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MALMEDY, BELGIUM, MISTAKEN BOMBING,

23 AND 25 DECEMBER 1944.

Prepared By:

Royce L. Thompson,
European Section, OCMH.
5 June 1952.

CONTENTS.

CRITIQUE.

Summary.

23 December.

Orders.

The Flight and Reports.

Photographs Identified MALMEDY.

Mistake Explanations.

24 December.

25 December.

Flight and Reports.

Mis-identification Reasons.

Allied Air Commanders' Conference.

DOCUMENTATION.

23 December.

IXth BD Mission Summary, 23 Dec. 44.
IXth BD Photo Interpretation.
322d BG OPFLASH Report.
Pilot Interrogation Reports.
322d BG A-2 Log of Mission, 23 dec. 44.
Orders.
Maps.
VIII.Weather Office of IXt^h
322d BG History.
MALMEDY-ZULPICH Distance and Terrain.
Route.
Bibliography.

25 December.

Formation for 25 Dec. 44, 387th BG.
Interrogation Form of 387th. BG, 25 Dec.
IXth BD Photo Interpretation.
Unsatisfactory Bombing report
Group’s OPFLASH, 252020 Dec.
Overlay of Mission, by 387th BG.
IXth BD Mission Summary, 25 Dec.
VIII.IXth BD Mission Report.
Eighth Air Force.
Bibliography.

Appendix 1: 387th Dec. 23,24 & 25 1944

Appendix 2: 387th B Group

Appendix 3: 387th BG Missions Dec 1944

Appendix 4: 322d BG

Appendix 5: Bombardment Group organisation

Appendix 6: B26 images

Appendix 7: B-26 BOX Formation

Appendix 8: Mission 760, Dec. 24th 1944

Appendix 9: B-24 Malmedy Dec.24,1944

Appendix 10: GEE Navigation.

Appendix 11: GEE AMES 7000

Appendix 12: GEE Chart.

Appendix 13: 322d Bomber Group ( B-26, Malmedy, Dec.23d, 1944)

Appendix 14: 458th Bomber Group ( B-24, Malmedy, Dec. 24th, 1944)

Appendix 15: 387th Bomber Group (B-26, Malmedy, Dec, 25th, 1944)

Appendix 16: Bomb Group Combat Formation.

SUMMARY.

MALMEDY was erroneously bombed on 23 and 25 December, not the 24th, by the

IX^th Bombardment Division (M), according to Ninth and Eighth Air Forces' records.

Photographs revealed the location, not pilot observation.

Personnel mis-identification was responsible.

Acknowledgement was made by the IX^th BD in its daily report, but not by the Ninth AF.

During the Allied Air Commanders'Conference on 4 January 1945, General Carl Spaatz referred to an Alleged MALMEDY mis-bombing by the Eighth AF in December.

That reference was the source for the only allusion to the MALMEDY accidents by the Air Force's official history.

ZULPICH was the assigned primary of the 322d Bombardment Group for the 23d, but of the 28 dispatched B-26’s, six dropped 86 x 250 General Purpose bombs upon MALMEDY about 1526.

Their personnel realised ZULPICH was not bombed, but believed LOMMERSUM six miles beyond had been attacked.

Photographs disclosed MALMEDY was the victim.

The flight was off course, bombed some 33 miles short, a town in hilly, forested country, whereas ZULPICH was in the open.

Visibility was unlimited.

Enemy aircraft did not oppose, nor did flak prevent full load drops.

Four B-26's from the 387th BG dropped 64 x 250 GP's upon MALMEDY about 1600 on the 25th, instead of the nearby ST. VITH, the Group's objective.

Pilot interrogation indicated a mistake, and BORN was believed to have been the locality. Photographic interpretation by the IX^th BD again pointed to MALMEDY as the location.

Personnel error was the apparent cause. Flight officers believed ST. VITH to be their position, inasmuch as instruments and visual observation agreed.

Plans-to-ground visibility was three to four miles.

23 DECEMBER.

Orders.

ZULPICH (F-230327) was the primary target

---no secondary, for the afternoon mission of the 322^d BG.(VI, Bibl. #5, V)

It was a necessary railhead for the German Seventh Army, according to the IX^th BP, which named the town as the 322d BG's target.

Bombing could be visual, if conditions permitted.

In turn, the 99^th Bombardment Wing added that the route was to be from the base to K-7746, to the target, and bombing as to be blind from approximately 12,000 feet at 1500.

At 1145, the 322^d's Operations notified A-2, and pilot were briefed et 1230-1330.

The Flight end Reports

Six B-26's attacked MALMEDY at 1526, while 22 others also dispatched to ZULPICH were aborted or bombed elsewhere.(I,IV,XI)

Maj. J. Watson's flight took off at 1328-1408.

According to the course map, the briefed route was flown, which was from the base to ROTGEN (InitiaI Point), to target, left to SIERVENICH, and return.

Pilots named LOMMERSUM (F-3445), some six miles northeast of ZULPICH, as the target of their 86 x 250 GP bomb. (IV,V) Their A-2 statements immediately after the 1655-1730 landing were descriptive.

Flight Leader, Maj. C. J. Watson. "hit town-not target-might be Lommersum. Excellent results on town."

2d Lt. D. R.Gustafson. --- "Center of town and walked out. Not target. Ex.”

1st It. S. E. Eyberg. --- "Hit town of Lommersum - not target. Excellent on town."

1st Lt. R. Pike. ---"Bombs through center of town - not target. Excellent results."

1st Lt. E. S. Isaac's. "Hit center of town - Was rot target. Excellent results on town."

Conley. "Bombs blanketed small town. Did not bomb primary. --- 3 or 4 runs on T/0.”

Based upon pilot reports, the Group telephoned the IX^th BD about 1845 that ZULPICH had not been bombed, and believed LOMMERSUM had been attacked.(III,V) A 2210 amendment to the official OPFLASH #228 of 1915, repeated that data.

Photographs Identified MALMEDY

Flight cameras operated “100%," and Capt. Bernhard 0. Hougen, IXth BD Photo Interpreter reported:

"6 A/C. P.N.B. Bombs hit through the center of the town of Malmedy, on buildings and streets in the town."

His "center of town" description was identical with pilots'. (II, IV)

Although the IX^th BD acknowledged the mistake, the Ninth AF did not.(I, Bibl. #5)

The IX^th’s daily Mission Summary as to the 322d BG reported “... 6 a/c bombed the town of Malmedy, 1/2 mile of bomb line, due to mis-identification of target..." by bombardier.

In turn, the Ninth AF's Summary of Operations for the 23d, d4ted the 26th, referred only to EUSKIRCHEN and GLADBACH attacks by the 322d BG.

Pilot statements based upon impressions were the original 322d BG information, then when later photographic interpretation provided accurate details, the Group's December history related this version.(IX^th)

"The Group's bombers headed for the defended area of Zulpich in the afternoon but weather conditions interfered with the operation and the majority of the aircraft brought air bombs back to base. Six aircraft misidentified the target and bombed the village of Malmedy in Belgium while four others bombed east of the village. ... Because of the fluid situation of the troop Lines during the German counter-offensive no serious damage to our troops was reported in the bombing of Malmedy."

MISTAKE EXPLANATIONS

Pilots were lost and committed a personnel error, yet several mission factors seemed to favour the flight.

Location.

MALMEDY was 33 air miles from ZULPICH, a substantial distance, even for aircraft, and LOMMERSUM was yet another six miles beyond ZULPICH.(X).

Actually, the flnight was off course and did not approach ZULPICH.(XI)

MALMEDY was on route to both base-to-target and base-to-IP of ROTGEN where the formation was to take positions.

Terrain Could Be a Guide.

MALMEDY was in hilly, forested country, ZULPICH in the open.(X) LOMMERSUM and MALMEDY were both on rivers, however, possibly a perplexity.

The former was on the ERFT, MALMEDY at the junction of LA WARCHE and LA WARChENNE RAU.(X)

Weather was Favorable.

Pilots reported CEILING AND VISIBILITY UNLIMITED.(IV) Their descriptions of results and photographs were both detailed, suggesting sharp observation.(IV,II)

Weather did not affect bombing, the IX^th BD Weather Office reported.(VIII)

Enemy Was Not Distracting.

Aircraft opposition was lacking, and flak did not prevent dropping of 86 of the 87 carried bombs.(IV)

Attention Is called to possible tactical significance in the IX^th BD's flak analysis of the 322d BG ZULPICH mission.(1)

The location's identity was uncertain, however, inasmuch as ZULPICH was the target, MALMEDY war bombed, but pilots believed LOMMERSUM had been attacked.

24 DECEMBER.

No MALMEDY bombing evidence was found among air force records.

Such an incident was not mentioned in the IX^th BD's Mission

Summary, as on the 23d and 25th.(T) Descriptions of mission to the nearby ZULPICH and NIDEGGEN did not refer to formatting striking MALMEDY by mistake. Records were not examined of the 387^th, 397^th, 410^th, 416^th BG’s, which also attacked those two communication centres, inasmuch as they were unsuspected.

Some Eighth AF. heavy bomber attacks were made within the tactical area, but MALMEDY was not among them, according to the day's mission report No. 760 (2)

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

1. IX^st Bombardment Division, Mission Summary, 24 Dec. 44. In Maxwell Field, Alabama. Air University. Air Historical Archives. 534.333, Dec. 44. Mission Summaries, Dec. 44.

2. Eighth Air Force, Mission No. 760. German A/F’s & Communication Center, 24 Dec. 44. ,IPIbid. 520.332 (or AF-8-SU-OP-S, 24 Dec. 44)

25 DECEMBER.

Flight and Reports.

Erroneous MALMEDY bombing by four 387^th. BG aircraft occurred during the executed afternoon mission of the IX^th BD against ST. VITH (VII, VI)

The 387^th and 323^d BG's dropped approximately 362-533 of 250 GP bombs, plus some 100's, enveloping the town in smoke. Briefing by the 387^th BG was et 1300, and 36 B-26'n were dispatched at 1430, to fly a course southeastward from an undesignated point, below SPA and STAVELOT and ST.VITH. Actually the flight passed between STAVELOT and MALMEDY, bombed about 1600, then turned right at ST. VITH for the return.

This was Flight A, Box I, led by Pilot Anderson and Bombardier Shannon, followed by Pilots Missimer, Patterson, and Mueller.

The 387^th BG realized at once that a mis-bombing had been place, but believed BORN (P-85040) to be the locality, a view repeated by the IX^th BD in its first report.(II,V,VIII)

This town was mentioned in the Group's interrogation report, which was likely made within two hours of the landing. The more official OPFLASH to tie IX^th BD carried the same information. In turn, the IX^th BD' 15 Minute Mission Report noted in the 'deviation from route' column that “...850940 bombed by 1 flight" of the 387^th BG.

Thus, based upon pilot observation, early reports pointed to BORN as the victim.

Photographs revealed it to be MALMEDY, which was acknowledged immediately by the IX^th BD.(III)

Camera of the 387^th BG operated "100%," and 1st Lt. Ben Mann, IX^th BD Photo interpretation Officer reported:

Box I, Flight A did not bomb the primary. "Apparent misidentification of target as primary completely enveloped by smoke. Hits in town of MALMEDY approx. 10-3/4 mi. N.W.. of primary."

Official confirmation was made by the IX^th BD's Mission Summary for the 25th, dated the 26th.(VII)

Referring to the 387^th BG:

"The leader or one flight misidentified primary. This a/c plus 3 others dropped 64 x 250 GP at MALMEDY friendly territory. Bombardier and navigator believed they were synchronised on primary. ‘Gee' operator. obtained fix 3 minutes from BRP which corresponded with visual observation. Snow cover and haze made Pinpoint navigator difficult."

The section 'Failures to Bomb’ classified personnel as responsible, the reason: "Leader misidentified primary, dropping at MALMEDY -friendly territory."

The only other details were provided in 'Unsatisfactory Bombing Report', as instance probably by the IX^th BD.(IV)

“Bombed on misidentified target. Bombed town of MALMEDY, 12 miles NNW of St. VITH. Bombardier and Navigator were both positive they were on briefed target. 'Gee' box was not working well but operator obtained supposedly accurate fix or course 3 minutes from BRP. This fix corresponded exactly with. bombardier's visual observation and no doubt existed as to his correct position. Snow cover and haze made pin point navigation difficult. All details concerning error not yet coordinated."

Mis-identification Reasons.

Personnel error was the apparent cause. Flight offices believed ST. VITH to be their position, inasmuch as navigation and2 visual observation agreed.

Weather seemed to favour the latter. Plane to ground visibility was three to four miles. (VII) Detailed photography was obtained, sufficient to identify the victim.(III)

ALLIED AIR COMMANDER’ CONFERENCE.

This was held at SHAEF in Versailles, Thursday, 4 January 1945.( General Carl Spaatz, U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe, reported:

“Eighth Air Force has operated…Towns in the battle area had also been attacked, including (so it was said) MALMEDY which was on our side of the line. “

General Spaatz was reporting presumably about the period since the last conference on 28 December.

That conference report was the cited source of information for the following statement in the Air Force history: (2)

One such town, Malmedy, was the scene of a tragic error, for it was held by Allied troops at the time it was bombed.”

The reference was the heavy bombers of the Eighth Air Force, but no date was mentioned, on an allusion to December operations of Ardennes.

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

1. Notes on the Allied Air Command’ Conferences, 4 January 1945. In Files of the Air Historical Archives, Air University, Maxwell Field, Alabama.

2. The Army Air Forces in World War II. Vol. Three, EUROPE:

Argument to V-E Day, January 1944 to day 1945. Chop. 18, Autumn Assault on Germany, by John E. Fagg. p. 670. ln Army Library; General Reference Section, OCMH; Air Force Historical Office.

DOCUMENTATION.

23 DECEMBER 1944. (Malmedy bombing)

By 322^d Bombardment Group(M), 99^th Combat Bombardment Wing, 9^th Bombardment Division(M).

I. 99^th BD(M) Mission Summary ( afternoon) 23 Dec. 44. Dated 24 Dec. 44. (Bibli. #1)

“Zulpich (Communication Center)

322 BG: 28 a/c dispatched (including 2 PFF a/c). 5 a/c bombed other targets, dropping

64 x 250 GP- 3 window a/c.

18 a/c failed to bomb: 6 a/c flight leader could not locate target due to weather.

2 PFF a./c returned to base after navigator determined that formation would be 12 minutes late at target due to late takeoff. 6 a/c bombed the town of Malmedy, 1/2 mile w of bomb-line, due to misidentification of target. XXX 4 a/c other reasons:

2 a/c jettisoned bomb. wEen a/c were hit by flak. 1 a/c could not catch formation.

1 a/c did not drop as leader jettisoned. Bombs of 1 a/c witch landed Couvron unaccounted for.

4 a/c attacked casual target, the location and type unknown at this time.

No photo coverage or visual observation.

1 a/c attacked the town of Goldbach (F-230410). No photo coverage or visual observations of results.

No losses, 18 a/c flak battle damaged, no casualties ."

