helped our ensign by recharging the magazines of his submachine gun, as he only had two magazines but a ration bag full of ammo. We formed a small combat group, fewer than twenty soldiers at this farm, and if I'm not mistaken, an officer was also present. The many bullets striking the tin wall of the shed made a very terrible noise, but the wall absorbed the bullets.



  "In the meantime, we became encircled by the Americans. No withdrawal toward the town was possible after the ammunition ran out. By 09:00 on 14 January 1945—Sunday—we held a white flag out of a window and indeed, no further shots came from the Americans. We put down our weapons in the rather large shed. In doing so I hid my pistol in a drawer hoping I might be able to collect is soon."
Modern view of farm (Louis Etienne) opposite the Thirimont'church  where U.S. soldiers took up position.

  Lieutenant John D'Amico reported by 13:30 hours that A Company, 1st Battalion, 120th Infantry Regiment, had taken its objective and consolidated its bullet was found to bewooden, a device which the Germans were remembered to use during the desperate close combat fighting of the hedgerows in Normandy. Tired, but sticking to their dug in outposts on the edge of the town, the men of Lieutenant D' Amico's A Company knew the enemy had been desperate and fanatical. But not strong enough.

Clearing Hill 551 (Hauts-Sarts).



  West of Thirimont, the battle continued to rage. On 15 January, at 0815 hours, the 3rd Battalion, 120th Infantry Battalion, 30th Infantry Division, had attacked again, and in the afternoon, only small, costly progress had been made. Help was requested.
 
GMC 6x6 Truck
In the command post of the 2nd Battalion, 120th Infantry Battalion, whose E and F Companies had been withdrawn to Waimes from their dug in positions before Thirimont, plans had been made to take the high ground called `Wolfsbusch', 300 yards south of Thirimont, and across the Amblève (Amel) river. Accordingly, at 13:15 hours, E Company, followed by the remainder of the Battalion at 14:15 hours, left Waimes by truck, and de-trucked at the road junction 800 yards south of Baugnez. The troops then started for their objective on foot.

  At 16:00 hours, orders came to Lt. Col. James W. Cantey, commanding officer of the 2nd Battalion, to return to help the 3rd Battalion. Colonel Purdue had divided Hill 551 into two areas; the southern portion was to be the 3rd Battalion objective, the north half the 2nd Battalion's.

  The 2nd Battalion returned to the initial road junction where it had de-trucked, and from a line of departure there, attacked, with G and F Companies in the lead. The 3rd Battalion pushed with renewed effort at the same time. Light tanks could have speeded the taking of the objective, and continues effort was made to get them on the high ground. The steep slope was covered with more than two feet of snow, however, and the tanks bogged down again and again.

  Late in the morning, L Company had run into a strong point. A platoon led by T/Sgt. Monte W. Keener was pinned down from a machine gun whose location was impossible to discern. The men tried to move forward; a squad leader jumped up aggressively and ran a few yards, when a sputtering from a hidden gun caused him to fall dead in the snow. Another man had already started forward and had gone about twenty yards when the fire cut him dead too. Before it could be knocked out, so the platoon could advance, Keener knew that the emplacement had to be found. Decisively he jumped up to make a rush; as he ran, he surveyed hastily the terrain, and when the bullets snapped around him, he lunged toward where he thought they had originated. He had gone twenty five yards when he saw the enemy grouped around the death dealing weapon. He yelled to his men and pointed to the location; then he dropped to his knee and fired his BAR into the nest. His men were moving to knock out the emplacement, when, hit by the machine gun he had discovered Keener fell forward on his face.
M1918 Browning B.A.R

  Lieutenant William H. Callaway had brought his own platoon up on the right of Keener's. Having seen Keener, and taking in the situation at a glance, he organized his own platoon for a flanking raid on the nest, grabbed what he could of the adjacent platoon, and sweeping around fifty yards right of the German position, he assaulted the emplacement and destroyed it, killing the complete German machine-gun crew and capture five more Germans, defending the position.

  Continuing to lead the two platoons, Calloway dispersed his men in a wooded area near the crest of Hauts-Sarts. Though L Company was trying to move forward, he knew that if his men left their positions, the infiltrating enemy who were sniping at them and the enemy who was delivering the flanking fire pinning down L Company, would gain an advantage and the hill would have to be taken again. He realized that while his men held the ground, someone would have to anni­hilate the enemy positions.

 

Still struggling uphill, the tanks were gaining the high ground an open field away from Lieutenant Callaway. Though one man had been killed and another wounded taking the exposed short cut, he dashed across a field and down a path to meet the tanks and bring them forward. Up the hill 600 yards to a point close to German strong points he led them. Once the tanks had gained vantage points near the crest of the hill, the Germans were, after a stiff fight, beaten. Lieutenant Callaway used a tank to evacuate nine wounded men of his platoon. He had a full day.

  Capt. George R. Reeves of L Company was another hero of the day. He had exposed himself to direct artillery fire on positions which were holding up his company. A sniper sighted him, and he felt a sharp crack at his hip, but on inspection found a bullet had pierced his clothing, his wallet and field glasses without even scratching him.
  During this struggle on Hill 551, Capt. "Indian Joe" Reaser of K Company was wounded. His executive officer, Lt. Glyn Persons, took command and distinguished himself conspicuously. Later, he also was wounded, and his executive, in turn, took command.