FAILURES TO BOMB

Group	No. A/C	Classifications	Reason
322	1	Personnel	Bombardier misidentified target
	5	Other	Bombs hit town of Malmedy in friendly territory

OBSERVATIONS

WEATHER: Zulpich 322 BG: Clear, Snow on Ground, Visibility 4-6 miles in haze

Photos Reports.

No photos available.

322^d’s cameras photographing 100%

Flak AnAnalysis Annex.

Zulpich Rail Communications Center. 322 BG.

No A/C were lost to flak, but 18 were damaged.

"Flak in the target area started out to be moderate and inaccurate. However, as the /C reacted the Inner defence zone of 18 km heavy guns, the fire became intense and accurate. This target represents one of the more heavily defended areas of the enemy's communication system. Moderate to intense fire could be expected from the 18 heavy guns plotted."

II. BD Photo interpretation.

S-2 Report( First Phase Interpretation), signed (typed name) by Capt. Bernhard 0. (Hougen), Photo Interpreter.

Target hit: Malmedy.

A. Target Briefed; Zulpich- - -Primary.

None --Secondary.

M.P.I.: Center of Town.

A.P. .Same.

C. No. & Type of A/C dispatched: 26 B-26e. 11 attacking.

D. No. and size of bombe dropped:

4 x 1000 GP

150 x 250 GP

F. Heading A/C when bombs drooped: Approx. 30'

G. Time bombs dropped: 1526.

H. Activity at target: None.

J. Results of bombing:

"Due to operational difficulties, weather, and enemy activity the A/C could not fly their designated positions in their respective boxes and flights; it is impossible to determine the bombing by either boxes or flight due to this.

#6 A/C. P.N.B. Bombs hit through the center of the town of Malmedy, on buildings and streets in the town.

#1 A/C. P.N.B. Location of strikes undetermined due to poor quality of photos, hits in fields, A/C hit by Flak, one engine out, jettisoned bombs.

No photos of otter bombings."

N.B. --- PNB was probably Primary not Bombed, according to postwar AF sources.

III . 322 BG’s OPFLASH REPORT

To be teletyped to the IX^th BD within two hours after last plane landed.

B. Briefed Primary: ZULPICH

D. No. A/A Attacking:

Primary. _

6 Secondary. “Believed Lommersum F3435 -- hit center of town -- Excellent."

F. Bombs.

86 Secondary.

G. Results of BombIng on:

Primary

Secondary. "Believed Lommersum - Fit center of town and walked through. Excellent."

H. No. A/C: (As to casualties)

5 damaged.

J. Flak: Target: Mod & Inac.

Elsewhere: IP Intense ard Acc.

L. Altitudes of Attacks: 12,000 Secondary.

M. Time over Targets 1526-1530, Secondary.

The more official OPFLASH from the 222 322 Group was the teletyped OPFLASH No. 228 for 23 Dec. at 231915A Dec., to the IX^th Bomber Command (A?t: A-2) and CG, 99th Combat Wing.

was amended at 2210A, to indicated some of the above data. The most important was Par. D to read; 11 A/C - Secondary-Lommersum (F3435).

#4. 23 Dec.

IV PILOT INTERROGATION REPORTS

WATSON (Maj. G.J.); Eft Ldr; Box 1, Flt. 1, Pos. 1; took off, 1408, landed, 1655.

Altitude, 12,300; hour, 1526.

"Hit town - not target - millet be Lommersum. Excellent results on town."

Bombs: Dropped load of 13 x 250 GPs.

Weather: Ground haze. CAVU.

Flak: Intense and accurate.

Opposition: none.

GUSTAFSON (2d Lt. D.R.); 451 Sq.; Box 2, FIt. 2, Pos. 4; took off, 1340, Landed 1700.

Alt., 12,000; 1529.

Center of town and walked out. Not target. Ex."

Bombs: Dropped load of 16 x 250 GPs.

Weather: 0/10 in hase.

Flak: intense, accurate.

Opposition: None.

EYBERG(1st. Lt. S.E.); 452 Sq.; Box 1, Flt. 3, Pos. 1; took off, 1404, landed 1705.

Alt. 12,300; 1526 hrs.

"Hit town of Lommersum - not target. Excellent on town.

Bombs: Propped load of 26 x 250 GPs.

Weather: Ground haze. CAVU.

Flak: Intense, accurate at IP.

Opposition; None-..

PIKE (1st Lt. R.W.); 451 sq.; Box 2, Flt. 2, Pos. 1; took off 1328, Landed 1700

Alt. 12,000; 1530 Hrs.

“Bombs through center of town - Not target. Excellent results.”

Bombs Dropped load of 13 x 250 GPs

Weather Haze on ground. CAVU.

Flak: Intense and accurate.

Opposition: None.

ISAAC (1st Lt. I • S.); 450 sq.; Box 1, Flt. 2, Pos. 4; took off, 1408, landed 1720.

Alt 12,000; 1526 hrs.

“Hit center of town- Was not target. Excellent results on town."

Bombs Dropped 12 of 13 x 250 GPs.

Weather CAVU.

Flak: Intense, Accurate.

Opposition: None.

CONLEY(?) ; 451 Sq.; Box 2, Fit 2, Pos. 2; took off, 1335, landed 1730.

Alt. 12,000; 1530 hrs.

"Bombs blanketed small town, did not bomb primary. -- 3 or 4 runs on T/0”

Bombs Dropped load of 16 x 250 GPs; "Salvoed bomb: around."

Weather: Over secondary, ground-haze 2/10 strato.

Flak: Primary target, intense, accurate.

Oppositions 2 ME 109a SE Zulpich.

V. 322^d BG’s A-2 Log of Mission, 23 Dec. 44. (Bibi. #1)

ZULPICH Defended Area.

1145 - Notified of target by operations.

1230-1300 Pre-briefing.

1520- F/O #399 and Intelligence annex recv’d.

1640 Interrogation started.

1730 Interrogation ended.

1845 - OPFLASH and 2-hour phone report.

VI. Orders.

IX^th Bombardment Division (V)

(Bibl. #4)

1. Typed summary of FO #680.

The 322^d BG of the 99th B was to bomb, blind, the Zulpich Railhead, F-230327, at 1530.

2. A chart (typed) of the wing's missions and detailed

The 99^thh B Wing's: target was the Zulpich Railhead, F-230327. The notation "Spec. Photos" was entered in the target column, probably indicating the requirement to take them or the target had been set up as the result of such photos.

Specifically, the target was a small railhead 7 miles from the bomb line, and in general, Zulpich was to be bombed as a mall village with important road net.

Attack's objective was to destroy supplies in the railhead and to cut communications in the area.

A TACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE column applied to railheads of MUNSTEREIFEL, ZULPICH, NIDEGGEN, as follows

*The German 7th Army which jumped off in an attack about 6 days ago are depending on these 3 feeder line railheads for all types of supplies and reinforcement, as the Germans expected to capture a great deal of supplies and as they did not, they are rather in bad need of supplies."

Bombing Visual and Blind.

N.B.—Bomb-line mentioned was that of the Medium Bomber interdiction line which curved westward from the RHINE near BONN to pass midway between ZUPICH and DUREN.

(Bibl. #5, p. 691.)

B. 99th B Wing’s FO #399, 231430 Dec. 44, and intelligence Annex at 231441 Dec.

(Bibl. #1)

ZULPICH (F-230237) was specified as the target, with zero hour to be 231500 for Plan B(Blind.), and bombing at 12,500 and 12,000 feet. The route was to be from base to K-7746 to Target, thus was well north of MALMEDY.

VII. Maps.

B.S.G.S (?). 4042: North West Europe, 1:250,000. Sheet 3, Brussels-Liege.

B.S.G.S (?). 4042: North West Europe, 1:250,000. Sheet 6, Namur-Luxembourg.

B.S.G.S (?). 4346; Central Europe, 1:250,000. Sheet K 51, Koln.

B.S.G.S (?). 4416; 1:100,000. Sheet ? , Bonn.

VIII. WeatherOffice IX’s BD.

(Bibl. #4.)

Its Flash Report, dated 23 December, for the 322^d BG was the following:

?22ND Bomb Group

Target: F-23027 (1530) ZULPICH

Target: Clear, Snow on Ground. VSBY 4-6 Miles in Haze.

Did Weather Effect Bombing: No.

IX. 322d FIG's history, December 1944. Undated. (Bibl. #2)

"The Group's bombers headed for the defended area of Zulpich in the afternoon but weather conditions interfered with the operation and the majority of the aircraft brought their bombs beck to base. Six aircraft misidentified the target and bombed the village or Malmedy in Belgium while four others bombed past of the village. Several others bombed casual targets. Because of the fluid situation of the troop lines during the German counter-offensive no serious damage to our troops was report'd in the bombing of Malmedy. Eighteen aircraft were flak damaged but there were no losses or casualties.

X. Malmedy-Zulpich Distance and Terrain.

Examination of a 1:100,000 map (see VII above) indicates the air distance to have been approximately 33 miles. MALMEDY was situated at the junction of LA WARCHE RIVER and LA WARCHENNE RAU, the terrain being hilly and forested. ZULPICH and nearby (northeastward) LOMMERSUM were in open country, the latter also on a river, the ERFT.

XI. Route: 322nd Bomb Group (V). 23rd Dec 1944

Target: Zulpich Deferred Aree. TOT: 1530-1532.

Alt: 12,200-11,500.Weather CAVU

Briefed Route

1st Box's Route

2nd Box's Route

Source: GP-322-SU-OP-S, 23 Dec.44. Zulpich Defined Area.

534.332A. 23 Dec. 44. 9th BD. F.O's 680. 23 Dec. 44

XII. Bibliography.

Maxwell. --- Documents were obtained through the Air Historical Liaison Office in Washington, from Maxwell Field, Alabama. Air University. Air Historical Archives.

322^d Bombardment Group, Supporting Documents. GP-322-SU-OP-S, 23 Dec 44. Zulpich Defended /res. In Maxwell.

322^d BG, History. GP-322-Bi. Dec. 1944. (Bomb-) In Maxwell.

IX^th Bombardment Division (M), Daily Mission Summaries, December 1944. 534.333. In Maxwell.

IX^th BD, Field Order #680. 23 Dec. 44. 534.332A, 23 Dec. 44. In Maxwell.

Ninth Air Force, Mission Files, 23 Dec. 1.4. 533.334. In Maxwell.

25 DECEMBER 1944.

By 387^th Bombardment Group, 98th Bombardment Wing, IX^th Bombardment Division(M), Ninth Air Force.

I.Formation for 25 Dec. 44, 387^th BG. (Bibl. #2)

Green Flight: Records did not identity the following as to rank and given names:

Lead A/C-- Pilot Anderson, Bombardier Shannon, in A/C #684.

Other A/C--- Pilots Mueller, Missimer it #880,#700; and

probably Patterson in #717, instead of Moffett of #899.

Briefing at 1300; Takeoff at 1432.

II. Interrogation Form of 387^th BG, 25 Dec. (Bibl. #2)

The flight lead by Anderson appeared to have been composed of Anderson, Mueller, Missimer, Patterson.

Tookoff it 1432; Target was St. Vith; Date 25 Dec.

Flight dropped 64 x 250 on the target. BORN was noted as locality.

III. IX^th BD, Photo Interpretation (First Phase Inter.) (Bibl. #2)

Report by 1st Lt. Ben Mann, Photo Interpretation Officer, of 398^th BG (98th BWg) operations of 25 Dec.

Target briefed and hit ---St.Vith. A/C attacking--30.

Drop at 1605. Activity at target: "Target area completely enveloped by smoke, making identification of target on their heading extremely difficult.

Results of bombing: Box I, Flight A. Anderson-Shannon.

PNB (Primary hot Bombed). "Apparent misidentification of target as primary was completely enveloped by smoke. Hits in town or Malmedy approx. 10-3/4 mi. N.W. of primary.”

Flights B and C or Box I attacked St.Vith.

Box II, not involved in Malmedy. Flight A, Morse-Britton bombed Rocherath by mistake, instead of St.Vith, and that incident was that referred to in the History (December) of the 387th BG.(Bibl.#1)

IV. "Unsatisfactory Bombing Report.,0 (Bibl. #2)

For 387^th BG, Mission of 25 Dec. 44 to St.VITH Issuing organisation was rot Identified, but it was likely the BD Unsigned; undated.

Box I, Flight A, Pilot Anderson, Bombardier Shannon-

Visual Bombing. Results: PNB.

“Reasons for ? Bombing or Failure to Attack Primary:

Bombardier misidentified target.

Bombed town of MALMEDY, 12 miles NNW of ST.VITH.

Bombardier and Navigator were both positive they were on briefed target.

'Gee' box were not working well but operator obtained supposedly accurate fix on course 3 minutes from BRP. This fix corresponded exactly with bombardier's visual observation and no doubt existed as to his correct position. Snow cover and haze made pin point navigation difficult. All details concerning error not yet coordinated.”

V. Group's OPFLASH, 25 Dec. (Bib1.12)

No mention of Malmedy mistake. Report would give impression the primary had been bombed as briefed, with certain exception.

One flight of 4 a/c may have bombed BORN P-850940.

VI. Overlay of Mission, by 387^th BG. (Bibl.#3)

TOT, 1600; Altitude 12,500; Weather Nil clouds,Vis. 5 mi.

Briefed Route

VII. IX^th BD, Mission Summary (Afternoon), 25 Dec. 44. Dated 26 Dec. 44, as to Field Order ff683 (Bibl.#3, #4)

“ST. VITH (Defended village)

387^th BG: 36 a/c dispatched, 26 dropping 426 x 250 GP on and in vicinity of primary. ...

…

The leader of one flight misidentified Primary. This a/c plus 3 other dropped 64 x 250 GP at Malmedy - friendly territory. Bombardier and navigator believed they were synchronised on primary.

'Gee' operator obtained fix 3 minutes from BRP corresponded with visual observation. Snow cover and haze made pinpoint navigation difficult.

…

Box I - Bligh . A. P.M.B. Apparent misidentification of target as primary was completely enveloped by smoke. Hits in town of Malmedy approximately 10 3/4 miles NW of primary.

…

Other ST. VITH Attacks.

323^d BG dropped from 40 a/c, 533 x250, 168 x100 ???

394^th PG dispatched 39 a/c, but none bombed.

VIII- IX^th MISSION REPORT

Failures to Bomb.

GP A/C Classification Reason.

387^th 1/C Personnel "Leader misidentified primary, drooping at Malmedy

- friendly territory.'

S/A Photo Reports

387^th cameras operating 100%

WEATHER: No clouds. Visibility 3-4 miles plane to ground.

VIII. IX^th BD. Mission Report (15 Minute Report' (

(B bl. #3)

387^th BG: 36 A/C; TOT 1500; Bombed primary; Deviation from route, etc.

--- *850940 bombed by 1 flight.”

IX. Eighth Air Force. (Bibl. #5)

No indication found among records.

Notes:

More than 10,500 bombers of the U.S. Eighth Air Force were lost during the war.
Statistically, a crew member had only a 25 percent chance of surviving 25 missions

X. Bibliography

Maxwell.: Documents were obtained though Air Historical Liaison Office in Washington, from Maxwell Field, Alabama. Air University. Air Historical Archives.

1. 387^th Bombardment Group, History. GP-387-Hi Dec. 44. In Maxwell.

2. 387^th BG, Supporting Documents. GP-387-SU-OP-S(b), 25 Dec. 44. In Maxwell.

3. IX^th Bombardment Division (M), Field Order #683, 26 Dec. 44. 534.332 FO #683, 25 Dec. 44. In Maxwell.

4. Ninth- Air Force, Mission Summary, 25 Dec. 44. 533.334. Mission File, 25 Dec. 44. In Maxwell.

5. Eighth- Air Force, Mission #761, 25 Dec. 44. 520.332.8’th AF Might FO 1451A and Mission No. #761. 25 Dec. 44. In Maxwell.

WIKIPEDIA

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/387th_Air_Expeditionary_Group

APPENDIX 1 387th BG:

(https://387bg.com/387th%20Bombardment%20Group%20-%20Chronology.htm)

1 Dec 1942 – Group and squadrons activated

The 387th Bombardment Group (M), with its four member squadrons, the 556th, 557th, 558th and 559th, was activated at MacDill Field, Tampa, Florida December 1, 1942.

– History of the 387th Bombardment Group (M) AAF, p. 4.

…

Sat, 23 Dec 44 – Mission: Prum defended area

In Germany, around 500 B-26s and A-20s attack rail bridges, communications targets, villages, a rail junction and targets of opportunity losing 31 bombers; fighters fly bomber escort,...

– Jack McKillop, Combat Chronology of the U.S. Army Air Forces.

Meanwhile the planes, after being grounded for several days by heavy fog, took off on December 23 to get the Mayen railroad bridge, an important link in the enemy’s supply system. Ordered to bomb by PFF, the crews found CAVU conditions in the target area and scored, as was learned later, four excellent and one superior out of seven flights. Just after crossing the bomb line en route to the target, the formation was jumped by fifteen to twenty-five ME-109s, who concentrated on the low flight of the second box and knocked down four ships—those of Lieutenant W. O. Pile, W. N. Church, C. O. Staub and W. J. Pucateri.

Partial compensation for this loss was the destruction of four ME-109s and four damaged by Technical Sergeant Joseph Delia, Staff Sergeant D. D. Fasey and Sergeants James Jones, Ed Wesolowski and Leo Mossman. The other flights, after the Germans had been beaten off, continued to the target through intense and accurate heavy flak and destroyed the bridge. The fifth plane was lost when Lieutenant Smith’s plane was picked off just before “bombs away.” In returning to the field Lieutenants W. P. Wade and T. G. Blackwell were forced to crash-land their badly damaged ships.

– History of the 387th Bombardment Group (M) AAF, p. xxx.

Just preceding Christmas Lieutenant Don Whitsett had flown his seventy-fifth mission in”Mississippi Mudcar” and had departed for the States. This plane was one of the original B-26s which had been ferried across the north Atlantic in June 1943; Lieutenant Whitsitt had flown in it as co-pilot. On December 23rd the “Cat” was shot down on its 150th mission.

– History of the 387th Bombardment Group (M) AAF, p. xxx.

Finally, on December 23rd, the weather over the Bulge area cleared and fighters and bombers from both the 8th and 9th Air Forces literally swarmed over the battlefield. The Luftwaffe was also out in a surprising show of strength.

The initial target of the 387th was the railroad bridge at Mayen, Germany, approximately 25 miles west of Koblentz, which carried a critical rail line to the battlefield. Our losses for the mission were seven of the thirty-six aircraft which were launched. The target for the afternoon mission was Prum, a communications center approximately 35 miles east of Bastogne.

...

On the 23rd of Dec., 1944, the first day that we could launch a mission in the Battle of the Bulge, I flew as a substitute co-pilot on both the Mayen and Prum missions. During the former, our a/c was in one of the wing positions in the first box and except for the excitement of finally being able to join in this critical battle, it was a fairly routine mission from my standpoint.

When we reached our fighter rendezvous the escorting fighters failed to appear and, as briefed, the leader turned on course over Bastogne.

We didn't realize it at the time, but for some reason our second box missed the turn and became separated from us by five or six miles. In addition, their low flight was lagging behind the box leader. This violation of formation discipline resulted in a flight of ME 109's effectively attacking the low flight and shooting down four of the six a/c.

In the first box, although we were aware of enemy fighter activity by the radio chatter, no enemy aircraft were in view from the cockpit. Flights in the first box approached the target in a routine manner, went into their in-trail formation and scored excellent results on the bridge. The flak was accurate and heavy, but no a/c were lost over the target.

In the meantime, the second box was engaged in a running gun battle with the ME 109's until one minute prior to opening their bomb bay doors. The two surviving Marauders from the low flight had tacked on to the lead flight. The Box Leader, realizing he was approaching the target on a heading different that that which had been briefed, made a 360° turn and lined up properly for the bomb run. The high flight followed him and the two flights made long steady runs and dropped with excellent results.

Both boxes sustained further flak damage on the way out, losing another aircraft and two aircraft crash landed at the base. Photos showed one span of the bridge destroyed and another span partially destroyed.

Within a few minutes after climbing out of the a/c, I was in a truck going to the briefing tent in preparation for a mission over Prum, Germany, a communications center for the German ground forces attacking in Belgium. As a substitute co-pilot for one of our Flight Commanders, I had more battle-time to observe the intense aerial activity over the area of the battle.

Our group was at 10,000 to 15,000 feet—the B-17's and B-24's were above us, probably at 20,000 to 25,000 feet and flights of P-47's could be observed peeling off below us in dive bombing and strafing attacks.

Prum was about thirty five miles northeast of Bastogne and I recall the flak was especially accurate as we flew toward the target. Regardless of our evasive action, the bursts seemed to be all over us. As our flights manoeuvred into their in-trail formation to commence the bomb run, the flight of six ships ahead of us from another group, literally blew apart. I presume the lead ship received a direct hit and the other five aircraft banked away to his right and left.

The 387th had been able to launch only 26 aircraft for this mission instead of the customary 36, and 21 of the 26 received battle damage. The bombing results were excellent.

– Paul Priday (556th B.S.), Mission to Mayen.

The 387th Group lost four bombers and a pathfinder to some 20 German fighters that blasted away at the B-26s between Bastogne and their target at Daun... In the hit on Mayen, the 387th suffered the loss of four Marauders to enemy fighters and another two to flak after failing to find their escort from the 367th Fighter Group. The B-26s did, however, claim 4 German fighters downed.

– Daniel Parker, To Win the Winter Sky, pp. 234.

The 387th and 394th BGs hit the village of Prüm east of St. Vith. The 387th lost only one plane due to flak damage. The crippled bomber was hit just before the bomb run and suddenly arched over on its back. The pilot somehow managed to roll over and straighten out in time to drop its bombs before the B-26 fell off to the side and spun to the ground...

– Daniel Parker, To Win the Winter Sky, pp. 235-236.

Staffeln of JG 11 opposed the 70 B-26 Marauders of the 387th and 394th BGs bearing down on the marshalling yards at Mayen.

– Daniel Parker, To Win the Winter Sky, pp. 243.

Sun, 24 Dec 44 – Mission: Nideggen railroad siding

276 B-26s and A-20s hit rail bridges and communications centers in W Germany; fighters escort the 9th Bombardment Division,...

– Jack McKillop, Combat Chronology of the U.S. Army Air Forces.

Mon, 25 Dec 1944 – Mission: St. Vith road

Nearly 650 B-26, A-20s and A-26s hit rail and road bridges, communications centers and targets of opportunity in W Germany and the breakthrough area;...

– Jack McKillop, Combat Chronology of the U.S. Army Air Forces.

Following the attacks on Prum and Nideggen the Group, on Christmas day, a mid hail and snow, went after the Irrel road junction. On this mission occurred one of the most heroic incidents in the history of the Group.

The lead plane of Lieutenant John A. Alexander of the low flight was hit hard by flak over Bastogne, four minutes from the target. Two minutes later the interphone was shot out and a few minutes after the intervalometer. Since the time remaining was too short to make the necessary adjustments, Lieutenant Harvey W. Allen, the bombardier, signalled to the pilot to make another bomb run. With rudder, ailerons and wings full of holes, Lieutenant Alexander managed to hold the plane level so that the bombs could be salvoed, hitting inside the target area.

Losing altitude fast and perceiving an indicated air speed of only 160 mph, Lieutenant Alexander coaxed his ship back across the bomb line near Trier and ordered the crew to bail out. Seven of the nine aboard made the jump, but staff Sergeant Michael Aguilar was thrown against the radio table and his chute flew open.

Lieutenant Alexander gallantly offered to try to crash land the plane, but Sergeant Aguilar gallantly refused to agree, realizing the impossibility of a crash-landing among the hills. Climbing gingerly down through the nose wheel with the parachute draped over his arm, Sergeant Aguilar successfully made the jump.

At 700 feet Lieutenant Alexander bailed out and watched his plane crash into a small creek and explode. They were not yet out of danger, for some American soldiers, thinking they might be Germans, fired at them before they could identify themselves. For their acts of gallantry, Lieutenant Alexander was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal and Lieutenant Allen and Sergeant Aguilar the Silver Star.

In the afternoon a 387th formation attacked St. Vith with excellent results, but the most exciting events of the day were to happen after the mission.

A 397th plane, coming in after dark, hit short of the runway, burned and exploded. The twenty-eight 100 pound demolition bombs knocked out nearly all windows, both on the base and in Clasteres. Fortunately all the crew escaped. About twenty minutes later a 387th plane, returning with sixteen 250’s from a test flight, came in. In landing the nose wheel tire was punctured by a bomb fragment from the 397th ship, the 387th plane nosed over, caught fire and exploded. This crew also escaped, but all other whole window panes in Group headquarters were shattered.

– History of the 387th Bombardment Group (M) AAF, pp. xxx.

Came a never-to-be forgotten Christmas Day. In the morning the target was a road junction at Irrel. Ground in the target area was blanketed with freshly fallen snow, and have made bombing more difficult. Nevertheless, most of the formation hit the target for good results, and the rest bombed the defended town of Echternach; also with good results. Making a secondary run on the primary target, the ship of Lieutenant [John] Alexander, leading the Low Flight of the II-Box, was hit hard by Flak, knocking out his one engine and the bombsight. Lt. [Harvey] Allen, bombardier, ingeniously got his bombs away in the target area, nonetheless, allowing his flight to bomb.

In turning off the target, the ship was hit again and again by Flak; the rudder being badly damaged, both left gasoline tanks punctured, the top turret smashed and the nose Plexiglas of the plane shattered.

Lt. Alexander kept the ship under control while Lt. Allen and Sgt. Miller, GEE Operator, directed him to friendly territory, where all nine men in the crew safely parachuted. S/Sgt. Aguilar jumped after his parachute had opened accidentally inside the aircraft, and Lt. Alexander, last man out, with difficulty jumped from the careening plane at 700 feet. The plane was seen to crash seconds later into the bank of a small stream. All of the men returned later. None of the remaining nine planes furnished by the squadron received damage.

– 556th Squadron, Monthly Report, December, 1944.

On the Group's morning mission to Irrel, Germany, 1st Lt. John A. Alexander-0699645, by his undaunted actions, earned our country's second highest honour for valour, the coveted Distinguished Service Cross.

– Peter Crouchman, Alan Crouchman, Robert C. Allen, William J. Thompson, Jr., 556th Bomb. Squadron, B-26 Marauder Reference and Operations Guide, p. 52.

1st Lt. James M. Neff was our crew's pilot, and I might add, a damn good one. His skills were certainly taxed to the limit during the afternoon mission to Saint Vith, Belgium on Christmas day.

After waiting most of the morning for a special mission, which did not materialise, our six plane flight was tacked on to the Group's second mission. The I.P. was the town of Malmedy, approximately twenty-eight miles north of St. Vith. The target was heavily defended, and the scene of much Allied aerial efforts to disrupt German traffic in the area. We had a fresh snowfall on Xmas morning, the first of that cold winter. The visibility over the target was excellent, and each flight bombed visually.

I was in my gun position as tail-gunner, as our flight levelled out for the bomb run. Lt. Vernon Briscoe was calling last second corrections., when our plane seemed to shudder. The next second, I saw the planes in our flight do what I thought was a climbing right turn. This brief recollection lasted only a millisecond before I realized our plane was descending fast in a steep left turn. I saw smoke coming from one of the engines and called Neff on the intercom. His calm reply was, "I know it." He called Gamble to come forward, "On the double." I then saw that the left wing had holes in it, as well as the tail section. Neff adroitly managed to control our descent, and told the crew to standby to bail out. I grabbed my chest pack and met Walt Simmons(AG-top turret gun.) at the waist gun window. Walt plugged into the waist window intercom as I made ready to jump.

I learned later... that when Gamble went forward, he waded through ankle deep gasoline in the aft bomb bay. He notified Neff of this potential danger. The pilot's compartment was a shambles. Jimmy Harris, our copilot, was bleeding from shoulder and face wounds, the plexiglas was shattered and the pilot's instruments were shot out. Neff had his hands full trying to maintain control of our aircraft's descent. Bris and Lt. Russ Trapper, our navigator, along with M/Sgt. Paris "Hoop" Hooper, our GEE operator, were feverishly, but methodically, plotting our position, and relaying headings for Neff to steer in order to be over friendly lines.

The left engine seized up and Neff feathered it, when Harris announced that our right engine had burst into flames. The danger was very great for a mid air explosion, and Neff and Gamble realized it. At the persistent coaxing of our calm bombardier, Neff delayed the bail out order until Bris assured him we were over our lines. Neff ordered Trapper and Briscoe out of their nose compartment, and then gave the order to bail out. Walt and I exited the flaming aircraft from the waist window, while the other six members used the open bomb bay. Neff was the last member of the crew to jump. The B-26G circled under him, and then exploded in mid air! The fuselage fell into the Muese River near Huy, Belgium, while its two engines fell on each embankment. Four of us descended by parachute into the front-line positions held by the 84th Inf. Div., where we ate our Xmas supper. Harris ended up in a Paris hospital, and the rest of us arrived back to the 387th BG within three days. I suffered injuries to my ankles, while Bris was crippled with a knee injury. Luckily, no one else was injured. On board were:

Pilot

Copilot

*Bomb.

Nav.

*GEE

ROG

1st Lt.

2nd Lt.

M/Sgt.

T/Sgt.

S/Sgt.

James M. Neff

James I. Harris.

Vernon L. Briscoe

Russell H. Trapper

Parris W. Hooper

Wm. J. Thompson, Jr.

Wm. F. Gamble

Walter H. Simmons

*Received DFC

– Peter Crouchman, Alan Crouchman, Robert C. Allen, William J. Thompson, Jr., 556th Bomb. Squadron, B-26 Marauder Reference and Operations Guide, p. 61.

Lieutenant Harvey Allen, bombardier on Lt. lead crew, suffered facial lacerations when the B-26 Plexiglas nose was shattered during their initial bomb run over Irrel. Lt. Allen reported that his bombsight was also damaged by the flak. On their flight's second bomb run, Lt. Allen aligned the secondary target up visually and they were able to place all their bombs in the target area. For his actions, 2nd Lt. Harvey Allen was awarded the Purple Heart and the Silver Star.