  By night, Hill 551 had fallen into the hands of the American troops. Eighty-seven prisoners of war were taken, although most of the German paratroopers fought ferociously, and many got killed. Three consecutive days of fighting had brought a long casualty for the 120th Infantry Regiment, too. It paused for a day to reorganize and consolidate its gains. Patrols cleared the area south of Hauts-Sarts to the river.

  General Hobbs, the division commander, entered the 3rd Battalion's command post on the day after the fight. He spoke to Colonel Purdue about the bitterness of the battle: "The Germans had outdone themselves in organizing clever, deceptive, powerful defenses on the ground. The Germans had fought viciously for each inch. But the men of the 30th Infantry Division, of the 120th Infantry Regiment, had overcome terrible obstacles. Not easily, no. But with a fortitude and persistence that did honor to every man associated with the unit."



HEADQUARTERS 1ST U.S. INFANTRY DIVISION

APO 1, U.S. Army
6 June 1945

SUBJECT: Selected Intelligence Reports, December 1944 — May 1945.



1. The enclosed intelligence reports represent a consecutive account of enemy operations against the 1st US Infantry Division from 1 December 1944 through 9 May 1945 — in other words, the second half-year of operations on the European continent. The volume as a whole is intended to complement the report, previously submitted, of enemy operations from the landing on D-Day through the end of November.

2. The reports cover a remarkably wide latitude of operations and situations: the completion of the ditch-to-ditch drive to the Roer River, the German counteroffensive of 16 December and its subsequent compression, the crossing of the Roer River and the advance across the Cologne plain, the capture of Bonn, the operations in the Remagen bridgehead, the closing of the Ruhr pocket and the crossing of the Weser, the elimination of resistance in the Harz mountains and, finally, the end of the fighting in Czechoslovakia.

3. Since enemy operations only assume form when balanced by our own, the operations of the 1st Infantry Division have been included where necessary to bring out a more cohesive picture of the campaigns. Basically, these reports are the result of the work of regimental and battalion S-2s complemented by the attached intelligence teams.
JOHN H. LAUTEN,
Major, G. S. C.
A. C. of S., G-2.



(1 January 1945 to 31 January 1945)1. CHOICE OF ACTION (1 January to 15 January)

On 1 January the enemy was on an operational see-saw: his original plans of an unchecked drive to the MEUSE had been blocked to the west and his desperate efforts to enlarge his salient to the north by driving the 12th SS Panzer Division through the 1st Infantry Division and on up the BUTGENBACH-EUPEN road net had failed with serious losses. 

As a consequence, the 1st SS Panzer Division, farther west, had been cut off on its exposed right flank and very roughly handled. The enemy was rapidly losing the advantage of initiative in operations, but he still had sufficient forces to> attempt to seize it again, although on a plan considerably revised from his original ambitious strategy. What he could do, and eventually, what he did was to bring in infantry units to hold the salient which he had won while he withdrew his striking forces, the panzer divisions, and assembled them for a new blow, possibly to the north toward LIEGE. (See Annex 1). 

But as so often in his planning, the enemy waited too long before initiating this policy. By the time sufficient infantry forces had been brought into the salient, his armored forces, regrouped in the center of the bulge, had to hurry off to answer the threat of the American penetration from the south in the vicinity of BASTOGNE. The idea of holding his gains by infantry, however, persisted, and on 1 January, a prisoner from a Volksgrenadier division was captured to the right of the Division sector. 

On 2 January a battalion of the 27th Regiment, 12th Infantry Division, another old acquaintance from VERLAUTENHEIDE and GRESSENICH, was identified in the BULLINGEN area, and on 3 January the 1st Battalion, 1055th Regiment (89th Volksgrenadier Division) was located south of DOM BUTGENBACH and the 2d Battalion in the BULLINGEN-WIRTZFELD area. It was probable that the 27th Regiment had dropped off on its way west to protect the stalled panzers and that 1055th Regimen had been moved into the area to hold the line permanently. 

In any case there was no question but that the enemy was implementing his capability of trying to hold the line he had gained with infantry while he regrouped his panzers elsewhere for either a concerted attack, or, failing that, an integrated withdrawal. (See Annex 2). It was evident from the activities of the enemy infantry units facing the Division that they held no idea of attacking in force. 

Our patrols, which were active and frequent, reported that the enemy was digging in, putting up wire and constructing dugouts. By 5 January the enemy position had become more or less stabilized, with the 1st Battalion, 9th Parachute Regiment on the extreme left flank of the 3d Parachute Division (one company held THIRIMONT), the 8th Regiment to the east extending to within 1,500 yards of the road from MORSCHECK to DOM BUTGENBACH, and the 1055th Regiment carrying on from there, through BULLINGEN to WIRTZFELD. Elements of the 5th Parachute Regiment, believed to be in strategic reserve, were identified in VIELSALM on 7 January, but prisoners captured on the Division front later in the fighting said that the main body of the 5th Regiment had relieved the 8th Parachute Regiment on 7 January.