Staff Sergeant Michael C. Aguilar's rip cord caught on the radioman desk in the confined compartment of their stricken plane. His parachute prematurely popped open as the crew were making their emergency exit from the Marauder. When Lt. Alexander saw Aguilar's plight, he offered to stay with their falling plane and attempt to make a crash landing in the mountainous terrain, in order to give his engineer a chance for survival. The airman realized the great risks of Lt. Alexander's offer. It was then that Anguilar (it is reported) picked up his unpacked parachute, draped it over his shoulder, and exited through the nose wheel. Fortunately, his parachute and shroud lines performed perfectly and he floated to earth safely. Lt. Alexander was right behind him. To add to their hectic experience, friendly infantrymen opened fire on them when they landed.

– FW Supplemental Section, Personal Experiences & Anecdotes By And Of The Men Of The 556th Bomb. Squadron, p. 52-A.

[This account reports that the flight was attacking the secondary target; this is probably incorrect.]

When the aircraft suffered its initial flak damage, Mike Aguilar, Engineer/Gunner, came forward from his position in the top turret to assist in the cockpit. As Mike passed through the bomb bay the ripcord of his chest pack parachute was snagged and the chute was accidentally opened. After "Bombs away," when it became apparent that the aircraft would have to be abandoned, John gave the order to bail out.

As John struggled to control the rapidly descending "June Bug," crew members exited the aircraft until only John and Mike remained. At that point they were faced with an agonizing decision. As aircraft commander, John was duty and morally bound to attempt a crash landing if Mike was unable to jump. If Mike elected to gather his opened chute in his arms and exit the aircraft, he faced the very real possibility that his chute would prematurely deploy and snag on some portion of the aircraft, carrying him to certain death. Another possibility was that the canopy would become twisted or entangled in the shroud lines and fail to properly deploy.

Considering the uneven terrain over which they were flying, an attempted crash landing was a questionable alternative. Mike decided that he would jump rather than risk both of their lives. Miraculously, Mike's parachute deployed and he landed safely. John exited the "June Bug" as soon as possible after Mike's departure and, though perilously close to the ground when his chute opened, survived the touch-down.

For his heroic act of unselfishness, Mike was awarded the Silver Star. So was Harvy Allen, Bombardier, who had gallantly effectively directed the successful bomb run after the nose section had been seriously damaged by flak.

On 25th of December 1944 the 387th was assigned to hit the target at St. Vith in the bulge. We misidentified the target and hit a small town a few miles away. That small town just happened to house the headquarters for the German General who commanded the German forces in the bulge. That general wrote an article that appeared in Life magazine in December of 1945 wherein he suggested that our mistake crippled the effectiveness of his headquarters. I hasten to add that the first two boxes of the 387th did hit St. Vith, but my box did a 360 degree turn at the I.P. to provide better separation, and lost sight of the first two boxes. I read the article in Life waiting to get a haircut. I would love to have someone find a copy of the article and make it available. Please e-mail me. Thank you.

Thomas C. Britton, Major, USAF (Ret'd) <britton@mcn.org>
– Wednesday, July 26, 2000 at 13:51:17 (CDT)

APPENDIX 2 387th BG:

https://387bg.com/387th%20Bombardment%20Group%20-%20Operations.htm

Most replacement aircraft were usually given names by the pilot--and his crew--that the plane was assigned to, but seldom were these names painted on the ship. This was always a mystery to me? Thinking back, I'm inclined to believe that the ground crew that maintained the aircraft had a big influence on whether the ship was adorned with the name chosen by the pilot, or one that they preferred.

By the time the 387th BG moved from its original overseas base at Chipping Onger, to its transitory base at Stoney Cross, the turnover in veteran air crews had begun. The close knit ties that had been woven between air and ground personnel, during the founding and training days of the squadron and Group, were being broken up by the influx of "the replacements."

For most of the ground personnel, whose skills were required until war's end, this transition was taken in stride. But, for others, it took much longer to accept the "new men." This was understandable. I do believe, however, that by VE-day even the most dubious veteran became convinced that "the replacements" were indeed "satisfactory."

The early B-26B's in the 387th BG were the original planes flown overseas by the cadre of the flight personnel. These planes were picked up at Selfridge Field, and for the most part, the ships were adorned with their new names at that time. Overseas, as the deadly business of air warfare progressed, getting the planes airborne, and on target, became top priority, regardless of who flew them.

– William J. Thompson, Jr., 556th Bomb. Squadron, B-26 Marauder Reference and Operations Guide, p. 67.

The aircrews hated the weather over England and the Continent. The first task that confronted everyone was that of insuring that the aircraft were free of frost and ice and that they stayed that way until take-off. Once airborne, there usually was an instrument climb through a heavy overcast to form up "on top.”. The climb, itself, was usually hazardous as the freezing level normally extended from close to the ground to well up into the clouds where heavy snow might be encountered. Adding to the dangers in the climb out, aircraft often overtook other aircraft of its own unit or encountered aircraft of other units descending.² It was truly amazing that more mid-air collisions were not encountered. The statistics, although good under the circumstances, were hardly comforting to the aircrews as they blindly "bored up through the shit.”. Typical of these climb-out problems, on March 11th [1944], S/Sgt Eulon C. Bell, Tail-Gunner on Capt. Clifford D. Gohdes' aircraft, "hit the silk" when he thought his ice-covered Marauder had slopped into a spin as it nosed down north of Thetford, England.

Once on top, the Pilot and aircrew had to find the leader in a sky that could be filled with hundreds if not thousands of aircraft milling around and filling the sky with identification flares. Making the "on top" rendezvous especially hazardous was usually poor visibility, coupled with intermittent layered clouds or cloud build-ups. More often than anyone liked, aircraft would arrive on top and then not be able to locate their unit and have to return to base.

– John O. Moench, Maj. Gen., USAF, Marauder Men, p. 152.

By the end of August, four Marauder Groups were operating out of England: the 322nd, the 323rd, the 386th and the 387th. Arriving with the worst of reputations and a skepticism that the aircraft would never make it in the rough northern European combat environment, the experience to date was leading to a reassessment.

To the south, Gen. Brereton was secretly advised that the Ninth Air Force Headquarters, including the bomber and fighter commands, were to be transferred to England to take command of the tactical air elements of the Eighth Air Force. Marauder operations were obviously heating up.

In the meantime, those who kept and pondered over statistics were now calculating that the survival rate for a B-26 aircrew was 37.75 missions compared to 17.74 for a B-17 aircrew.

Contributing to these differences were the enemy tactics that led to a concentration of fighters on the heavy bombers while, in most cases, avoiding Marauders. On the other hand, the B-26s, flying at much lower altitudes than the heavies, were better targets for the German flak gunners, particularly those fierce 88 MM guns whose most effective zone of fire was considered to be between 10,000 and 20,000 feet. (Many aircrews of the heavies would hold to just the reverse, alleging that their higher damage to flak resulted from their higher altitude making them a better target.)

– John O. Moench, Maj. Gen., USAF, Marauder Men, p. 60.

[Comment on this passage: The Marauders didn't penetrate as far as the heavies and so were over enemy territory for less time per mission; comparing survival rates on a "time over enemy territory" basis eliminates much of the difference.

As to the concentration of fighters against heavy bombers: shorter penetrations also meant that there was less time for enemy fighters to respond and that it was very difficult to send the same fighters against the same mission twice, as was done for the heavies (once on the way in, once on the way out). Shorter penetrations also meant better escort coverage. Finally, the B-26s were smaller and faster; the handling characteristics that made them harder to fly also made it harder for an individual fighter to make as many passes against them (although the lower altitude of the mediums did give the fighters an additional advantage on their initial attack).]

APPENDIX 3 387th BG

:https://www.asisbiz.com/il2/B-26-Marauder/387BG-Chronology.html

387BG Mission:268	Target: Mayen railroad bridge	Dec 23 1944
387BG Mission:269	Target: Prum defended area	Dec 23 1944
387BG Mission:270	Target: Nideggen railroad siding	Dec 24 1944
387BG Mission:271	Target: Irrel highway bridge	Dec 25 1944
387BG Mission:272	Target: St. Vith road	Dec 25 1944

Fri, 22 Dec 44 https://387bg.com/387th%20Bombardment%20Group%20-%20Chronology.htm

Fighters fly a few strafing, weather reconnaissance, intruder patrol, and alert missions; bad weather cancels all other missions.

Sat, 23 Dec 44 – Mission: Mayen railroad bridge

Sat, 23 Dec 44 – Mission: Prum defended area

In Germany, around 500 B-26s and A-20s attack rail bridges, communication targets, villages, a rail junction and targets of opportunity losing 31bombers; fighters fly bomber escort,...

Meanwhile the planes, after being grounded for several days by heavy fog, took off on December 23 to get the Mayen railroad bridge, an important link in the enemy’s supply system. Ordered to bomb by PFF, the crews foundCAVU conditions in the target area and scored, as was learned later, four excellent and one superior out of seven flights. Just after crossing the bomb line en route to the target, the formation was jumped by fifteen to twenty-five ME-109s, who concentrated on the low flight of the second box and knocked down four ships—those of Lieutenant W. O. Pile, W. N. Church,C. O. Staub and W. J. Pucateri. Partial compensation for this loss was

the destruction of four ME-109s and four damaged by Technical SergeantJoseph Delia, Staff Sergeant D. D. Fasey and Sergeants James Jones, Ed Wesolowski and Leo Mossman. The other flights, after the Germans had been beaten off, continued to the target through intense and accurate heavy flak and destroyed the bridge. The fifth plane was lost when LieutenantSmith’s plane was picked off just before “bombs away.” In returning to the field Lieutenants W. P. Wade and T. G. Blackwell were forced to crash-land their badly damaged ships.

– History of the 387th Bombardment Group (M) AAF, p. xxx.

Just preceding Christmas Lieutenant Don Whitsett had flown his seventy-fifth mission in”Mississippi Mudcar” and had departed for the States. This plane was one of the original B-26s which had been ferried across the north Atlantic in June 1943; Lieutenant Whitsett had flown in it as co-pilot. On December 23rd the “Cat” was shot down on its 150th mission.

– History of the 387th Bombardment Group (M) AAF, p. xxx.

The initial target of the 387th was the railroad bridge at Mayen, Germany, approximately 25 miles west of Koblentz, which carried a critical rail line to the battlefield.

Our losses for the mission were seven of the thirty-six aircraft which were launched. The target for the afternoon mission was Prum, a communications center approximately 35 miles east of Bastogne.
…

On the 23rd of Dec., 1944, the first day that we could launch a mission in the Battle of the Bulge,

I flew as a substitute co-pilot on both the Mayen and Prum missions. During the former, our a/c was in one of the wing positions in the first box and except for the excitement of finally being able to join in this critical battle, it was a fairly routine mission from my standpoint.

When we reached our fighter rendez-vous the escorting fighters failed to appear and, as briefed, the leader turned on course over Bastogne.

This violation of formation discipline resulted in a flight of ME 109's effectively attacking the low flight and shooting down four of the six a/c. In the first box, although we were aware of enemy fighter activity by the radio chatter, no enemy aircraft were in view from the cockpit. Flights in the first box approached the target in a routine manner, went into their in-trail formation and scored excellent results on the bridge. The flak was accurate and heavy, but no a/c were lost over the target.

In the meantime, the second box was engaged in a running gun battle with the ME 109's until one minute prior to opening their bomb bay doors.

The two surviving Marauders from the low flight had tacked on to the lead flight.

The Box Leader, realizing he was approaching the target on a heading different that that which had been briefed, made a 360° turn and lined up properly for the bomb run. The high flight followed him and the two flights made long steady runs and dropped with excellent results.

Prum was about thirty five miles northeast of Bastogne and I recall the flak was especially accurate as we flew toward the target. Regardless of our evasive action, the bursts seemed to be all over us. As our flights manoeuvred into their in trail formation to commence the bomb run, the flight of six ships ahead of us from another group, literally blew apart. I presume the lead ship received a direct hit and the other five aircraft banked away to his right and left.

The 387th had been able to launch only 26 aircraft for this mission instead of the customary 36, and 21 of the 26 received battle damage. The bombing results were excellent.

– Paul Priday (556th B.S.), Mission to Mayen.

The 387th Group lost four bombers and a pathfinder to some 20 German fighters that blasted away at the B-26s between Bastogne and their target at Daun...

In the hit on Mayen, the 387th suffered the loss of four Marauders to enemy fighters and another two to flak after failing to find their escort from the 367th Fighter Group.The B-26s did, however, claim 4 German fighters downed.

– Daniel Parker, To Win the Winter Sky, pp. 234.

The 387th and 394th BGs hit the village of Prüm east of St. Vith. The 387th lost only one plane due to flak damage. The crippled bomber wash it just before the bomb run and suddenly arched over on its back. The pilot somehow managed to roll over and straighten out in time to drop its bombs before the B-26 fell off to the side and spun to the ground...

– Daniel Parker, To Win the Winter Sky, pp. 235-236.

Staffeln of JG 11 opposed the 70 B-26 Marauders of the 387th and 394th BGs bearing down on the marshalling yards at Mayen.

– Daniel Parker, To Win the Winter Sky, pp. 243.

….

Mon, 25 Dec 1944 – Mission: St. Vith road

Nearly 650 B-26, A-20s and A-26s hit rail and road bridges, communications centers and targets of opportunity in W Germany and the breakthrough area;...

Following the attacks on Prum and Nideggen the Group, on Christmas day, amid hail and snow, went after the Irrel road junction. On this mission occurred one of the most heroic incidents in the history of the Group.

Since the time remaining was too short to make the necessary adjustments,Lieutenant Harvey W. Allen, the bombardier, signalled to the pilot to make another bomb run. With rudder, ailerons and wings full of holes, Lieutenant Alexander managed to hold the plane level so that the bombs could be salvoed, hitting inside the target area.

Losing altitude fast and perceiving an indicated air speed of only 160 mph, Lieutenant Alexander coaxed his ship back across the bomb line near Trier and ordered the crew to bail out.Seven of the nine aboard made the jump, but staff Sergeant Michael Aguilar was thrown against the radio table and his chute flew open.

Lieutenant Alexander gallantly offered to try to crash land the plane, but SergeantAguilar gallantly refused to agree, realizing the impossibility of a crash-landing among the hills. Climbing gingerly down through the nose wheel with the parachute draped over his arm, Sergeant Aguilar successfully made the jump.

For their acts of gallantry, Lieutenant Alexander was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal and Sergeant Aguilar the Silver Star.

In the afternoon a 387th formation attacked St. Vith with excellent results, but the most exciting events of the day were to happen after the mission.

About twenty minutes later a 387th plane, returning with sixteen 250’s from a test flight, came in. In landing the nose wheel tire was punctured by a bomb fragment from the 397th ship, the 387th plane nosed over, caught fire and exploded.

This crew also escaped, but all other whole window panes in Group headquarters were shattered.

– History of the 387th Bombardment Group (M) AAF, pp. xxx.