2. DEFENSE OF THE SALIENT (15 January to 30 January) 

In the early morning of 15 January, the 1st Infantry Division, with the 23d Combat Team attached, jumped off from positions which had been held since the 12th SS Panzer Division had tried to force a passage north at the beginning of the German breakthrough. The attack was the reverse swing of the pendulum: the Division was attacking to the south to close off the ambitious enemy salient. During the time between the German  breakthrough and the Division's attack to the south the enemy had seen his best forces shot up, his reserves committed, his drive curbed and turned and his main power slowly draining away by attrition, lack of gasoline and the paralyzing rigors of winter. 

By the middle of January he no longer had the initiative of attack; his most pressing concern, in fact, was to get what he could of his indispensable panzer divisions off the hook. To accomplish this it was imperative that the shoulders of his original salient be held firm. He could not allow any reduction of the mouth of his bulge, since his road nets, clogged with traffic and blocked with snow, were already carrying capacity movement.The loss of any roads at all would be disastrous. 

It was into this situation that the 1st Infantry Division attacked on on 15 January. The enemy's strategic position forbade a slow and organized withdrawal; he had to hold the ground he was on and hold it to the last man. Over and above any reaction by the enemy, however, was the difficulties of the terrain and weather. Both presented conditions which were almost insurmountable. The terrain comprised a series of high ridges and deep draws, usually heavily wooded. 

These obstacles, difficult enough in themselves were greatly increased by the weather: a deep snow, over a foot and a half on the level and running as high as five feet in drifts, covered the area. The ground was frozen, making it extremely difficult to dig sufficient cover. The temperature hovered around 20 degrees and the wind was strong and cutting. 

The weather was so bad, in sum, that during the engagement PWs often expressed surprise that the Division had been able to attack at all. The only advantage that the weather presented, and it was a somewhat left-handed one, was that the Division was often able to achieve surprise because the enemy did not believe that an attack was possible under the prevailing conditions. It is hard to say whether or not the initial attack came as a surprise to the enemy. (See Annex 2.) 

Prisoners taken later said that their officers had told them that the Americans would attack on 15 January; it was front-line gossip, and the report may have had its origin in "Operation GREIF". On the other hand they said that the attack without artillery preparation certs inly was unexpected. 

Probably as a result of the first report, a strong combat patrol, numbering over 50 men attacked the 16th US Infantry positions after midnight, and was only driven off by 0430 hours. Shortly afterwards the Division jumped off all along the line, with the 23d US Infantry on the right, the 16 US Infantry in the center and the 18th US Infantry on the left. 

The 23d US Infantry was to take STEINBACH and REMONVAL, the 18th US Infantry was to take the high ground about 1400 yards south of their line of departure, and the 16th US Infantry was to seize FAYMONVILLE. 

The first and all-encompassing obstacle was the snow. Complete mine detection was next to impossible and in at least one case a tank was knocked out by one of our OT"-n mines, buried so deeply in the snow that it did not register on the detectors. The attacking infantrymen found the going as difficult as wading through waist-high water. 

A man carrying his equipment could go no more than 300 yards without stopping for a rest. All across the front progress was slow. On the eastern end, the 23d Infantry, moving out from positions near WEISMES, labored over the difficult terrain to take STEINBACH and REMONVAL against enemy resistance. REMONVAL was held by about 120 men from the 3d Battalion and part of the 2d Battalion, 9th Parachute Regiment; the enemy in STEINBACH numbered about 100, with an equal number on the hill southeast of the town. 

The approaches were well mined and difficult to detect: 56 mines were probed at one point near the underpass, and two tank destroyers and one tank were lost. In spite of the fact that the enemy controlled all observation and had ideal fields of fire, the two towns were taken by 1900 hours, as well as a bag of more than 100 prisoners. 

In the center of the line, the 16th US Infantry pushed towards FAYMONVILLE, but was stopped cold north of the town; the 3d Battalion moving to the east, got into a hornets' nest in a patch of woods east of the town, which was only cleaned out by "K" Company after a hard and bloody struggle. "Later, however, the 1st Battalion was able to push the enemy out of the northern part of FAYMONVILLE, which was held by the 2d Battalion, 9th Parachute Regiment. (See Annex 4). 

By nightfall, the 16th Infantry held about half of the town, but the enemy at first showed no disposition to vacate his end without forcible ejection. On the Division's left flank, the enemy was giving the 18th US Infantry serious trouble from well emplaced positions on KLINGELBERG and the hill to the south. "L" Company, advancing to the south was caught by daylight in front of the enemy's MLR, and the 1st Battalion, 5th Parachute Regiment on the high ground was able to cut the company to ribbons. 

By 1125 hours the company's attack had been broken and the company was forced back to its original positions. Casualties were heavy; one officer and 25 men were wounded; one officer and 42 men missing. The first day of the attack emphasized the difficulties imposed on supply and evacuation which were, indeed, as dogged as the reaction of the enemy himself. Jeeps were almost uselees in the snow; the only vehicle which could negotiate the drifts, in fact, was the Weasel, and there were not enough of them: only one to a battalion. 

Evacuation was particularly difficult and made more so by the fact that unless casualties could be evacuated within a few hours the chances of the wounded, if seriously hit, were pretty slim. It is probable that a large percentage of the men listed as missing were not captured by the enemy but had fallen when hit and had been covered over by the snow. The attack, however, continued. The enemy facing the 23d US Infantry had retired south of the AMEL River to take up strong defensive positions on the south bank. 

As the deployed troops of the 23d US Infantry pushed on down to the river bank they were subjected to intense small arms and mortar fire, but in spite of heavy casualties, the 2d Battalion managed to reach the near bank. But the position was untenable; exposed to direct fire from the other side, the troops were being decimated. 

After dark on 16 January the battalion pulled back to the high ground southwest of ONDENVAL. In the center sector of the 16th US Infantry it was found that the enemy occupying the southern half of FAYMONVILLE, in spite of a show of force earlier in the night, had withdrawn to the south. By 0915 hours the town was open and the high ground taken to the south. Enemy resistance stiffened almost immediately, however. 

As the 2d Battalion, 16th US Infantry pushed on down the road to SCHOPPEN, with "F" Company leading, intense small arms fire, supported by self-propelled guns, was laid on the advancing troops from the town. The condition of the road prevented friendly tanks from being brought up, and it is doubtful that they would have had much effect anyway: the enemy was firing from hull-down positions and had the road covered and zeroed in from several directions.  

Meanwhile the 1st Battalion, 5th Parachute Regiment, facing the 18th US Infantry on the right, continued to resist any attempts to push further south, a resistance that was considerably aided by artillery support that resembled that of HEISTERN and VERLAUTENHEIDE ridge. An attempt to take the ground at 888014 was turned back, although other elements of the 18th US Infantry managed to push through the snouth east of the KLINGELSBERG draw. 

To the east the 1055th Regiment, 89th Volksgrenadier Division was identified holding the northern edge of the woods from 903017 to 921017. In spite of the artillery  concentrations laid on the 18th US Infantry, enemy artillery over the whole front showed a substantial decrease from the day before, when more than 1,700 rounds were reported. 

The reduction was believed to be the result of the 3d Parachute Division artillery moving to more secure areas. The next day, 17 January, the first offensive enemy reaction to the attack of the 18th US Infantry hit "K" Company at 888018; about 40 men from the 1st Battalion, 5th Parachute Regiment, supported by two tanks, attacked and were repulsed. Later elements of the 18th managed to push to the southern edge of Hill 566 and to the high ground north of SCHOPPEN. 

Enemy artillery was intense.  On the other end of the front enemy mounted a major counterattack to break up the drive of the 23d US Infantry (with 1st Battalion, 18th US Infantry attached) through the ROHR BUSCH, 865990. About 200 men from the 8th Parachute Regiment (160 of whom were replacements fresh from Holland), plus 60 men from the 13th Company, 9th Regiment, and 30 men from the 3d Parachute Division Reconnaissance unit, launched their attack supported by five to seven self-propelled guns. 

The attack came in at 0730 hours, just before the 23d US Infantry was to launch its own attack to clear the woods, and raged back and forth through the woods until noon. Extremely heavy casualties were inflicted on the enemy; at least two-thirds of the attacking force was killed, captured or wounded, and by 1400 hours the remnants of the enemy began pulling out to the south. 

While this fight was going on, the 1st Battalion, 18th US Infantry, attacking the elements of the 1st Battalion, 9th Regiment plus the 15th Company, 8th Regiment and the reserve companies of both regiments which were holding the pocket south of the AMEL River, cleaned the force out of the woods. The complete surprise of the attack from the south resulted in the captured of three 88mm guns, four 105mm howitzers, a half-track and an ammunition dump. (See Annex 6). 

These two actions on the western flank of the Division sector netted a total of 236 prisoners for the day. To the east the 16th and 18th US Infantries continued to work their way south under heavy artillery fire. On 19 January four more enemy-held towns were taken in the worst weather of the battle.  EIBERTINGEN, the first, was defended by a force of about 130 replacements and stragglers from the ROHR BUSCH. 

Entrance to the town was blocked by a large number of wooden box mines. Self-propelled guns and one tank were in the town, which faced the attacking 23d US Infantry, and it was only after heavy artillery concentrations forced the enemy to fall back into the town that infantyrmen were able to move forward and seize several houses on the northern edge. 

The enemy counterattacked immediately, and bitter hand-to-hand fighting resulted, but by 1400 hours the enemy troops began to pull out toward DEIDENBERG. One hundred prisoners were taken and more than 35 enemy dead were counted in the streets. MONTENAU and IVELDINGEN, also taken by the 23d US Infantry, put up less resistance, and only 22 prisoners were taken from the two towns. 

The most effective resistance was put up by a nine-man strongpoint from the 5th Company, 352d Regiment in IVELDINGEN; the same group was later encountered in MONTENAU after they had been forced back. With the line on 20 January running roughly on the axis DEIDENBERG— EIBERTINGEN—SCHOPPEN, the division attack held up, except for readjustment of the lines and mopping up of stubborn areas. 

Most stubborn of these was the BUTGENBACHER HECK, where elements of the Fusilier Battalion, 89th Volksgrenadier Division, and the 1st Battalion, 1055th Volksgrenadier Regiment were deeply and skillfully dug in. Division troops succeeded in clearing about 800 yards of the northern edge of the woods in the face of extremely heavy small arms and artillery fire and the relentless weather and terrain. 