Came a never-to-be forgotten Christmas Day. In the morning the target was a road junction at Irrel. Ground in the target area was blanketed with freshly fallen snow, and have made bombing more difficult. Nevertheless, most of the formation hit the target for good results, and the rest bombed the defended town of Echternach; also with good results. Making a secondary run on the primary target, the ship of Lieutenant [John] Alexander, leading the Low Flight of the II-Box, was hit hard by Flak, knocking out his one engine and the bombsight. Lt. [Harvey] Allen, bombardier, ingeniously go this bombs away in the target area, nonetheless, allowing his flight to bomb.

Lt. Alexander kept the ship under control while Lt. Allen and Sgt. Miller,GEE Operator, directed him to friendly territory, where all nine men in the crew safely parachuted. S/Sgt. Aguilar jumped after his parachute had opened accidentally inside the aircraft, and Lt. Alexander, last man out, with difficulty jumped from the careening plane at 700 feet. The plane was seen to crash seconds later into the bank of a small stream. All of the men returned later. None of the remaining nine planes furnished by the squadron received damage.

– 556th Squadron, MonthlyReport, December, 1944.

On the Group's morning mission to Irrel, Germany, 1st Lt. John A. Alexander- 0699645, by his undaunted actions, earned our country's second highest honour for valour, the coveted Distinguished Service Cross.

– Peter Crouchman, Alan Crouchman,Robert C. Allen, William J. Thompson, Jr., 556th Bomb. Squadron, B-26Marauder Reference and Operations Guide, p. 52.

1st Lt. James M. Neff was our crew's pilot, and I might add, a damn good one. His skills were certainly taxed to the limit during the afternoon mission to Saint Vith, Belgium on Christmas day.

After waiting most of the morning for a special mission, which did not materialize, our six plane flight was tacked on to the Group's second mission.

The I.P. was the town of Malmedy, approximately twenty-eight miles north of St. Vith.

The target was heavily defended, and the scene of much Allied aerial efforts to disrupt German traffic in the area. We had a fresh snow fall on Xmas morning, the first of that cold winter. The visibility over the target was excellent, and each flight bombed visually.

I was in my gun position as tail-gunner, as our flight levelled out for the bomb run.

Lt. Vernon Briscoe was calling last second corrections.,when our plane seemed to shudder. The next second, I saw the planes in our flight do what I thought was a climbing right turn. This brief recollection lasted only a millisecond before I realized our plane was descending fast in a steep left turn.

I saw smoke coming from one of the engines and called Neff on the intercom. His calm reply was, "I know it." He called Gamble to come forward, "On the double." I then saw that the left wing had holes in it, as well as the tail section. Neff adroitly managed to control our descent, and told the crew to standby to bail out.

I grabbed my chest pack and met Walt Simmons (AG-top turret gun.) at the waist gun window. Walt plugged into the waist window intercom as I made ready to jump.

43-34303I learned later... that when Gamble went forward, he waded through ankle deep gasoline in the aft bomb bay. He notified Neff of this potential danger.The pilot's compartment was a shambles. Jimmy Harris, our copilot, was bleeding from shoulder and face wounds, the plexiglas was shattered and the pilot's instruments were shot out. Neff had his hands full trying to maintain control of our aircraft's descent. Bris and Lt. Russ Trapper, our navigator, along with M/Sgt. Paris "Hoop" Hooper, our GEE operator, were feverishly, but methodically, plotting our position, and relaying headings for Neff to steer in order to be over friendly lines.

The left engine seized up and Neff feathered it, when Harris announced that our right engine had burst into flames. The danger was very great for a midair explosion, and Neff and Gamble realized it.

At the persistent coaxing of our calm bombardier, Neff delayed the bail out order until Bris assured him we were over our lines. Neff ordered Trapper and Briscoe out of their nose compartment, and then gave the order to bail out. Walt and I exited the flaming aircraft from the waist window, while the other six members used the open bomb bay. Neff was the last member of the crew to jump.

The B-26G circled under him, and then exploded in mid air!

The fuselage fell into the Meuse River near Huy, Belgium, while its two engines fell on each embankment.

Four of us descended by parachute into the front-line positions held by the 84th Inf. Div., where we ate our Xmas supper.

Harris ended up in a Paris hospital, and the rest of us arrived back to the 387th BG within three days. I suffered injuries to my ankles, while Bris was crippled with a knee injury. Luckily, no one else was injured. On board were:

– Peter Crouchman, Alan Crouchman, Robert C. Allen, William J. Thompson, Jr., 556th Bomb. Squadron, B-26Marauder Reference and Operations Guide, p. 61.

Lieutenant Harvey Allen, bombardier on Lt. John Alexander's lead crew, suffered facial lacerations when the B-26 Plexiglas nose was shattered during their initial bomb run over Irrel.

Lt. Allen reported that his bomb sight was also damaged by the flak. On their flight's second bomb run, Lt. Allen aligned the secondary target up visually and they were able to place all their bombs in the target area. For his actions, 2nd Lt. Harvey Allen was awarded the Purple Heart and the Silver Star.

FW Supplemental Section,Personal Experiences & Anecdotes By And Of The Men Of The 556th Bomb.Squadron, p. 52-A.

[This account reports that the flight was attacking the secondary target;this is probably incorrect.]

When the aircraft suffer edits initial flak damage, Mike Aguilar, Engineer/Gunner, came forward from his position in the top turret to assist in the cockpit. As Mike passed through the bomb bay the ripcord of his chest pack parachute was snagged and the chute was accidentally opened. After "Bombs away," when it became apparent that the aircraft would have to be abandoned, John gave the order to bail out.

As John struggled to control the rapidly descending "June Bug," crew members exited the aircraft until only John and Mike remained. At that point they were faced with an agonising decision. As aircraft commander, John was duty and morally bound to attempt a crash landing if Mike was unable to jump. If Mike elected to gather his opened chute in his arms and exit the aircraft, he faced the very real possibility that his chute would prematurely deploy and snag on some portion of the aircraft, carrying him to certain death. Another possibility was that the canopy would become twisted or entangled in the shroud lines and fail to properly deploy.

Considering the uneven terrain over which they were flying, an attempted crash landing was a questionable alternative. Mike decided that he would jump rather than risk both of their

lives. Miraculously, Mike's parachute deployed and he landed safely. John exited the "June Bug" as soon as possible after Mike's departure and, though perilously close to the ground when his chute opened, survived the touch-down.

For his heroic act of unselfishness,Mike was awarded the Silver Star. So was Harvy Allen, Bombardier, who had gallantly effectively directed the successful bomb run after the nose section had been seriously damaged by flak.

General Orders No. 53

John A. Alexander O-699645,First Lieutenant, Army Air Forces, United States Army. For extraordinary heroism in action against the enemy while serving as pilot of a B-26 aircraft in a daylight bombardment mission over Germany, 25 December 1944. On this date, during the initial approach to the target, flak damage severed communications between Alexander and his bombardier and since contact could not be reestablished in time for accurate bombing Lieutenant Alexander continued to lead the flight on a true and level course. Midway on the bomb run another flak burst destroyed the bomb sight, shattered the plexiglass and tore holes in the wings and rudder. In spite of the great damage sustained by the aircraft, Lieutenant Alexander continued on an accurate course over the target and bombs were released with excellent results. The extraordinary heroism and determination to complete his assigned mission displayed byLieutenant Alexander on this occasion are in keeping with the highest traditions of the Armed Forces of the United States.By Command of General Spaatz

On 25th of December 1944 the 387th was assigned to hit the target atSt. Vith in the bulge. We misidentified the target and hit a small town a few miles away. That small town just happened to house the headquarters for the German General who commanded the German forces in the bulge. That general wrote an article that appeared in Life magazine in December of1945 wherein he suggested that our mistake crippled the effectiveness of his headquarters. I hasten to add that the first two boxes of the 387th did hit St. Vith, but my box did a 360 degree turn at the I.P. to provide better separation, and lost sight of the first two boxes. I read the article in Life waiting to get a haircut. I would love to have someone find a copy of the article and make it available. Please e-mail me. Thank you.

Thomas C. Britton, Major, USAF (Ret’d)

APPENDIX 4: 322nd BG

http://www.historyofwar.org/air/units/USAAF/322nd_Bombardment_Group.html

History

The 322nd Bombardment Group was a medium bomber group that had a disastrous introduction to combat in the spring of 1943, losing ten out of eleven aircraft on its second raid, but that went on to develop effective medium level medium bomber tactics and supported the Allied armies after the D-Day invasions.

The group was formed in the United States in the summer of 1942. It was equipped with the B-26 Marauder and would use that aircraft throughout the war. The group's ground echelon began to cross the Atlantic in November-December 1942, followed by the aircrew and aircraft in March and April 1943.

On 13 May 1943 the group was declared operational, as part of the Eighth Air Force. This was the day that saw the 4th Bombardment Wing enter combat, and the available aircraft strength of the Eighth Air Force rise from 100 to 215 as the US build-up began to gather pace. Its first combat mission came on 14 May and was an attack on a power station in Holland. This first low level attack was successful, but a second low-level attack on 17 May was a total disaster. Eleven aircraft were sent on the raid. One returned early, but all ten that pressed on to their target were lost, shot down either by anti-aircraft fire or by German fighters.

After this disaster low level medium bomber operations were suspended. The group spent two months training to operation from medium altitude, before returning to combat on 17 July 1943. The new medium level tactics were more effective, and were tried out against German airfields between July 1943 and February 1944. The group was awarded a Distinguished Unit Citation for the period between 14 May 1943 and 24 July 1944, reflecting the success of the new tactics.

On 16 October 1943 the 322nd was one of six groups transferred to the Ninth Air Force from the Eighth, after the Ninth moved from the Mediterranean to Britain. This included four bombardment groups that formed the entire bomber strength of the Ninth until the spring of 1944.

On 22 February 1944 the 322nd became one of the first groups in the Ninth Air Force to be guided to its target by pathfinder aircraft, during a raid on Coxyda airfield in Holland.

In March 1944 the group began to focus on transport links, attacking road and rail bridges and oil facilities as part of the build-up to D-Day. The group also took part in the attack on the German V-1 bases.

On 6 June 1944 the group was used to attack German gun batteries and coastal defences. During the fighting in Normandy German fuel and ammo dumps and transport links were the main targets. The group took part in the fighting at Caen and in the breakthrough at St Lo in July 1944. In August and September it supported the US Third Army during the advance across France. In October-December 1944 it took part in the campaign against the Siegfried Line, the German western defences, while in December 1944 and January 1945 it attacked rail bridges to isolate the Germans taking part in the Ardennes offensive.

Timeline

October 1943

To Ninth Air Force

Commanders (with date of appointment): Col John S Samuel: Jul 1944

Main Bases: Beauvais/Tille France: Sep 1944

Component Units

449th Bombardment Squadron: 1942-45; 1947-49
450th Bombardment Squadron: 1942-45; 1947-49
451st Bombardment Squadron: 1942-45; 1947-49
452nd Bombardment Squadron: 1942-45; 1947-49

Assigned To: 1943-44: 99th Bombardment Wing; IX Bomber Command; Ninth Air Force

APPENDIX 5: Bombardment Group Organisation.

Unit organization

The tables of organization and equipment (TO&E) for all bombardment groups were roughly the same. In 1942, existing bomb groups were expanded from three to four numbered bombardment squadrons; and most bomb groups created during the war retained this structure - B-29 groups were the exception, having only three squadrons. In addition to the flying squadrons issued Aircrew Badges, each group contained a group headquarters, a service squadron, and detachments for support of aircraft, equipment, and personnel from quartermaster, aviation ordnance, military police, chemical, signal, and maintenance companies, and from a weather squadron. These support personnel were then pooled and re-distributed among an unofficial service group and detailed for various duties as needed.

The service group provided support and technical sections for the group requirements as a whole: Flying control, Ordnance, airfield security, firefighting, Post Exchange (PX), Special Services, Mail, Transportation ("motor pool"),

Communications, Radar, Gunnery instruction, Personal Equipment, and Weather (Meteorology). The service group also had its own mess section.

The service group had approximately 30 officers and 300 to 400 enlisted men.

The group headquarters contained sections organized in the traditional U.S. Army structure:

Personnel (S-1),

Intelligence (S-2),

Operations (S-3),

and Supply (S-4).

Including inspectors, headquarters organizations in practice totalled approximately 20 officers, some of whom were also pilots, and 60 to 80 enlisted men.

Each bomb squadron, in addition to its assigned flight crews, had a squadron headquarters structured similarly to the group's, and six technical support and maintenance sections supporting its aircraft, equipment, and personnel: Mess, Armament, Ordnance, Communications, Medical, and Engineering (aircraft maintenance). The ground support members of a bomb squadron numbered 15-20 officers and 250 to 300 enlisted men.

Functionally, bomb groups were divided into an air echelon (the collective aircrews), and a ground echelon (all supporting ground personnel within the group, including those in attached Sub Depots). Groups commonly had two deputy commanders, termed the air executive officer and the ground executive officer, to coordinate these echelons.

Personnel strengths[edit]

In 1943, a heavy bomb group had a total complement of 294 officers and 1,487 enlisted men to fly and support 48 heavy bombers; and a medium bomb group had 294 officers and 1,297 enlisted men for 64 medium bombers.

By February 1945, the size of the 125 standardized bomb group establishments had grown to:

AAF Bombardment group organization

March 1945

Type of unit	Type of aircraft	Number of aircraft	Number of crews	Men per crew	Total personnel	Officers	Enlisted
Very heavy bombardment group	B-29	45	60	11	2,278	462	1,816
Heavy bombardment group	B-17, B-24	72	96	9 - 11	2,261	465	1,796
Medium bombardment group	B-25, B-26	96	96	5 - 6	1,759	393	1,386
Light bombardment group	A-20, A-26	96	96	3 - 4	1,304	211	1,093

Very Heavy: B-29 Superfortress, B-32 Dominator
Heavy: B-17 Flying Fortress, B-24 Liberator
Medium: B-25 Mitchell, B-26 Marauder
Light: A-20 Havoc, A-26 Invader

USAAF squadron codes: https://www.worldwarphotos.info/usaaf-codes/

USAAF unit identification markings, codes and colors

ETO

USAAF in Europe adopted a similar coding system to that of the RAF:

two character alphabetical or alpha-numeric combination were separated from a third by the national Insignia.

3rd letter was Radio Call Letter, in Bomb Groups often repeated on the fin.
1st Air Division

APPENDIX 6: B26 images

https://www.alamyimages.fr/photos-images/marauder-1944.html?sortBy=relevant

APPENDIX 7 B26 BOMBERS FORMATION

(https://b26.com/historian/trevor_allen/marauder_formation.htm)

On a normal B-26 the crew would consist of a Pilot, Copilot, Bombardier/Navigator, radio/gunner, engineer/gunner and armourer/gunner.

Normal bombing practice was to bomb by formations of 18 or 36 aircraft.

A flight of 18 x B-26's was called a box formation and this constituted of 3 flights of six planes.

(See layout)

Box Formation

Only the Box Lead/Deputy Box Lead, Flight Lead and Deputy Flight Lead normally carried a bombardier and a navigator.

All other ships in the formation dropped their bombs on a signal from the Box Lead, so there was no need for both a navigator and a bombardier in these ships.

To further complicate crew stations a box lead frequently carried two radio gunner, one to permanently man the command radio and the other to take over the gunner duties.