On other sectors of the front the enemy took advantage of the breather to reorganize his shattered forces and feverishly erect defenses. He was anxious to learn our intentions. (See Annex 5). Division patrols heard digging and construction work all along the front as the enemy tried to bring a coordinated resistance line out of the chaos. 

This activity, with concomitant stubborn defensive action on the part of the enemy troops in the BUTGENBACHER HECK, continued to 24 January. It was clear from patrol reports that the enemy intended to make an MLR on the east bank of the MODERSCHEID River, with an outpost line on the western bank. During 24 January, the enemy's MORSCHECK position, which he had captured in the early stages of his December offensive, was retaken. 

The MORSCHECK crossroads, possibly the best organized of the enemy's defensive positions, and probably where he least expected an attack, was held by the 1st Battalion, 1055th Regiment. The force was divided by the attack of the 18th and 26th US Infantries, and our troops, achieving this breakthrough by surprise, continued to push on south and southwest against stubborn but disorganized resistance. 

Coincidentally, the enemy positions in the BUTGENBACHER HECK were heavily attacked and the enemy was forced to withdraw from the northern part of the woods. A high number of prisoners were taken from the 1st Battalion, 1055th Regiment, which held the eastern part of the woods as well as the crossroads, and the 2d Battalion which was deployed to the west. Our troops pushing south from the crossroads position reached MODERSCHEID shortly before dark. 

Our positions in the vicinity of the crossroads were counterattacked by the 2d Battalion, 1056th Regiment, which had assembled in HEPSCHEID, but effective artillery fire beat the attack off. A second attack by 50 enemy was similarly handled. MODERSCHEID itself fell after a brief struggle when the 3d Battalion, 5th Parachute Regiment, pulled out toward HEPSCHEID at dusk. A total of more than 280 prisoners were taken during the day. On the next day, 25 January, the enemy was cleared from the ridge southwest of MODERSCHEID and the towns of AMEL and MIRFELD were taken. 

The 2d Battalion, 1055th Regiment, encircled in the BUTGENBACHER HECK managed to extricate only a limited number of its personnel to HEPSCHEID to organize another line of defense. The 3d Parachute Division, which had been holding the MODERSCHEID—MIRFELD—AMEL line apparently withdrew to the HEPPENBACH—VALENDER area, a move that was reported by several P¥ s and civilians. The outposts left in the two towns were captured when our forces took advantage of the withdrawal and attacked, not from the southwest as the enemy expected, but from the northeast. 

The only enemy reaction to this operation was to move a force of about 50 or 60 personnel north from HEPPENBACH to HEPSCHEID, but if he had any idea of an attack it was discouraged by our intense artillery fire. During the next two days, 26 and 27 January, as the Division attack halted, the enemy activities were confined to further work on his defenses and counter patrolling. On 27 January two of our outposts, one about 1,000 yards west of HEPPENBACH and the other on Hill 625 (939008) were pushed back by stronger enemy forces, but the latter outpost was retaken after a heavy artillery concentration had driven off the enemy. 

On 28 January, however, HEPSCHEID, HEPPENBACH and VALENDER were cleared of the enemy, and our troops, taking advantage of the enemy's disorganization, pushed rapidly up the HEPSCHEID-HONSFELD road to Hill 620, about 1500 yards west of HONSFELD. This move apparently caused the enemy to believe his troops in the REIGELSBUSCH were being encircled; at any rate, the enemy in the area pulled back to the HONSFELD area, and when the woods were taken by our forces, only a few stragglers remained. 

A total of 257 prisoners were taken during the day's operation. HEPSCHEID was held by the remnants of the 1055th Regiment and elements of the 5th Parachute Regiment; the rest of the 5th'Regiment held HEPPENBACH. In both areas the enemy had taken advantage of the hiatus in the Division's attack, and well constructed fortifications were encountered. 

The flanking position to the north in the REIGELSBUSCH was held less firmly by the 2d Battalion, 1056th Regiment, and a strong position in the patch of woods about 1,000 yards west of HEPPENBACH was outposted by a force of about 40 men from the 48th Parachute Regiment under a Lt SPRENGER. In spite of these precautions, however, the fighting in HEPSCHEID was over as soon as our tanks penetrated the town. Fighting in HEPPENBACH was more severe: our tanks got stuck in the snow and the initial assault was by infantry alone. With the taking of HEPPENBACH, our troops moved along the road to HONSFELD, encountering small resistance, but eventually clearing the enemy as far as Hill 620. 

Battlegroup SPRENGER was eliminated when our tanks were able to advance far enough to bring the woods under direct fire. It appeared that the 2d Battalion, 1056 Regiment had pulled back to HONSFELD and was holding the town. To the north, BULLINGEN, the base of the attack of the 12th SS Panzer Division in December, was finally cleared of enemy after stubborn fighting in the southern and western parts on 29 January. 

The town was held by the 3d Battalion, 1056th Regiment, from which more than 200 prisoners were taken. Prisoners said they had no warning of the attack until it had actually closed in, but in spite of this surprise, the elements in the outskirts put up a stiff fight before the added support of our tanks discouraged them. Whatever was left of the 3d Battalion, 1056th Regiment pulled out toward MURRINGEN. Along the rest of the Division front the enemy was inactive. 