Now the muddy pool gets even muddier when radar aids were fitted. The Box Lead would now carry Pilot, copilot, bombardier, navigator, gee navigator, two radio gunners, armourer gunner and engineer gunner. Add to this an occasional photo/gunner.

APPENDIX 8: Mission 760

https://www.thisdayinaviation.com/tag/8th-air-force-mission-no-760/

The President of the United States of America, in the name of Congress, takes pride in presenting the Medal of Honor (Posthumously) to

BRIGADIER GENERAL (AIR CORPS) FREDERICK WALKER CASTLE

UNITED STATES ARMY AIR FORCES,

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

“For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity in action above and beyond the call of duty while serving with the 487th Bombardment Group (H), 4th Bombardment Wing, Eighth Air Force.

Brigadier General Castle was air commander and leader of more than 2,000 heavy bombers in a strike against German airfields on 24 December 1944. En route to the target, the failure of one engine forced him to relinquish his place at the head of the formation. In order not to endanger friendly troops on the ground below, he refused to jettison his bombs to gain speed manoeuvrability. His lagging, unescorted aircraft became the target of numerous enemy fighters which ripped the left wing with cannon shells, set the oxygen system afire, and wounded two members of the crew. Repeated attacks started fires in two engines, leaving the Flying Fortress in imminent danger of exploding. Realizing the hopelessness of the situation, the bail-out order was given. Without regard for his personal safety he gallantly remained alone at the controls to afford all other crew members an opportunity to escape. Still another attack exploded gasoline tanks in the right wing, and the bomber plunged earthward, carrying General Castle to his death. His intrepidity and willing sacrifice of his life to save members of the crew were in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service.”

In December 1944 Brigadier General Frederick W. Castle was the Commander of the 4th Combat Bomb Wing of the 3rd Air Division, 8th U.S. Army Air Force in England. 4th Bomb Wing headquarters was located at Rougham Field near Bury St. Edmunds, but General Castle lost his life while flying with the 487th Bomb Group at Lavenham.

On 24 December 1944 he commanded the 487th Bomb Group and led the Air Task Force in the largest 8th Air Force action of the war.

This was 8th Air Force Mission #760, which involved more than 2,000 B-17s and B-24s, including formation assembly ships, war wearies, and almost anything else that could fly and carry a bomb load.⁹

The mission was to bomb German airfields and supply lines to stem the German offensive in the Ardennes known as the Battle of the Bulge.

The 487th Bomb Group's target was the airfield at Babenhausen, Germany.

As Air Leader, General Castle flew in the copilot's position with pilot Lt Robert W. Harriman's lead crew.

Their aircraft was Pathfinder B-17G 44-8444 of the 836th Squadron (2G:C).

The crew called the aircraft Treble Four after the last three digits of its serial number.¹³ In the 487th Bomb Group formation, the 838th Squadron was the lead squadron. Treble Four flew in the number 1 position of the lead element. Pilot Lt John H. Edwards and Deputy Air Leader Captain Mayfield R. Shilling flew Pathfinder B-17G 44-8021 in the number 2 position off Harriman's right wing. Pilot Lt Richmond C. Young and copilot Lt Lawrence N. Bross flew B-17G 43-38028 in the number 3 position off Harriman's left wing.⁴

As the Wing’s commander, General Castle flew as co-pilot aboard the lead ship, B-17G 44-8444 of the 487th, with pilot 1st Lieutenant Robert W. Harriman and his lead crew of 6 officers and 3 sergeant/gunners. As the leading Pathfinder, Treble Four carried three navigators.

The airplane was a “Pathfinder,” equipped with H2X ground-mapping radar which allowed a radar navigator to locate a target through cloud cover. The rotating antenna replaced the bomber’s ventral ball turret.

The Crash of B-17 44-8444 'Treble Four

'APPENDIX 9: Malmedy Dec. 24th, 1944.

https://www.458bg.com/crewij5floyd.htm

https://24december1944.com/8th-af-order-battle/

The Floyd crew took part in the mission of December 24, 1944 to hit the marshalling yards at Schonecken, Germany, south of Aachen. Due to the weather, this was the first time since December 12th that the 458th had been able to mount a mission. This was also the first day of clear weather since the Germans had launched their offensive in the Ardennes, which would come to be known as “The Battle of the Bulge”.

On this particular day, the Eighth Air Force mounted a maximum effort, sending more that 2,000 heavy bombers and nearly 1,000 fighters to hit airfields, marshalling yards, and communications centers to try and relieve the pressure from the ground forces. The 458th put up an unprecedented 56 aircraft, of which 53 dropped their bombs on Schonecken and other targets in Germany.

It was also on this date that the town of Malmedy was mistakenly bombed by the USAAF. While not purposely targeting this city, which was under the control of the Allied forces, elements of the 458th are believed to have unloaded their bombs here in the belief that they were bombing a target of opportunity in Germany.

The after action critique held by Col Isbell shows that the lead squadron, “failed to pick up primary target…and bombed a crossroad and railroad north of the assigned primary. (Maj. Betzold, CA of deputy lead A/C, stated that GH fixed bombs at Blumenthal, about 22 miles north of primary target. SAV’s confirm this showing excellent pattern on railroad and roads.)”

The mention of “Blumenthal” in this report is confusing, especially when the distance between the primary target at Schonecken and Blumenthal is stated to be “about 22 miles north….” Blumenthal, Germany is in fact over 300 miles north of Schonecken.

The town of Malmedy is a little over 21 miles north of Schonecken, as mentioned further along in the Colonel’s critique: “A Group – Low Left SQ:, Major LaRoche, CA and the lead bombardier thought they had bombed the primary target but had hit to one side. (SAV’s show that bombs of this squadron landed in open fields 2 miles south east of Malmedy, some 22 miles from assigned MPI.)”

If the bombs of Major La Roche’s squadron landed in open fields two miles southeast of Malmedy, which is stated to be “…some 22 miles from assigned MPI” and Major Betzold’s squadron bombed a crossroad and a railroad “…about 22 miles north of the primary target”, the evidence is very compelling that Major Betzold’s squadron mistook Malmedy for the primary and dropped on that city.

Further evidence shows that the primary was bombed at 1436 hours by at least two squadrons, one of which was led by Floyd. They were flying in the “B Group” Low Left Squadron with Captain Simes as command pilot.

The son of navigator Lt Gerry Covey (left) remembered that his father told the story of the Christmas Eve 1944 mission every year:

“The bombardier on my Dad's plane was a fellow named George Dicks, who stayed in the Air Corps/Air Force after the war and became Colonel George Dicks. He earned the DFC on the Christmas Eve mission for hitting the target exceptionally well.

“Anyway, he recollected to his son years later that the Group had great difficulty finding the IP somewhere near Namur. It is quite possible that one of the towns bombed by the Group was actually Malmedy; the distance between Malmedy and Schonecken by air is only around forty miles and the Group had to go after many secondary targets in the area.

Bombing a Belgian town would have been only another mess-up among a few. For example, the squadron ahead of my Dad's going after Schonecken dropped way too early and plowed up a field. On the other hand, so many planes were in the air that there's lots of room for doubt.

“Things got so bad navigation-wise that afterwards a fellow by the name of Simes, who was a ‘guest’ co-pilot [Command Pilot] on my Dad's plane, recommended that if the Group ever needed to go all-out again, there should be more Group lead navigators. I'm sure he was thinking in particular of my Dad, who had been grousing with Dicks about how close the Group came to being truly lost.

“My Dad's squadron was the last one of the Group to bomb and it was during the bomb run that he conclusively identified the town as the primary. Because of that, the Group lined up on his plane to return home and, because the 458th knew where it was, the ‘whole damn Eighth Air Force lined up behind us.’"

The mission critique seems to lend credence to this: “B Group – Low Left Squadron: Lead bombardier stated that they had hit the I.P. and that the rest of the group went off course there. There were no check points in the snow, so they selected a target of opportunity, and made a run on it. Just at bombs away, the navigator got a GEE fix that indicated their target was the primary. They laid a pattern in center and west side of town. (SAV’s show an excellent pattern of bombs on the primary target with 95% within 1000 feet, and 100% within 2000 feet.)”

American soldiers of the 30th Infantry Division were currently occupying the town. Eye witnesses on the ground saw B-24 bombers approaching from a northerly direction. The numbers vary, but anywhere from 12-18 were seen.

1Lt Frank W. Towers, a platoon leader and Liaison Officer in the 30th Infantry Division, had a ring side seat and viewed the bombing of the town: "In the meanwhile, the Germans had claimed the capture of Malmedy (right), and the headlines of the Stars & Stripes proclaimed this! Thus our Air Corps partners, the “9th U.S. Luftwaffe” as we called them, came over with their heavy B-24 bombers on 24 December, and opened their bomb-bay doors directly over Malmedy.
2Lt John B. Floyd Crew - Completed Tour

Floyd Missions

….

Date	Target	458th Msn	Pilot Msn	Cmd Pilot	Ld	Serial	RCL	Sqdn	A/C Msn	A/C Name
24-Dec-44	SCHONECKEN	157	23	SIMES	L5	42-50575	O	J3	15	UNKNOWN 020

….

"Malmedy had been liberated in October 1944, with little or no fighting, as the Germans were on the run at that time, heading for their defences along the nearby border of Belgium and Germany. So, Malmedy had been spared of any appreciable damage, and when we moved into the town on 18 December, it was a beautiful and picturesque resort town, where everyone was merrily going about their business as usual.

"This suddenly changed the whole picture! Malmedy was a total disaster, with the entire center of the city laid to waste. Many civilians were killed and wounded, but we were fortunate in losing only a very few men of our own. Our biggest loss was our https://mediaprocessor.websimages.com/width/700/crop/0,0,700x490/www.458bg.com/Crews/Floyd/CrewIJ5Floyd.jpg Christmas dinner, which was being prepared that day. Spam and bread is what we got!! Three of our Company’s kitchens located within the City of Malmedy, were totally destroyed.

"Of course our Air Corps ‘friends’ apologised, and they still could not understand just what went wrong. As they were apologising, the 9th Air Corps was on its way, to make sure of the knock-out, and they bombed Malmedy again on Christmas Day! This in spite of the whole city having been covered with our normal phosphorescent panels, to indicate that the area was occupied by our own forces.

"As I mentioned, the entire center of the city of Malmedy was a total wasteland, and the next day, the Stars & Stripes proudly proclaimed,’ that Malmedy had been retaken by our troops, due to the strong support of the Air Corps, in stopping the German advance through Malmedy.’

"At this particular time, I was a Liaison Officer from the Division Hq., which was located in the Hotel des Bruyères in Francorchamps, to the 120th Regimental Hq. which was located in the City Hall in Malmedy. I drove between these two points frequently, day and night, so it was prudent to find the shortest route between these two points. This led me to an unimproved road up over a mountain to the northwest of Malmedy, and through the settlement of Burnenville, situated on the top of the mountain. This route saved me many miles of travel and hours of time.

"On the fateful day of 24 December, as I was traversing this route, and was about to descend the slope of the mountain down into Malmedy, I heard the drone of planes to my rear. I told my driver to stop right there. We looked back and saw this great flight of B-24 bombers. What a wonderful sight to behold! I said to my driver, “The Germans are going to catch Hell somewhere”, and he agreed. Little did we know at that moment that their target was Malmedy!! In a few moments, we were appalled when we could see the bomb-bays of the planes open, and the bombs began to tumble out!! It was total horror as we watched the bombs drop all the way down to their target, the heart of the City of Malmedy!! Clouds of smoke erupted from this point, then flames reaching hundreds of feet into the air over Malmedy. I had a small camera with me, and I took a few photos of the planes, dropping their bombs, and then of the city shrouded in smoke and flames.

"It was later learned that three of our 3rd Battalion kitchens had been totally destroyed, and about 25 of our men were missing in action, all presumably in and around the kitchen areas, and no trace of them was ever found. "There is some question as to just when this action occurred, as everything and everybody was in a state of chaos. Whether this action took place on 24 December or 25 December is questionable, but the fact remains that we WERE bombed on both days. All of the Company’s records were destroyed in these bombings, so all we have is the accounts written in the history books, and the recollection of others many years after the event.

"We cranked up our Jeep, and raced down the slope of the mountain, and crossed the bridge over the river on the north side of the city. That was as far as we could go, as there was debris from the bombing all over the streets, making them impassable. People were running around screaming for help and needing assistance. Knowing where all of our medical facilities were located in Malmedy, all that I could do was to direct them to the nearest medical facility, where they could get help. Upon reaching the Regimental CP located in the City Hall, I found that all of the phone lines were out, and radio communication with the Division Hq. was not possible due to the distance and the interference of the mountain between the two headquarters.

"I was delegated to race back to the Division Hq. and advise them of the disaster that had just occurred, and to summon assistance at once. Almost immediately, as many of the Medical officers and staffs were summoned and dispatched to go to Malmedy to render any assistance possible to our own troops first, then to render assistance to the civilian population as needed.

"Needless to say, the 105th Engr. Bn was dispatched also, to render assistance in clearing the main routes through the city as quickly as possible.

"It was remarkable to note that, although the entire heart of the city was destroyed, the St. Quirin Cathedral was virtually untouched! Talk about Miracles!!

"However, we recovered from this disaster rather quickly, as most all of the necessary ground support was almost immediately available, since we were in the midst of the 1st Army supply depots, which had been abandoned by them on 16, 17 & 18 December 1944."

Courtesy: http://www.30thinfantry.org/history_docs/battle_of_the_ardennes_towers.doc

T/Sgt Arthur P. Wiley, 2nd Platoon, M Company, 120th Infantry, 30th Infantry Division, was directly under the bombs:

"Malmedy was a beautiful town of some 15,000 people that had been spared the destruction that occurred to so many European towns and cities. Later that evening we received some information that had been reported to Army Hdqrs. 'Malmedy had been captured by the Germans.' December 24th dawned bright and clear as we remained in our positions. Around noon my Company Commander sent his jeep to pick me up to report to "M" Co. Hdqrs. I asked Mike O'Hara to go with me and we reported to the Command Post in the center of Malmedy.

Around 2:30 PM, after the meeting with Capt. Broussard, Mike and I retired to another room in the three-story house that had a “wood burning” stove so we took off our combat boots to warm our feet. We had been there about five minutes when we heard a "swishing" sound that kept getting louder and louder. We thought some German rockets were coming in so we grabbed our boots and headed for an interior hallway that had no exterior windows. About that time there was one hell of an explosion and dust and debris flew everywhere. We sat down and put our combat boots on and about that time somebody ran into the Command Post and yelled that our Mortar Platoon had been hit by a bomb.

"This time it was twelve or fifteen American B-24 Bombers that had bombed Malmedy and their accuracy was deadly. The loud explosion we heard was the house next door that suffered a direct hit. This was a three-story house that was flattened even with the ground. I never did know if there were any soldiers or civilians in that house but for sure no one survived. As soon as we had our boots on we took off down the street about a block where our Mortar Platoon was located. We came to a pile of debris that had been a three-story house and someone said the 1st Section of the Mortar Platoon was in that house. It was obvious that there would be no survivors so we worked our way around to the back of the house to see if there was another way to get into the basement because we were sure that is where they would be. It was hopeless but we did find one man who was still alive but he died in about five minutes. The bomb must have had a delayed fuse because the men we could see were blown up under what had been the first floor of the house. The Mortar Platoon lost fourteen men in that one house but they did not suffer because death was instantaneous. It was beyond our belief that our own planes could bomb us two days in a row.