ANNEX 1

(Battalion Order, 2d Battalion, 9th Parachute Regiment) 2d Bn, 9 Para Regt CP, 5 January 1945 Battalion Order No 3/1945 


It seems that the enemy has penetrated more deeply west of STAVELOT. Counter-measures are being undertaken. However, there remains the constant capability that the enemy will attack on our division front, in order to tie down our troops or even to force a breakthrough. The small-scale attacks which the enemy undertook on the 4th of January must be considered as feints for the main attack in the STAVELOT-MARCHE sector. 

The division expects the enemy to undertake several small-scale attacks in the next few days. It is a constant necessity, especially during the hours of dawn and dusk, to have reserves available, to improve defensive dugouts, and to have constant and adequate communications with the artillery forward observers. 

According to an order from the 3d Parachute Artillery Regiment, dated 2 January 1945, the division artillery is also responsible for counter-battery fire against heavy mortars. The 3d Parachute Artillery Regiment will fire at these targets when sufficient ammunition is available.Not a single foot of soil will be relinquished. The enemy's attack must be stopped immediately at the MLR by concentrated fire of all weapons and by counterattacks. 

The enemy's penetration west of STAVELOT was accomplished by tanks with the infantry riding on the armor. The AT defenses are once more to be checked fdr adequate security in depth. The troops are to be instructed again that we are now on German soil. Theft will be punished as pillage. The inhabitants are to be treated as German "Peoples Comrades". Civilians who are picked up at the MLR or under suspicious circumstances anywhere are to be arrested and evacuated immediately. Signal security will be stressed once more. 

The Americans are able to listen in on all telephone conversations. Secret messages are to be transmitted by runners only. Morning report — 









Les soldats U.S. se trouvant repris dans la liste qui suit ne représentent qu'une partie des soldats U.S morts ou disparus à Thirimont en Janvier 1945.

Vous remarquerez que toutes ces personnes sont des "KIA" (Killed In Action) mais il existe également d'autres dénominations comme WIA (Wounded In Action) ou MIA (Missing In Action) et bien d'autres "subtilités définissant militairement parlant"... la disparition d'un soldat U.S. durant la seconde guerre mondiale.


Ces personnes sont enterrées au Cimetiere d'Henri Chapelle
Dans les quelques textes repris plus haut, vous avez probablement lu que le Lt. Edward W. HUNN ainsi que le Lt. MALCOLMSEN avaient, eux aussi, trouvés la mort à Thirimont en janvier 1945. Aucune de ces deux personnes ne se trouve reprise dans liste  ci-dessous, ce qui signifie que beaucoup de dépouilles ont du être rapatriées aux U.S.A. Et cela, sans parler des disparus lors des combats de Thirimont...
Il doit etre possible en fouillant ce lien de trouver d'autres renseignements.




EDWARDS, Donald L Staff Sergeant 120th Inf. Reg. 2nd Bn. F Cy. 13-Jan-45 KIA Thirimont.
DOMINGUE, Clebert J  Private 120th Inf. Reg. 2nd Bn. G Cy. 13-Jan-45 KIA Thirimont.
COSCIA, Mario S Private 120th Inf. Reg. 2nd Bn. G Cy. 13-Jan-45 KIA Thirimont.
LUCAS, George E  Private 120th Inf. Reg. 13-Jan-45 KIA Baugnez-Thirimont
ROGERS, Harold Private 120th Inf. Reg. 13-Jan-45 KIA Baugnez-Thirimont
NADEAU, Henry G Private 120th Inf. Reg. 13-Jan-45 KIA Baugnez-Thirimont
THOMAS, Roy W  Private 120th Inf. Reg. 3rd Bn. K Cy. 14-Jan-45 KIA Hauts Sarts, SW of Thirimont
PADILLA, Isabel  Private 120th Inf. Reg. 14-Jan-45 KIA Thirimont.
STAFFORD, Earl  Private 120th Inf. Reg. 14-Jan-45 KIA Thirimont.
LEMOINE, Charles J Jr Private 120th Inf. Reg. 14-Jan-45 KIA Baugnez-Thirimont
AYERS, Lawrence H Staff Sergeant 120th Inf. Reg. 1st Bn. A Cy. 15-Jan-45 KIA Thirimont.
BRITCH, George Private 120th Inf. Reg. 3rd Bn. I Cy. 15-Jan-45 KIA Thirimont.
MEDEIROS, Charles Private 120th Inf. Reg. 3rd Bn. K Cy. 15-Jan-45 KIA Thirimont.
RESCIGNO, John Technical Sergeant 120th Inf. Reg. 3rd Bn. L Cy. 15-Jan-45 KIA Thirimont
MALCOMSON, William H Jr First Lieutnant 823rd Tank Destr. Bn. B Cy. 15-Jan-45 KIA Thirimont.
BARTON, Leon C Sergeant 823rd Tank Destr. Bn. 15-Jan-45 DOW Thirimont.
MARKLE, Neal S  Sergeant 120th Inf. Reg. 15-Jan-45 KIA Thirimont.
TROTTER, Carlton W  120th Inf. Reg. 15-Jan-45 KIA Thirimont.
NESS, Alfred Private 120th Inf. Reg. 15-Jan-45 KIA Thirimont.
DEVITO, Joseph A Private 120th Inf. Reg. 15-Jan-45 KIA Thirimont.
CROWE, Fred W Private 120th Inf. Reg. 15-Jan-45 KIA Thirimont.
WIGGIN, Everett M Private 120th Inf. Reg. 15-Jan-45 KIA Thirimont.
DUSANG, Clifford G Sergeant 120th Inf. Reg. 15-Jan-45 KIA Thirimont.
CRABTREE, Lenvil Private 120th Inf. Reg. 15-Jan-45 KIA Thirimont.
EFFEREN, Howard B  Private 120th Inf. Reg. 1St Bn. B Cy. 16-Jan-45 KiA Thirimont.
MASTERBRAY, Joe  Private 120th Inf. Reg. 3rd Bn. L Cy. 16-Jan-45 DOW Wolfsbusch, W of Thirimont
ARENT, Lawrence Staff Sergeant 120th Inf. Reg. 3rd Bn. L Cy. 16-Jan-45 KIA Wolfsbusch, W of Thirimont
MONTIEL, Gabino    Private 120th Inf. Reg. 17-Jan-45 KIA Thirimont.


Il doit être possible de trouver un document Allemand similaire au Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge 


  Dans la base de données du VDK, il est possible d'identifier une personne bien spécifique mais il n'est pas possible d'identifier, par exemple, tous les soldats morts (ou disparus) à Thirimont en janvier 1945.
  Je suppose qu'à Recogne sont inhumés la plupart des soldats allemands morts à Thirimont. 
  Comme pour les soldats U.S., certains ont du être rapatriés par leurs familles en Allemagne.


... Après que l'offensive allemande de Noël 1944 fut arrêtée devant Bastogne et que les Américains eurent repris l'initiative du combat, ces derniers commencèrent, le 4 février 1945, la création d'un grand cimetière de groupage, réunissant leurs propres soldats et des soldats allemands, en deux pelouses séparées, dans un terrain situé à l'ouest de la route Bastogne-Noville.  Au total, ils inhumèrent ici 2700 soldats américains et plus de 3000 membres de la Wehrmacht dont une partie avaient été tués à la bataille de Bastogne, tandis que les autres étaient tombés dans la région frontière en Allemagne et avaient été ramenés à l'arrière du front par les services de sépulture américains.

Pendant les années 1946/47, les morts américains furent transférés à Henri-Chapelle, primitivement un cimetière provisoire qui, depuis, a été définitivement aménagé en cimetière militaire américain.  La pelouse des soldats allemands resta sur place à Bastogne.

Entre-temps, le service des sépultures belge était entré en action.  Il commença par supprimer les tombes allemandes en pleins champs, les tombes isolées dans les cimetières communaux, ainsi que les petits cimetières, en transférant les corps dans deux grands cimetières de groupage qui furent désignés pour devenir les cimetières militaires allemands définitifs de la deuxième guerre mondiale en terre belge.  C'étaient la pelouse allemande de Bastogne et un champ immense situé à Lommel, au Nord de Bourg-Léopold.

Dans le cadre de ces opérations, 3300 tombes furent ainsi ajoutées à Bastogne, lesquelles provenaient de la province du Luxembourg, du sud de la province de Liège et des territoires environnant Eupen-Malmédy et Saint-Vith.  Il ne s'agissait pas uniquement de victimes de l'année 1944, mais également de soldats allemands tombés en 1940 ou morts pendant l'occupation.

Le cimetière militaire allemand de Recogne-Bastogne contient aujourd'hui 6776 morts.

Un accord sur les cimetières militaires fut conclu en 1954 entre le Gouvernement Belge et le Gouvernement Fédéral Allemand, accord qui remettait l'entretien futur des tombes allemandes en terre belge en mains allemandes.

À partir de ce moment, l'Association Populaire Allemande pour l'Entretien des Tombes Militaires put commencer les travaux d'aménagement.  Spontanément, des jeunes volontaires de six nations s'offrirent pour aider à l'édification du rempart et de la tranchée qui entourent et protègent cette nécropole de trois côtés.  Un camp international de jeunes eut lieu pendant l'été 1954, sous la direction de l'oeuvre Kolping et de l'Y. M. C. A. (UCJG).  Ces jeunes gens ont contribué de manière décisive à surmonter les douloureux souvenirs chez la population locale et ce dans un esprit de réconciliation et de compréhension.
L’origine du cimetière militaire 

Après que l'offensive allemande de Noël 1944 fut arrêtée devant Bastogne et que les Américains eurent repris l'initiative du combat, ces derniers commencèrent, le 4 février 1945, la création d'un grand cimetière de groupage, réunissant leurs propres soldats et des soldats allemands, en deux pelouses séparées, dans un terrain situé à l'ouest de la route Bastogne-Noville.  Au total, ils inhumèrent ici 2700 soldats américains et plus de 3000 membres de la Wehrmacht dont une partie avaient été tués à la bataille de Bastogne, tandis que les autres étaient tombés dans la région frontière en Allemagne et avaient été ramenés à l'arrière du front par les services de sépulture américains.