Most of the bombs landed in and around the center of Malmedy and the destruction was terrible. The final count was something like thirty G.I.s killed and four hundred civilians killed and wounded.

"Mike and I decided that we could not be of any help so we grabbed a jeep that someone had abandoned and returned to our hole in the ground. This had been one terrible Christmas Eve - one that will never be forgotten by the ones who were there."

Courtesy: http://www.marcolowe.com/vmsr/war_at_ground_level/part2/body_index.html

-------------------------------------

While much of the evidence points to the 458th as having dropped on Malmedy, no record of this exists in the 458th war diary, other than what is mentioned in Colonel Isbell’s mission critique of bombs landing two miles “southeast of Malmedy.” It does not help the group’s case that one squadron that had trouble with check points elicited the response, “There is some doubt as to where this squadron bombed” from the Colonel.

While the truth of who actually bombed Malmedy on December 24th may never be known, there is one thing for certain: the town of Malmedy was NOT bombed deliberately by this group. If it was in fact a squadron or squadrons from the 458th, they believed they were either dropping on the primary target of Schonecken, or a target of opportunity in Germany.

APPENDIX 10: GEE Navigation

https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Gee_(navigation)

Gee, sometimes written GEE, was a radio navigation system used by the Royal Air Force during World War II.

It measured the time delay between two radio signals to produce a fix, with accuracy on the order of a few hundred metres at ranges up to about 350 miles (560 km).

It was the first hyperbolic navigation system to be used operationally, ente

ring service with RAF Bomber Command in 1942

Gee was devised by Robert Dippy as a short-range blind landing system to improve safety during night operations, the range was found to be far better than expected.

It then developed into a long-range, general navigation system.

For large, fixed targets, such as the cities that were attacked at night, Gee offered enough accuracy to be used as an aiming reference without the need to use a bombsight or other external references.

Jamming reduced its usefulness as a bombing aid, but it remained in use as a navigational aid in the UK area throughout and after the war.

History

Prerequisite work

The basic idea of radio hyperbolic navigation was well known in the 1930s, but the equipment needed to build it was not widely available at the time. The main problem involved the accurate determination of the difference in timing of two closely spaced signals, differences in milli- and microseconds.

During the 1930s, the development of radar demanded devices that could accurately measure these sorts of signal timings. In the case of Chain Home, transmission aerials sent out signals, and any reflections from distant targets were received on separate aerials.

An oscilloscope (or oscillograph as it was known in the UK) was used to measure the time between transmission and reception.

The transmitter triggered a time base generator that started a "trace" moving quickly along the oscilloscope display. Any received signals caused the beam to deflect downward, forming a blip.

The distance that the trace had moved from the left side of the display could be measured to accurately calculate the difference in time between sending and receiving, which, in turn, could be used to calculate the slant range to the target.

Navigation system proposal

The RAF's bombing campaign plans quickly went awry, especially after the Air Battle of the Heligoland Bight in 1939. Contrary to prewar thinking, the bombers proved extremely vulnerable to both ground fire and attacking fighters. After some discussion, the best course of action was decided to be to return to night bombing, which had been the primary concept earlier in the 1930s.

This raised the need for better landing aids, and for night navigation aids in general. Dippy refined his system for this purpose, and formally presented a new proposal on 24 June 1940.

The original design used two transmitters to define a single line in space, down the runway centerline.

In his new concept, charts would be produced illustrating not only the line of zero-difference, where the blips were superimposed like the landing system, but also a line where the pulses were received 1 μs apart, and another for 2 μs, etc. The result would be a series of lines arranged at right angles to the line between the two stations.

A single pair of such transmitters would allow the aircraft to determine on which line they were, but not their location along it.

For this purpose, a second set of lines from a separate station would be required.

Ideally, these lines would be at right angles to the first, producing a two-dimensional grid that could be printed on navigational charts.

To ease deployment, Dippy noted that the station in the centre could be used as one side of both pairs of transmitters if they were arranged like an L. Measuring the time delays of the two outlier stations relative to the centre, and then looking up those numbers on a chart, an aircraft could determine its position in space, taking a fix.

The gridded lines on the charts gave the systems its name, "Gee" for the "G" in “Grid".

As the system was now intended to offer navigation over a much wider area, the transmitters of a single station would have to be located further apart to produce the required accuracy and coverage.

The single-transmitter, multiple-antenna solution of the original proposal was no longer appropriate, especially given that the stations would be located far apart and wiring to a common point would be difficult and expensive.

Instead, Dippy described a new system using individual transmitters at each of the stations.

One of the stations would periodically send out its signal based on a timer.

The other stations would be equipped with receivers listening for the signal arriving from the control station.

When they received the signal, they would send out their own broadcasts.

This would keep all the stations in synchronization, without the need for a wire between them.

Dippy suggested building stations with a central "master" and three "secondaries" about 80 miles (130 km) away and arranged roughly 120 degrees apart, forming a large "Y" layout.

A collection of such stations was known as a chain.

The system was expected to operate over ranges around 100 miles (160 km), based on the widely held belief within the UK radio engineering establishment that the 30 MHz shortwave signals would have a relatively short range.

With this sort of range, the system would be very useful as an aid for short-range navigation to the airport, as well as helping bombers form up at an arranged location after launch.

Additionally, after flying to their cruising altitude, the bombers could use Gee fixes to calculate the winds aloft, allowing them to more accurately calculate dead reckoning fixes after the aircraft passed out of Gee range.

Experimental systems were being set up in June 1940.

By July, to everyone's delight, the system clearly was usable to at least 300 miles (480 km) at altitudes of 10,000 feet (3.0 km).

On 19 October, a fix was made at 110 miles (180 km) at 5,000 feet.

New offensive

The discovery of Gee's extended range arrived at a pivotal point in the RAF's bombing campaign. Having originally relied on day bombing, the RAF had not invested a tremendous amount of effort on the navigation skills needed for night flying.

When The Blitz night-bombing offensive started, the Germans were found to have developed a series of radio aids for this, notably the X-Gerät system.

The RAF initially pooh-poohed this approach, claiming it only demonstrated the superiority of the RAF's training.

By late 1940 a number of reports were trickling back from observers in the field, who were noting that Allied bombers did not appear to be bombing their targets.

In one instance, bombs reportedly fell over 50 mi (80 km) from their target.

For some time, these results were dismissed, but calls for an official enquiry led to the Butt report, which demonstrated only 5% of the bombs sent out on a mission landed within 5 mi (8 km) of their targets.

With these statistics, any sort of strategic campaign based on attacks against factories and similar targets was hopeless.

This led to Frederick Lindemann's notorious "dehousing" paper, which called for the bomber efforts to be used against the houses of the German citizens to break their ability to work and will to resist. This became official policy of the RAF in 1942.

While the debate raged, Bomber Command dramatically lowered their sortie rate, awaiting the rebuilding of the force with the newly arriving 4-engine "heavies" such as the Handley Page Halifax and Avro Lancaster, and the deployment of Gee.

The two, combined, would offer the accuracy and weight of bombs that Lindemann's calculations called for.

Efforts to test and deploy Gee became a high priority, and the Chain Executive Committee was set up under the chairmanship of Robert Renwick in October 1941 to site a series of Gee stations. Gee was not the only solution being developed; it was soon joined by H2S radars and the Oboe system.

Near-compromise

As the initial availability of the Gee devices would be limited, the idea of the pathfinder force was adopted.

This concept had originally been developed by the Luftwaffe for their early night raids against England. Lacking enough radio sets and the widespread training to place their radio navigation systems on all their aircraft, they collected what they had into the single group, KG100. KG100 would then use their equipment to drop flares, which acted as an aiming point for following bombers.

Eager to test the Gee system, prototype sets were used on target indicator aircraft well before the production sets were available in the number required for large raids.

On 15 May 1941, such a set provided an accurate fix at a range of 400 miles (640 km) at an altitude of 10,000 feet (3,000 m).

The first full transmitter chain was completed in July 1941, but in testing over the North Sea, the sets proved to be unreliable. This was traced to the power supplies and tubes, and corrections were designed and proved that summer.

On the night of 11/12 August, two Gee-equipped aircraft bombed using Gee coordinates only and delivered "uncanny accuracy".

However, on the next night on a raid over Hanover, a Gee-equipped Vickers Wellington was lost. The Gee set did not contain self-destruct systems, and it might have fallen into German hands. Operational testing was immediately suspended.

R. V. Jones responded by starting a disinformation campaign to hide the existence of the system. First, the use of the codename 'Gee' in communications traffic was dropped, and false communications were sent referring to a fictitious system called 'Jay'; it was hoped the similarity would cause confusion.

A double agent in the Double Cross system reported to German Intelligence a fictional story of hearing a couple of RAF personnel talking carelessly in a hotel about Jay, and one dismissing it as it was "just a copy" of the German Knickebein system. Jones felt this would flatter the Germans, who might consider the information more reliable as a result. Extra antennae were added to the Gee transmitters to radiate false, unsynchronised signals. Finally, false Knickebein signals were transmitted over Germany. Jones noted all this appealed to his penchant for practical joking.

In spite of these efforts, Jones initially calculated only 3 months would be needed before the Germans would be able to jam the system. As it turns out, jamming was not encountered until five months into the campaign, and it was much longer before it became a serious concern.

Into service

Even with limited testing, Gee proved itself to be easy to use and more than accurate enough for its tasks.

On 18 August 1941, Bomber Command ordered Gee into production at Dynatron and Cossor, with the first mass-produced sets expected to arrive in May 1942. In the meantime, a separate order for 300 hand-made sets was placed for delivery on 1 January 1942, which was later pushed back to February.

Overall, 60,000 Gee sets were manufactured during World War II, used by the RAF, USAAF, and Royal Navy.

The first operational mission using Gee took place on the night of 8/9 March 1942, when a force of about 200 aircraft attacked Essen. It was installed on a Wellington of No. 115 Squadron from RAF Watton captained by Pilot Officer Jack Foster, who later said, "targets were found and bombed as never before". Krupp, the principal target, escaped bombing, but bombs did hit the southern areas of the city. In total, 33% of the aircraft reached the target area, an enormous advance over earlier results.

The first completely successful Gee-led attack was carried out on 13/14 March 1942 against Cologne. The leading crews successfully illuminated the target with flares and incendiaries and the bombing was generally accurate. Bomber Command calculated that this attack was five times more effective than the earlier raid on the city. The success of Gee led to a change in policy, selecting 60 German cities within Gee range for mass bombing using 1,600–1,800 tons of bombs per city.

To provide coverage of the entire UK, three Gee chains were constructed under the direction of Edward Fennessy. The original chain started continuous operation on 22 June 1942, followed by a chain in Scotland later that year, and the southwest chain in 1943. Even as German jamming efforts took hold, Gee remained entirely useful as a short-range navigation system over the UK. Only 1.2% of Gee-equipped aircraft failed to return to their base, as opposed to 3.5% of those without it.

Gee was considered so important that an unserviceable Gee set would ground an aircraft.

One illustration of Gee's routine employment by Bomber Command in navigation tasks was its use (albeit a limited one) in Operation Chastise (commonly known as the "Dam Buster Raid") in May 1943.

In his memoir, Enemy Coast Ahead, Guy Gibson, the leader of the raid, briefly mentions his navigator, F/O 'Terry' Taerum, RCAF, employing what Gibson calls Taerum's "G Box" to determine groundspeed while flying very low at night over the North Sea from Britain to Holland, en route to Germany.

Upgrades

The first serious jamming was encountered on the night of 4/5 August 1942. This grew in strength as the bombers approached their target at Essen, and the signals became unusable at 10 to 20 miles (16–32 km) from the target.

The newly formed southern chain was not yet known to the Germans and continued to be useful.

On 3/4 December, a fix was made from this chain over Turin in Italy, at a range of 730 miles (1,170 km). This remained the operational record for Gee, bested only by a freak reception over Gibraltar at a range of 1,000 miles (1,600 km).

Counter-jamming efforts had already been considered, and resulted in the Gee Mk. II.

This replaced the original receiver with a new model where the oscillators could be easily removed and swapped out to provide a range of operational frequencies.

These included the original 20–30 MHz band, as well as new bands at 40–50, 50–70, and 70–90 MHz.

The navigator could replace these in flight, allowing reception from any active chain.

Gee Mk. II went into operation in February 1943, at which point it had also been selected by the US 8th Air Force.

On 23 April 1942, the go-ahead was given to develop mobile stations for Gee in preparation for the invasion of Europe. This would not only extend the range of the system eastward, but also allow stations to move and suddenly appear elsewhere if jamming became an issue.

The first of an eventual three such mobile chains was formed up on 22 November 1943.

This was put into operation on 1 May 1944 at Foggia in Italy, and was used operationally for the first time on 24 May.

Other units were sent into France soon after D-Day. The mobile units in France and Germany were later replaced by fixed stations, the "heavies".

…

German bombers also used the Gee system for attacks on the UK; captured Gee receivers provided the electronics.

http://www.radarpages.co.uk/mob/navaids/gee/gee2.htm

APPENDIX 11: GEE AMES 7000 Navigational Aids

Range Difference Systems

If two transmitters A and B in Fig. 17.2 send out a train of pulses in synchronism, but on different radio frequencies, an aircraft, or a ship, situated any-where along the line PQ, which bisects AB at right angles, will receive the pulses from A and B simultaneously.

If the receiver is at the point X:

it is apparent that it will receive the pulses from B slightly before the pulses from A.

In fact there will be a whole series of points, along the line X1 X X2 where the pulses from B will be received in advance of those from A by the same amount.

In terms of geometry the line X1 X X2 is the locus of all points that satisfy the relation:

AX - BX = constant.

This is one of the ways of defining the curve known as a hyperbola.

By assigning a series of values to the constant in the equation a family of hyperbolae is defined.

In our case we are going to measure not the differences in the distances AX and BX, but the differences in the times that wireless waves take to travel those distances.

We can now describe the hyperbolae by the equation

AX/c - BX/c = 1, 2, 3 etc. microseconds, where c = velocity of wireless waves.

The hyperbolae can be labelled 1, 2, 3 etc., microseconds and thus by measurement of the time interval between the receipt of pulses, and noting whether the A or the B pulse is received first, a navigator could find out on which hyperbola his position lay.

To enable a position fix to be obtained a third transmitter is required also transmitting pulses in synchronism with A and B and located in such a position that the two families of hyperbolae intersect. Fig. 17.3 shows a typical arrangement.

It will be appreciated, from the divergence of the hyperbolae, that the accuracy of fix will be greatest in the vicinity of the base lines and will decrease as the distance from the transmitters increases.

A very great advantage of hyperbolic navigational systems is that they cannot be saturated; there is no limit to the number of navigators who can make simultaneous use of the system.