Pendant les années 1946/47, les morts américains furent transférés à Henri-Chapelle, primitivement un cimetière provisoire qui, depuis, a été définitivement aménagé en cimetière militaire américain.  La pelouse des soldats allemands resta sur place à Bastogne.

Entre-temps, le service des sépultures belge était entré en action.  Il commença par supprimer les tombes allemandes en pleins champs, les tombes isolées dans les cimetières communaux, ainsi que les petits cimetières, en transférant les corps dans deux grands cimetières de groupage qui furent désignés pour devenir les cimetières militaires allemands définitifs de la deuxième guerre mondiale en terre belge.  C'étaient la pelouse allemande de Bastogne et un champ immense situé à Lommel, au Nord de Bourg-Léopold.

Dans le cadre de ces opérations, 3300 tombes furent ainsi ajoutées à Bastogne, lesquelles provenaient de la province du Luxembourg, du sud de la province de Liège et des territoires environnant Eupen-Malmédy et Saint-Vith.  Il ne s'agissait pas uniquement de victimes de l'année 1944, mais également de soldats allemands tombés en 1940 ou morts pendant l'occupation.

Le cimetière militaire allemand de Recogne-Bastogne contient aujourd'hui 6776 morts.

Un accord sur les cimetières militaires fut conclu en 1954 entre le Gouvernement Belge et le Gouvernement Fédéral Allemand, accord qui remettait l'entretien futur des tombes allemandes en terre belge en mains allemandes.


À partir de ce moment, l'Association Populaire Allemande pour l'Entretien des Tombes Militaires put commencer les travaux d'aménagement.  Spontanément, des jeunes volontaires de six nations s'offrirent pour aider à l'édification du rempart et de la tranchée qui entourent et protègent cette nécropole de trois côtés.  Un camp international de jeunes eut lieu pendant l'été 1954, sous la direction de l'oeuvre Kolping et de l'Y. M. C. A. (UCJG).  Ces jeunes gens ont contribué de manière décisive à surmonter les douloureux souvenirs chez la population locale et ce dans un esprit de réconciliation et de compréhension.




The general complimented Greer. 

Hill 551(Hauts-Sarts) was as hard a battle as was fought in this war, in the Pacific of the European theater. 

Men agreed on that.
Then the general and the colonel left the command post.

A medic drags a wounded man on a litter across a snowy field during the Battle of the Bulge. Photograph taken January 1945.
______________________________________________________

The Battle for Thirimont, Belgium...Jan 13-15, 1945.





    Please find below a series of maps created by Peter Vandersmissen depicting the troop movements and actions of the Jan. 13th to 15th battle for the village of Thirimont, Belgium.  
 








This was an extremely complex battle against well dug-in German forces.  Mr. Vandersmissen would truly appreciate any and all feedback from any one that was there or has knowledge of this time frame.
You may contact this website:   hoops@metc.net

Unités U.S. ayant pris part aux combats de THIRIMONT en Jan.45 

30th Division 1944-1945

  117th Infantry Regiment
  119th Infantry Regiment 
  120th Infantry Regiment
HHB Division Artillery
  113th Field Artillery Battalion (155mm)
  118th Field Artillery Battalion (105mm)
  197th Field Artillery Battalion (105mm)
  230th Field Artillery Battalion (105mm)
30th Reconnaissance Troop, Mechanized
740th Tank Battalion (12/19/44-12/28/44)
743rd Tank Battalion (3/1/44-6/23/45)
744th Tank Battalion (2/7/45-2/28/45)
801st Tank Destroyer Battalion (2/25/45-2/28/45, 4/1/45-4/5/45)
807th Tank Destroyer Battalion (3/18/45-3/27/45)
823rd Tank Destroyer Battalion (6/24/44-6/27/44, 7/3/44-7/24/45)116th AAA Gun Battalion (7/20/44-8/3/44)
448th AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion (7/9/44-4/26/45, 5/3/45-5/9/45)
459th AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion (7/19/44-7/27/44)
105th Engineer Combat Battalion
105th Medical Battalion
30th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment
Headquarters Special Troops
Headquarters Company, 30th Division
Military Police Platoon
730th Ordnance Light Maintenance Company
30th Quartermaster Battalion
30th Signals Company












De nombreux films concernant le Bataille de St-VITH sont présent sur YOUTUBE.
En voici deux à visionner avec un esprit critique...!
1-Battle of the Bulge 1944-45
2-Battle of St.VITH.
Je suppose que beaucoup d'autres documents intéressants doivent encore dormir dans des armoires à Thirimont, à Ondenval (ou à Malmedy). Il serait peut être opportun de les sortir et de les faire commenter par les personnes, de moins en moins nombreuses, qui ont vécus ces évènements en tant qu'adolescents. 
Numerous pictures have been founded on this site:



Le Café-Restaurant des Hauts-Sarts à Thirimont.



De toutes façons, si vous avez soif de boire un verre et d'en savoir un peu plus sur Thirimont: 

il vous suffit de faire pivoter le "petit bonhomme de Street View"

ICI.