Gee

The Gee systems was the primary radio navigational aid used during the war in Europe and proved to be an invaluable homing system. It differed from the simple arrangement already described in minor ways, all of which were designed to make the task of the aerial navigator easier.

To obviate the necessity of using different radio frequencies for each of the three transmitters and also to remove any confusion that might arise through not being sure whether the B pulse were lagging or leading the A pulse, it was arranged that the B transmitter pulses should be emitted with a 'standard' delay of 1 millisecond with respect to those from the A transmitter.

Suppose, for example, that the transmitter A and B in Fig. 17.4 were at such a distance apart that wireless waves took 500 uSec to cover the distance AR.

Then along the perpendicular bisector of AB the two pulses would be received at times separated by the standard delay of 1000 uSec;

at points nearer to B than to A the delay would be less than 1000 uSec and at points nearer to A, more than 1000 uSec and the hyperbolae could be labelled in the manner shown in the figure.

To enable the delay between the A and C pulses to be measured without confusion, the A pulse which is to be compared with the C pulse is made double.

The complete cycle of transmissions from A, the "master" station and the two "slave" stations B and C consists of a pulse from A followed by a pulse from B 1000 uSec later, followed after a further 1000 uSec by a double pulse from A and then, 1000 uSec later, by a pulse from C.

After a further 1000 uSec the sequence repeats thus taking 4000 uSec in all corresponding to 250 complete cycles per second.

The sequence is shown in Fig. 17.5. The basic pulse recurrence frequency of the master station is 500 per second.

The essential equipment in the aircraft consists, in addition to a suitable receiver, of a cathode-ray tube with a two-sweep time-base and suitable calibrating arrangements to enable the time differences to be measured precisely.

The two-sweep time-base is used so that the AB and AC pulse pairs may be separately displayed. In practice both sweeps are duplicated and arrangements are made to invert the pulses from the slave stations so that the appearance of the cathode-ray tube might be as shown in Fig. 17.6.

It is not proposed to described the "drill" for lining up the pulses and measuring the time differences. For this, the equipment handbook must be consulted.

To enable the time differences to be measured with accuracy an oscillator is provided in the aircraft which produces calibration marks on the two time-bases.

The oscillator has a frequency of 150 kc/s and provides 1 5 kc/s calibration marks on the normal display and 150 kc /s calibration marks on the expanded display which is used when making accurate measurements.

It is clear that the precision of position finding will depend entirely on the accuracy of the 150 kc /s oscillator.

It is not very practicable, and certainly would be very

expensive to carry a high precision oscillator in every aircraft and an ingenious solution was found to the problem in the following manner.

One high precision 150 kc/s oscillator is maintained at the Master (A) station.

The pulse repetition frequency is obtained by subdivision of this 150 kc/s oscillator. In the aircraft an oscillator with fairly short period stability is provided which is capable of slight frequency adjustment. This oscillator, in addition to providing the calibration marks also, by subdivision, is made to control the time-bases of the display.

If the time-bases are generated at exactly the pulse repetition frequency the pulses will appear stationary on the cathode-ray tube screen, but if the locally generated 150 kc/s oscillation is of incorrect frequency the pulses will be seen to drift either to right or left depending on whether the oscillator is fast or slow.

If the operator adjusts the oscillator so that the pulses remain stationary it must mean that the frequency is exactly 150 kc /s and measurements made in the air will have the same accuracy as they would have had if a high grade precision oscillator had been carried.

The time for ten cycles of this 150 kc/s oscillation, 66 2/3 uSsec was called a Gee unit and corresponded to a range difference of 12.4 miles (20km).

Appendix 12: GEE CHART

https://timeandnavigation.si.edu/sites/default/files/multimedia-assets/downloadable_images/20110721_0026.tif

Description

GSGS (Series) ; 4534. GSGS (Series) ; 4072. 2nd ed. "Published by War Office 1940". "G.S.G.S. No. 4524" has been crossed out. "Compiled and drawn at War Office 1940. Heliographed Ordnance Survey 1940." "Compiled and drawn at G.S.G.S.(A.M.)". "Projection. Europe (Air) conical orthomorphic (central zone)". Part of the Gordon Griffith fonds.

"Gee" Lattice Topographical Charts

Title Frankfurt, Cologne Chain: Lattice Topographical Map

Creator Subject Description GSGS (Series) ; 4534. GSGS (Series) ; 4072. 2nd ed. "Published by War Office 1940". "G.S.G.S. No. 4524" has been crossed out. "Compiled and drawn at War Office 1940. Heliographed Ordnance Survey 1940." "Compiled and drawn at G.S.G.S.(A.M.)". "Projection. Europe (Air) conical orthomorphic (central zone)". Part of the Gordon Griffith fonds.

Publisher War Office

Contributor Great Britain. War Office. General Staff. Geographical Section, Great Britain. Ordnance Survey

Date 1942 Type Topographic maps

Format map, 1:500,000

Identifier macrepo:82178, local: WW2_Lattice_500k_Frankfurt_CologneChain

Source Language eng

APPENDIX 13: 322d BOMBARDMENT GROUP (B-26, Malmedy, December 23^d, 1944 @ 15:26 H)

Constituted as 322d Bombardment Group (Medium) on 19 Jun 1942. Activated on 17 Jul 1942. Trained with B-26 aircraft.

Part of the group moved overseas, Nov-Dec 1942; planes and crews followed, Mar-Apr 1943.

Operated with Eighth AF until assignment to Ninth in Oct 1943. Served in combat, May 1943- Apr 1945, operating from England, France, and Belgium.

Began combat on 14 May when it dispatched 12 planes for a minimum-level attack on a power plant in Holland.

Sent 11 planes on a similar mission three days later: one returned early; the others, with 60 crewmen, were lost to flak and interceptors.

Trained for medium-altitude operations for several weeks and resumed combat on 17 Jul 1943.

Received a DUC for the period 14 May 1943-24 Jul 1944, during which its combat performance helped to prove the effectiveness of the medium bombers. Enemy airfields in France, Belgium, and Holland provided the principal targets from Jul 1943 through Feb 1944, but the group also attacked power stations, shipyards, construction works, marshalling yards, and other targets.

Beginning in Mar the 322d bombed railroad and highway bridges, oil tanks, and missile sites in preparation for the invasion of Normandy; on 6 Jun 1944 it hit coastal defences and gun batteries; afterward, during the Normandy campaign, it pounded fuel and ammunition dumps, bridges, and road junctions.

Supported the Allied offensive at Caen and the breakthrough at St Lo in Jul. Aided the drive of Third Army across France in Aug and Sep. Bombed bridges, road junctions, defended villages, and ordnance depots in the assault on the Siegfried Line, Oct-Dec 1944.

Flew a number of missions against railroad bridges during the Battle of the Bulge, Dec 1944-Jan 1945. Then concentrated on communications, marshalling yards, bridges, and fuel dumps until its last mission on 24 Apr 1945.

Moved to Germany in Jun 1945. Engaged in inventorying and disassembling German Air Force equipment and facilities.

Returned to the US, Nov-Dec 1945.

Inactivated on 15 Dec 1945.

Redesignated 322d Bombardment Group (Light). Allotted to the reserve. Activated on g Aug 1947. Inactivated on 27 Jun 1949.

Redesignated 322d Fighter-Day Group. Activated on I Jul1954. Assigned to Tactical Air Command. Equipped first with F-86 and later with F-100 aircraft. 27 Jun 1949.

SQUADRONS.

35th: 1947-1949.

449th 1942-1945; 1947-1949.

450th: 1942-1945; 1947-1949; I954-.

451st: 1942-1945; 1947- 1949; 1954-.

452d: 1942-1945; 1947-9949; I954-.

STATIONS.

MacDill Field, Fla, 17 Jul 1942;

Drane Field, Fla, 22 SepNov 1942;

Rougham, England, c. I Dec 1942;

Great Saling, England, Jan 1943;

Beauvais/Tille, France, Sep 14;

Le Culot, Belgium, Mar 1945;

Fritzlar, Germany, Jun-Sep 1945;

Camp Kilmer, NJ, c. 14-15 Dec 1945.

Reading AAFld, Pa, g Aug 1947-27 Jun 1949.

Foster AFB, Tex, I Jul 1954-.

COMMANDERS.

Lt Col Jacob J Brogger, c. 8 Aug 1942;

Col Robert R Selway Jr, c. 21 Oct 1942;

Lt Col John F Batjer, c. 22 Feb 1943;

Lt Col Robert M Stillman, c. 17 Mar 1943;

Col Glenn C Nye, c. 19 May 1943;

Col John S Samuel, Jul 1944;

Maj John L Egan, c. 12 Jul 1945-unkn.

Col Carlos M Talbott, I Jul 1954-.

CAMPAIGNS. Air Offensive, Europe ; Normandy; Northern France; Rhineland; Ardennes-Alsace ; Central Europe.

DECORATIONS. Distinguished Unit Citation: ETO, 14 May 1943-24 Ju1944.

INSIGNE. Shield: Tierce per fess azure and or, five piles, three conjoined between two transposed counterchanged.

Motto: RECTO FACIENDO NEMINEM TIMEO

I Fear None in Doing Right. (Approved 9 Jan 1943.)

APPENDIX 14: 458th BOMBARDMENT GROUP (B-24, Malmedy, December 24^th, 1944 @14:36 H)

Constituted as 458th Bombardment Group (Heavy) on 19 May 1943.

Activated on 1 Jul 1943.

Prepared for combat with B-24’s.

Moved to England, Jan-Feb 1944, and assigned to Eighth AF.

Flew diversionary missions on 24 and 25 Feb 194 to draw enemy fighters from German targets being attacked by other AAF bombers.

Began bombardment on 2 Mar 1944, and afterward operated primarily against strategic objectives in Germany. Hit such targets as the industrial area of Saarbrucken, oil refineries at Hamburg, an airfield at Brunswick, aircraft factories at Oschersleben, a fuel depot at Dulmen, a canal at Minden, aircraft works at Brandenburg, marshalling yards at Hamm, and an aircraft engine plant at Magdeburg. Carried out some interdictory and support operations in addition to the strategic missions. Helped to prepare for the invasion of Normandy by striking gun batteries, V-weapon sites, and airfields in France; hit coastal defences in support of the assault on 6 Jun 1944; afterward, bombed bridges and highways to prevent the movement of enemy materiel to the beachhead. Attacked enemy troops to aid the Allied breakthrough at St Lo in Jul.

Ceased bombardment during Sep 1944 to haul gasoline to airfields in France.

Struck transportation lines during the Battle of the Bulge, Dec 194-Jan 1945.

Attacked enemy airfields to assist the Allied assault across the Rhine in Mar 1945.

Flew last combat mission on 25 Apr 1945.

Returned to the US, Jun-Jul 1945.

Redesignated 458th Bombardment Group (Very Heavy) in Aug 1945.

Trained with B-29’s.

Inactivated on 17 Oct 1945.

SQUADRONS.

752d: 1943-1945.

753d: 1943-1945-

754h : 1943-1945-

755th: 1943-1945.

STATIONS. Wendover Field, Utah, I Jul 1943;

Gowen Field, Idaho, 28 Jul 1943;

Kearns, Utah, 11 Sep 1943;

Wendover Field, Utah, 15 Sep 1943;

Tonopah AAFld, Nev, 31 Oct-29 Dec 1943;

Horsham St Faith, England, Jan 1944-14 Jun 1945;

Sioux Falls AAFld, SD, 12 Jul 1945;

Walker AAFld, Kan, 25 Jul 1945;

March Field, Calif, 21 Aug-17 Oct 1945.

COMMANDERS.

Lt Col Robert F Hardy, 28 Jul 1943;

Col James H Isbell, 16 Dec 1943;

Col Allen F Herzberg, 10 Mar 1945;

Capt Patrick Hays, 13 Aug 1945;

Maj Bernard Carlos, 17 Aug 1945;

Maj V R Woodward, 22 Aug 1945;

Lt Col Wilmer C Hardesty, 3 Sep-17 Oct 1945.

CAMPAIGNS. Air Offensive, Europe; Normandy; Northern France; Rhineland; Ardennes-Alsace; Central Europe.

DECORATIONS. None.

INSIGNE. None.

APPENDIX 15: 387th BOMBARDMENT GROUP (B-26, Malmedy, December 25^th, 1944 @ 16:00 H)

Constituted as 387th Bombardment Group (Medium) on 25 Nov 1942.

Activated on 1 Dec 1942.

Trained with B-26 aircraft. Moved to England in Jun 1943.

Served with Eighth AF until assigned to Ninth in Oct 1943.

Began combat in Aug 1943 and concentrated its attacks on airdromes during the first months of operations. Made numerous strikes on V-weapon sites in France in the winter of 1943-1944.

Hit airfields at Leeuwarden and Venlo during Big Week, 20-25 Feb 1944, the intensive campaign against the German Air Force and aircraft industry.

Helped to prepare for the invasion of Normandy by attacking coastal batteries and bridges in France during May 1944.

Bombed along the invasion coast on 6 Jun 1944 and supported ground forces throughout the month by raiding railroads, bridges, road junctions, defended areas, and fuel dumps. Moved to the Continent in June 1944 and participated in attacks on the enemy at St Lo in the latter part of the month and on German forces at Brest during Aug and Sep. Extended operations into Germany by fall of 1944.

Received a DUC for action during the Battle of the Bulge when the group hit strongly defended transportation and communications targets at Mayen and Prum.

Supported the Allied drive into the Reich by attacking bridges, communications centres, marshalling yards, storage installations, and other objectives.

Ended combat operations in Apr 1945, Returned to the US in Nov. Inactivated on 17 Nov 1945.

SQUADRONS.

556th: 1942-1945.

557th.’ 1942-1945.

558th: 1942-1945.

559th: 1942-1945-

STATIONS. MacDill Field, Flay I Dec 1942;

Drane Field, Fla, 12 Apr 1943;

Godman Field, Ky, c. 11 May-10 Jun 1943;

Chipping Ongar, England, 25 Tun 1943;

Stony Cross, England, 18 Jul 1944;

Maupertuis, France, 22 Aug 1944;

Chateaudun, France, 18 Sep 1944;

Clastres, France, 30 Oct 1944;

Beek, Holland, 29 Apr 1945;

Rosieres-en-Santerre, France, 24 May-c. Nov 1945;

Camp Kilmer, NJ, 14-17 Nov 1945-

COMMANDERS.

Maj David S Blackwell, 20 Dec 1942;

Col Carl R Storrie, c. 19 Jan 1943;

Col. Jack E Caldwell, 8 NOV 1943

Col T'homas M Seymour, 13 Apr 1944;

Col Grover C Brown, C. 18 Jul 1944;

Lt Col Richard R Stewart, 20 May 1945;

Col Philip A Sykes, Jun 1945-unkn.

CAMPAIGNS. Air Offensive, Europe;Normandy; Northern France; Rhineland;Ardennes-Alsace; Central Europe.

DECORATIONS. Distinguished Unit Citation: Germany, 23 Dec 1944.

INSIGNE. None.

APPENDIX 16: Bomb Group Combat Formations

Aircrafts number:

TYPE	Wing	Group	Squadron	Box	Flight
B-26 Medium	144	48	12	18	6
B-17 Heavy	108	36	12	12

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